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About That White House Memo on IRAs

Just when ERISA watchers were ready to assume that the Department of Labor would not reissue its 2010 proposal on prohibited IRA transactions before time expires on the Obama administration, a leaked White House memo—or fragment of one—raised expectations that a re-proposal might emerge very soon.

“I think it’s fair to say that the DOL now has the support of the White House on the fiduciary re-proposal,” ERISA lawyer Fred Reish told RIJ this week. “Regardless of anyone’s views on the merits of the rule, I believe this means that we will have the proposal in short order.” 

Printed on White House letterhead and written by economists Jason Furman and Betsey Stevenson of the president’s Council of Economic Advisors, the memo “lays out evidence that consumer protections in the retail [IRA] and small [401k] plan markets are inadequate and the current regulatory environment creates perverse incentives that ultimately cost savers billions of dollars a year.”

The financial services industry was said to be “apoplectic” about the memo. Possibly irritated by the memo’s use of freighted words like “perverse” and “churn,” one industry executive responded publicly and in kind. “The ignorance in the memo is shocking to me,” said Adam Antoniades, chairman of the Financial Services Institute and president of Cetera Financial Group, according to a report in ThinkAdvisor. “For those who spend their lives in the industry, it is frankly offensive.”

The memo, published in The Hill, doesn’t include any fresh details about the anticipated DoL re-proposal, however. Instead, it “provid[es] background on the potential Conflict of Interest Rule for Retirement Savings.” The seven pages that were leaked included estimates of the alleged cost to savers of current distribution practices, as well as summaries of efforts by other countries to regulate conflicts of interest in retail financial services.  

ERISA law is byzantine, but the crux of this issue seems to involve “exemptions from prohibited transactions.” Nine years ago, for instance, the DoL’s Employee Benefit Securities Administration (EBSA) published Advisory Opinion 2005-23A, which said “No” to the question: “Would an advisor who is not otherwise a plan fiduciary and who recommends that a participant withdraw funds from the plan and invest the funds in an IRA engage in a prohibited transaction if the advisor will earn management or other investment fees related to the IRA?”

In 2010, following the 2008 switch to a Democratic from a Republican administration, EBSA issued a new proposal that would reverse at least part of 2005-23A, so that the answer to the question above would be or might be “Yes.” There’s a lot more to the proposal, but that’s one of the sensitive points. Changing “No” to “Yes” might keep some brokers from executing transactions in the retail IRA business.  

Today, that’s a humungous business—and one that nobody foresaw or intended and whose governance was not well thought-out. As 401(k) participants change jobs and retire, many of them move money to rollover IRAs at broker-dealers or to fund companies like Vanguard, Fidelity, or Schwab, or to discount brokers like E*Trade, or TD Ameritrade. Over time, some $6 trillion in 401(k) assets has rolled over to IRAs. Competition for even a small a piece of that giant pie is intense.

But the Obama administration, and specifically EBSA chief Phyllis Borzi, sees those tax-deferred accounts as moving from a safe (think: convent) to a dangerous (think: casino) environment when they go from a highly regulated 401(k) to a loosely regulated retail IRA. They lose the fiduciary standard of conduct and the low fees of 401(k) plans. They can be steered into investments or uses that, in EBSA’s view, are too expensive or too risky for retirement accounts.     

The nuances of the proposal, like other pension regulations, are subtle and the language tends to loop around in mind-numbing double-negatives (“Exemption from prohibited” means permissible). But the big picture may be simple: The financial services industry recognizes a bonanza in that $6 trillion IRA rollover market and the government—or rather, members of the Obama administration—want to make it less of a bonanza by banning conflicted transactions when tax-deferred money is involved.

Is abuse of the advisor/broker ambiguity the exception or the rule? Reasonable people strenuously disagree. The securities industry, I believe, fails to understand that, because of tax deferral, the government has a reasonable obligation to make sure that rollover IRA money receives more conservative handling than other retail money. The government, I think, fails to understand the web of incentives that drive the investment industry, and the difficulty of distinguishing the perverse from the benign. For instance, many (but not all) of the firms or people who go into the arduous, low-return retirement plan business do so in anticipation of much their real profits when the money rolls over to retail IRAs. One person’s conflict of interest is another person’s synergy.

The leaked memo could be a red herring. Lots of position papers circulate in the White House. This might be just one of many straws in the wind. A senior financial services executive told RIJ, “We’ve been told that this was a leaked memo that was for internal purposes only, therefore it does not represent the current position of the White House.”

Even if the re-proposal were submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review tomorrow, it would still have a long row to hoe. “Once it’s there, it could take anywhere from weeks to three months (or even more) to get cleared and published in the federal register,” Reish told RIJ. “That will start a comment period of anywhere from 30 to 60 days. My suspicion is that it will be on the lower end of that since this thing has already been commented on twice before and… the comments will be similar on both sides.  Then the DOL will go to work on a final regulation. I suspect the final will go to the OMB before the end of the year, [with] a final regulation in place by summer of 2016.”

© 2015 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

New issue of The Journal of Retirement published

The Winter 2015 issue of The Journal of Retirement, edited by Sandy Mackenzie and filled with articles by academics and professionals who are well-known in retirement industry circles, has just been published by Institutional Investor Journals.

This quarter’s edition includes the following articles.

  • Editor’s Letter, by George A. (Sandy) Mackenzie
  • “Social Security Costs in the Larger Context of Retirement Savings,” by Sylvester Schieber
  • “Why Retirees Claim Social Security at 62 and How It Affects Their Retirement Income: Evidence from the Health and Retirement Study,” by Mark M. Glickman and Sharon Hermes
  • “Backtested Pension Math: An Empirical Look at the Causes of CALPERS Underfunding,” by Michael J. Sabin
  • “Retiree Health Insurance and the Retirement Plans of College and University Faculty,” by Robert L. Clark 
  • “The Risk Profiles of 401(k) Accounts,” by Ganlin Xu
  • “Tail-Risk Management for Retirement Investments,” by Vineer Bansali
  • “Better Outcomes from Defined Contribution Plans,” by Jodi Strakosch and Melissa Kahn
  • “It Is Time to Revisit Public Policy and Options for Older-Worker Employment,” by Anna Rappaport

© 2015 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

O’Brien retires; NAFA looks for new chief

Kim O’Brien has retired from her position as president and CEO of the National Association for Fixed Annuities (NAFA), effective January 16, 2015, the organization announced this week. During the board of directors’ search for an executive director, Janet Terpening, Director of Operations, will take over the duties being vacated by Ms. O’Brien, according to NAFA.

The retirement became effective on the day that NAFA had said it would present a letter signed by O’Brien to the Treasury Department requesting qualified longevity annuity contract status for fixed indexed annuities. A day earlier, RIJ published an editorial that examined the argument made in the letter. Asked in an email if these events were coincidental, a NAFA spokesman responded, “Absolutely.”

A NAFA release said:

“An ardent advocate for fixed annuities with 10 years at the helm of NAFA, Ms. O’Brien dedicated a large portion of her career to the fixed annuity industry. O’Brien played a key role in leading the membership of NAFA in promoting fixed annuities in her work with legislators and key members on Capitol Hill. 

“NAFA will continue its mission and dedication to promoting the awareness and understanding of fixed annuities and their benefits to consumers. NAFA is well-positioned for significant growth, due in part to Kim’s vision and leadership. We are confident Kim’s successor will have all the tools, staff, and resources needed to exceed NAFA’s goals in the future,” said S. Christopher Johnson, Chairman of the Board of Directors.”

© 2015 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Ultimate Income Strategy

With a title like, “The Only Spending Rule Article You Will Ever Need,” a new piece in the latest issue of the Financial Analysts Journal sure sounds like required reading for advisors who specialize in retirement income planning. And, despite the obvious hyperbole of the headline, it probably should be. 

But here’s a spoiler alert. The article starts out by proposing an annually-adjusted systematic withdrawal program from a diversified portfolio as the best possible retirement income generator for someone who holds risky assets. But about halfway through, the authors change direction and semi-endorse a strategy that combines risky assets and deferred income annuities. 

Let’s look at those two income strategies—which complement rather than contradict each other in this alternately wonkish and jocular article by former Barclays Global Investors strategist M. Barton Waring and Laurence B. Siegel of the CFA Institute Research Foundation—one at a time.

A new financial acronym

Waring (right) and Siegel primarily favor a drawdown principle that they call “periodic re-annuitization,” which they’ve been fine-tuning for several years. It involves an algebraic, easily spreadsheetable formula for adjusting clients’ spending levels each year in retirement to account for changes in interest rates, account levels and life expectancy.

“We call a portfolio managed according to this principle an annually recalculated virtual annuity (ARVA)—‘virtual’ because the investor does not have to buy an actual annuity to reap many of the benefits of annuity thinking, even if she continues to hold a portfolio of risky assets,” they write. M. Barton Waring

They reject the classic inflation-adjusted “safe” spending rate of 4% because it uses the initial account value to calculate annual income and doesn’t offer enough longevity risk protection. They also reject attempts at “smoothing”—using one year’s surplus gains to offset another year’s losses—as a way of keeping retirement income spending level from year to year, because they don’t trust the principle of reversion to the mean. And they nix the idea of taking on more risk (and assuming a higher rate of return) in order to justify an unsustainably high drawdown rate.

Instead, they insist that if you’re going to invest in something riskier than Treasury Inflation Protected bonds (TIPS) in retirement, and you want to rule out the possibility of running out of money within a specific interval (in their example, 30 years), you have no choice but to accept a retirement income that fluctuates with the markets.     

“Many would like to have their aggressive risky asset portfolio ‘cake’ and eat it smoothly too, as the old saying (almost) goes, holding lots of equities and other risky assets. But—this is a reality check—the ‘tough love’ lesson of this article is worth repeating: consumption volatility directly follows from investment and discount rate volatility and is what risk is.”

A capstone of longevity insurance

Having said all that, Waring and Siegel concede that the ARVA method has a shortcoming: it relies on an assumed life expectancy (of 30 years, in their example) rather than the uncertain life expectancy that all of us face. So they take several pages to consider the benefits of using some kind of annuity as a source of or supplement to income from a portfolio of risky assets.

After considering various types of annuities—single premium immediate income (SPIA), deferred income (DIA), deferred variable (VA) and fixed index (FIA) with income riders, and ruin-contingent (RCLA)—they seem to settle on a hybrid strategy. That is, a combination of the ARVA method for the early and middle years of your retirement and a deferred income annuity for the years that you may not live to see and which are prohibitively expensive to save for. Laurence Siegel

“The appeal of the plan is that it is much less expensive than self-insurance to a very old age and enables the individual to focus on the earlier part of retirement, when he believes he is most likely to be alive and healthy enough to engage in discretionary consumption—instead of giving up when faced with the prospect of savings for a 45-year retirement. By making the final years of life (should they occur) the insurance company’s problem, the plan makes retirement investing feel more manageable.”

“I would give the TIPS-DIA strategy two and a half cheers and I am actually planning to invest that way,” Siegel (right) told RIJ in an email. “Barton would give it one-and-a-half cheers due to his concern about [insurance company] default risk. I think the gains from mortality risk pooling are much greater than the loss in expected utility from possible default. At any rate, I’ve only saved enough to last for 20 years so I need the strategy!”

An echo of a bestseller

Waring and Siegel have studied various retirement income strategies and published articles about them for several years. Waring is the former chief investment officer of Barclays Global Investors. Siegel is director of research at the CFA Institute Research Foundation. Siegel said that while the title of their article may echo the title of the 1978 bestseller, “The Only Investment Guide You’ll Ever Need,” by Andrew Tobias, which became a classic and has been reprinted many times, the resemblance was coincidental. 

© 2015 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.    

Should Undersaved Americans Work Longer?

Alicia Munnell, the nation’s leading retirement policy economist, and colleagues (Charles D. Ellis, a financial planner and Andrew Eschtruth, a research economist) at the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, which Munnell directs, have written an elegant, short, and nearly definitive book on the retirement crisis facing Americans today.

Their ambitious goals are to describe the problem of retirement unpreparedness, to explain how we reached this crisis, and to suggest ways for individuals and the government to solve it. They mostly succeed—but after delivering sharp, accurate blows to the system’s weaknesses, I think they misfire on some of the policy recommendations. 

For instance, they encourage workers to keep working into their late 60s and 70s and call for government action to raise the Social Security early retirement age from 62 to 64. This set of policy recommendations ignores three major facts: involuntary retirement, inadequate labor demand, and older workers’ falling bargaining power. 

Involuntary retirement is a very real phenomenon. First, most workers retire before they want to. They are fired or laid off or have to quit because of poor health. Second, the labor market doesn’t fully employ prime age adults. Third, the incidence of long-term unemployment increasingly singles out older workers, who are also losing pensions. These latter two facts together weaken the bargaining power of older workers, and create conditions for low-quality jobs and low wages. Ultimately, these low-quality, low-wage jobs hasten death and worsen inequality in rates of illness, injury and reduced longevity.

The challenge and its solutions

The problem, as Munnell, Ellis and Eschtruth describe it, is that the financial crisis, along with the erosion of traditional pensions, rising Medicare premium costs, and the slow decline in Social Security benefits (as a share of career average preretirement earnings) placed half of near-retirees (over age 55) in 2013 at high risk of having inadequate old-age income. “Inadequate,” in this case, is defined as having too little savings to generate an income that replaces 70% of their annual pre-retirement earnings.

They go on to explain, accurately, that the biggest cause for retirement unpreparedness is the drop-off in employer-based sources of retirement income. Less than half of employers offer a 401(k) or any other type of tax-deferred savings plan. The workers near retirement who are lucky enough to have 401(k)s and IRAs have saved a median amount of just $111,000 (2013), which would yield only about $400 per month.

While I agree with these authors on the problem and its causes, I agree with only some of their solutions. Munnell, Ellis, and Eschtruth recommend shoring up Social Security by using general revenues instead of payroll taxes. Given the lack of retirement readiness, they say that we should fix the Social Security deficit by raising revenues progressively, not by cutting benefits. They also want all 401(k) plans to use auto-enrollment (though studies show that firms adopting auto-enrollment tend to reduce contributions). The authors recommend improving the tax expenditures for retirement plans by replacing the current deduction for retirement saving with a credit. Those recommendations make a lot of sense.

But the authors also want the early retirement age to increase from 62 to 64, and, as I said earlier, I don’t agree with that. They call for the government to “vigorously promote work at older age” because even a part time, minimum wage job yielding $800 per month is likely to prevent severely low incomes. You might advise a healthy working older person to work longer if he or she doesn’t have a pension; but advice to individuals doesn’t necessarily serve as good public policy. Working longer may solve the retirement income problem for some people, but promoting new ways to save for retirement will have a much broader impact. 

A lack of bargaining power

Tens of millions of older workers will have an average real annual Social Security benefit of only $15,000 per year and an income of just $2,400 from IRAs and 401(k) plans—amounts that barely meet the federal poverty standard (a standard that ensures a chronic state of want and deprivation). Because having low retirement benefits weakens older workers’ bargaining power, they will find it more difficult to quit a job or garner decent pay or working conditions. Increasing numbers of older people will have to take low wage jobs with poorer working conditions than they want.

I’m not against the idea of older people working. Some people derive their identities from their jobs and welcome the society and structure of paid work. Laudably, the United States is among the few rich countries that ban mandatory retirement. But policies that promote work should be paired with public policies that protect older workers. Raising the minimum wage, extending the protections in the Americans with Disabilities Act (I credit Sara Rix at the AARP for her efforts in that direction), and pro-union policies in service and retail jobs would all help older workers

I also worry that the authors have not acknowledged the growing inequality of mortality. Brookings Institution economists Barry Bosworth and Kathleen Burke have confirmed Social Security economist Hilary Waldron’s findings that class-based longevity gaps are growing.

The average life expectancy today for 55-year-old men in the lowest income decile is 79.2 years. For those in the top decile (both men and women), it is 89.3 years. Men in the bottom decile who were born in 1920 can expect to collect benefits for 16.6 years, while men in the top 10% are expected to collect for 20.7 years.

For men born in 1940, the gap is even greater. Those near the bottom of the income spectrum will collect benefits for 18.2 years, on average; those at the top for 26.4 years. Cutting benefits for those who now retire before age 64 would disproportionately adversely affect those with shorter life spans.

A valuable book

That said, I think Falling Short is an important book. It succinctly identifies the retirement readiness crisis, pinpoints its causes and suggests comprehensive and imaginative solutions. (I read it in just two sittings.) The writing reflects Munnell’s, pithy, inimitable style, as in sequences like this on page 16: “That’s it: work longer, fix Social Security, save more through 401(k)s, and consider using home equity. These steps are all doable, and they should all seem familiar.”

And I agree with many of the authors’ positions: that most people need prearranged savings mechanisms in order to save successfully; that retirees need both longevity insurance and private savings; and that if we are going to give out over $120 billion in tax incentives for retirement savings, the 401(k) system has to work better. 

In the next-to-last sentence of the book, the authors mention that incremental change may not solve America’s retirement crisis. I agree with that too, but instead of raising the retirement age, I recommend (in my books and academic papers) increasing private wealth through a system of universal retirement savings accounts—guaranteed, privately managed, cash balance-type accounts on top of Social Security.

Teresa Ghilarducci is a labor economist and director of the Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis at the New School in New York City. She is the author of When I’m 64: The Plot Against Pensions and the Plan to Save Them (Princeton University Press, 2008).

Extend RMD Relief to Indexed Annuities

Since deferred income annuities (DIAs) do not have account balances, the regulatory relief from required minimum distributions (RMDs) that the Treasury Department provided for these products in 2014 was necessary. It allowed DIA contracts with start dates after age 70½ to be used in a qualified environment. The justification for the relief, however, was not technical. Treasury granted the relief because it perceived the value of allowing Americans to gain longevity risk protection by using qualified assets to pre-purchase income that begins after age 70½. 

So, if there are other products that can provide the same type of protection as well or better than DIAs can, shouldn’t they benefit from the same regulatory relief? Wouldn’t that allow consumers to choose the product that best fits their needs?

Today DIAs and FIAs with withdrawal benefit riders both are reasonable options for purchasing deferred income. In some cases, an FIA can provide as much or more guaranteed income than a DIA for the same premium payment. Some FIA income riders provide a specific roll-up rate and a payout percentage, so that the income amount for any age can be determined with certainty (allowing a clear comparison between the two product types). Other FIA products can provide an even higher guaranteed income floor, depending on the performance of the equity indices to which they are exposed.

There are other differences between these products, which may make one preferable to the other. While both will allow life and joint life payouts, DIAs are likely to have more payout options (life-with-period-certain, for example). DIAs can generally be built with inflation riders, while few FIA withdrawal benefit riders have an inflation option.

On the other hand, FIA withdrawal benefit riders have more flexibility in the choice of start date, because income can generally be turned on at any time. Such flexibility can be valuable to retirees who don’t know exactly when they will need to start the income.

Because FIAs do have an account balance, it is true that RMDs can be taken from a FIA, starting at age 70½. But doing so would reduce income payments when the withdrawal benefit rider is turned on. If the goal is to give consumers the option to buy delayed income that begins at age 80 or 85, requiring RMDs from the FIA only reduces the later income payments and defeats the objective of deferred income.  

There don’t appear to be any major obstacles to providing RMD relief to FIAs. The existing rules could be applied:

  • Using the same premium limits that apply to DIAs (the lesser of $125,000 or 25% of qualified savings)
  • Using the same age limit for the income start date (85)
  • Allowing only the portion of qualified savings in the FIA to be exempt from the RMD requirements
  • Requiring that the FIA income distributions not be aggregated with other required distributions

Other limits might be placed on the product design of qualifying FIAs. It may be appropriate to limit the relief to FIAs with withdrawal benefit riders. To deal with the trickiest aspect of relief—the possibility that a contract owner might take withdrawals without annuitizing or using the withdrawal benefit rider—the relief might need to include some schedule of required distributions or a penalty for this contingency.  

I applaud the new Treasury regulations that provide RMD relief to DIAs. Deferred income annuities are an important retirement income planning tool. They mitigate longevity risk and can help ensure that retirees remain financially independent. The rules also recognize that, for many Americans, the assets needed to purchase these products will have to come from their 401(k)s, IRAs and other tax-advantaged plans. Extending this relief to similar products would provide a level playing field that encourages competition, better serves the public, and potentially expands the pool of consumers interested in these types of solutions. 

David A. Littell, JD, ChFC, CFP, is professor of taxation, Boettner Chair in Research, The American College New York Life Center for Retirement Income.

© 2015 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

S&P Ratings to pay $77 million to settle SEC and state violations

Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services violated federal securities law through fraudulent misconduct in its ratings of certain commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), the Securities and Exchange Commission announced this week.

To settle the charges, S&P agreed to pay the federal government more than $58 million. The firm will also pay $12 million to the New York Attorney General’s office and $7 million to the Massachusetts Attorney General’s office, to settle parallel charges.

The SEC issued three orders instituting settled administrative proceedings against S&P: 

  • One order involved S&P’s practices in its “conduit fusion CMBS ratings” methodology.” S&P said it was using one approach when it actually used another in 2011 to rate six conduit fusion CMBS transactions and issue preliminary ratings on two others. S&P made some admissions, and agreed in 2011 not to rate conduit fusion CMBS for a year.
  • Another SEC order found that after being frozen out of the market for rating conduit fusion CMBS in late 2011, S&P sought to re-enter the in mid-2012 by overhauling its ratings criteria. To illustrate the relative conservatism of its new rating criteria, S&P falsely tried to show that “its new credit enhancement levels could withstand Great Depression-era levels of economic stress” by publishing a misleading study. The original author of the study had objected that the firm’s CMBS group had turned the article into a “sales pitch” for the new criteria, and that the removal of certain information from the article could lead to him “sit[ting] in front of [the] Department of Justice or the SEC.”  Without admitting or denying the accusation, S&P agreed to publicly retract the false and misleading Great Depression-related study and correct the descriptions in the publication about its criteria.
  • A third SEC order involved internal controls failures in S&P’s surveillance of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) ratings. The order finds that S&P allowed breakdowns in the way it conducted ratings surveillance of previously-rated RMBS from October 2012 to June 2014. S&P changed an important assumption in a way that made S&P’s ratings less conservative, and was inconsistent with the specific assumptions set forth in S&P’s published criteria describing its ratings methodology.  S&P did not follow its internal policies for making changes to its surveillance criteria and instead applied ad hoc workarounds that were not fully disclosed to investors. 

Without admitting or denying the findings in the order, S&P agreed to improve its internal controls environment.  S&P self-reported this particular misconduct to the SEC and cooperated with the investigation, enabling the Enforcement Division to resolve the case more quickly and efficiently and resulting in a reduced penalty for the firm.

In a separate order instituting a litigated administrative proceeding, the SEC Enforcement Division alleges that the former head of S&P’s CMBS Group fraudulently misrepresented the manner in which the firm calculated a critical aspect of certain CMBS ratings in 2011. Barbara Duka allegedly instituted the shift to more issuer-friendly ratings criteria, and the firm failed to properly disclose the less rigorous methodology.  The matter against Duka will be scheduled for a public hearing before an administrative law judge for proceedings to adjudicate the Enforcement Division’s allegations and determine what, if any, remedial actions are appropriate.

© 2015 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

End of forced annuitization creates product vacuum in UK

With only three months to go before annuitization becomes optional for retirees from British defined contribution (DC) plans, European asset managers are thinking a lot about affordable products that might help retirees tap their savings, according to Cerulli Associates’ European Defined Contribution Markets 2014 report. 

But they haven’t gotten very far in developing those products. “Widely accessible drawdown or equity income strategies are still a ‘work in progress’ for Europe’s investment managers,” a Cerulli release said.

A 2013 ruling by the Chancellor of the Exchequer ended the UK’s policy of requiring most DC participants to annuitize any unspent tax-deferred savings by age 75, effective this spring. Most people bought their annuities from the “preferred provider” chosen by their DC plan providers, rather than shop for more competitively priced contracts in annuity exchanges.

That ruling has triggered a big drop in the percentage of asset managers who say their plans will offer period-certain or life annuities from preferred providers in the future. Only 8.3% of managers surveyed intended to do so. About one in five managers said their plans offer those types of annuities today.

The Cerulli report covered the opinions of DC asset managers with combined pension assets of more than $1.4 trillion. “Affordable drawdown products” was their biggest concern. Cerulli surveyed the managers in September 2014. 

The end of forced annuitization doesn’t mean that retirees will stop buying annuities entirely, said Cerulli’s European research director, Barbara Wall. “This is a notable decline, but the annuity is far from dead,” she said in the release.

“Many retirees in the United Kingdom and on the Continent will still want some certainty of income. For many that will make annuitization attractive. Swiss retirees do not have to annuitize, for example, but most still choose to do so.”

Optional annuitization is also being discussed in the Netherlands. “Continental asset managers will be eyeing the whiteboards of their UK rivals when it comes to retirement phase products,” the Cerulli release said.

© 2015 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Pershing to roll out enhanced DC platform for plan distributors

Hoping to attract broker-dealers, investment advisors and registered investment advisors (RIAs) who want to expand their defined contribution retirement plan business, Pershing LLC, a unit of BNY Mellon, says it will roll out a new Retirement Plan Network solution during the first quarter of 2015.

The Retirement Plan Network is “an open-architecture platform that allows advisors to connect to independent recordkeepers, hold assets in custody, and to leverage an integrated suite of investment products, retirement plan tools and practice management solutions,” according to a Pershing release.  

The opportunity for growth in the DC business is significant, Pershing noted. Currently at about $6.6 trillion, DC assets are expected to increase by five to six percent per year through 2019, Pershing said. Rollover IRA assets are expected to exceed $11.5 trillion by the end of the decade, as investors change jobs or retire and roll money out of DC plans.

The Retirement Plan Network is intended to give advisors access to: 

  • Independent recordkeepers, including Allen, Gibbs & Houlik, L.C.; Aspire Financial Service; Benefit Consultants Group; DailyAccess Corporation; July Business Services; and Sentinel Benefits & Financial Group.  
  • A variety of managed investment models featuring mutual funds, stable value funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs).
  • Tools and solutions that can be used to create proposals, view plan investments, conduct investment reviews, facilitate IRA rollovers, select recordkeepers and access plan sponsor and participant education materials.

© 2015 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

In one lifetime, median U.S. age will jump from 28 years to 42

The president and the 114th Congress should focus in the next two years on addressing the needs of an America whose average age continues to rise, according to a call-to-action from the 18,000-member American Academy of Actuaries.

“A concerted national strategy on policies to support systems such as retirement security and lifetime income, health care and long-term care for the elderly, and public programs such as Social Security and Medicare, is long overdue,” the organization said in a recent release. 

 “The demographic transition of proportionately greater numbers of Americans entering retirement, coupled with increased longevity, or life expectancies… will compound the fiscal challenges to both private systems and public programs in the years to come,” the release said.

The U.S. median age in 2015 will be 37.8, up from 28.1 in 1970, and will rise to 42 in 2045, the actuarial organization said, citing U.S. Census Bureau estimates.

To address the needs created by an aging population, the administration and Congress should:

  • Address solvency concerns of key public programs like Social Security and Medicare to ensure that they are sustainable in light of changing demographics. The Academy also urges action to allow the disability trust fund to continue to pay full scheduled disability benefits during and beyond 2016.
  • Evaluate and address the risk of retirement-income systems not providing expected income into old age, especially in light of increasing longevity. The Academy’s Retirement for the AGES initiative provides a framework for evaluating both private and public retirement systems, as well as public policy proposals.
  • Encourage the use of lifetime-income solutions for people living longer in retirement. The Academy’s Lifetime Income initiative supports more widespread use of lifetime-income options.
  • Improve the governance and disclosures regarding the measurements of the value of public-sector (state/municipal) employee pension plans. The Academy’s Public Pension Plans Actuarial E-Guide provides information on the nature of the risks and the complex issues surrounding these plans.
  • Evaluate the relative health level of older Americans and those with disabilities, and assess the ability of Medicare and other public and private programs to meet those needs. The Academy is conducting an examination of the drivers of health care costs; Medicare, Medicaid, and private-sector payment and delivery system reform; quality of care metrics; and other issues through its Health Care Cost/Quality of Care initiative.
  • Explore solutions to provide for affordable long-term care financing, and address caregiver needs and concerns through public and/or private programs.
  • Address the impact of delayed retirement, either voluntary or through future retirement age changes, on benefit programs, as well as the needs it may create with increased demand for early retirement hardship considerations and disability income programs.

© 2015 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Let’s Concentrate on Recordkeeping

Two days before last Christmas, New York Life became the latest big service provider to quit the world of defined contribution recordkeeping, when it sold its 401(k) plan services business (1,400 plans, $42 billion in assets in 2013) to ManuLife’s John Hancock division for an undisclosed sum.

The pace of consolidation in the DC business, which tends to run in cycles, has accelerated lately. In April 2014, mega-bank JP Morgan decided to sell its retirement plan services business (856 plans, $171 billion in assets) to Great-West Financial. Overall, there were 13 major industry moves last year, according to Fred Barstein of NAPA.Net.

Declining profits drive some companies to sell, while a quest for scale drives others to buy. But observers cite other factors, some familiar and some new: Litigation and regulation, technology expenses, the rise of indexing and target date funds, the “commoditization” of recordkeeping and the undertow of Boomer savings from 401(k) s to IRAs.  

“Recordkeeping seems to go through these waves of consolidation every 10 to 12 years,” said long-time retirement industry watcher Nevin Adams of NAPA.Net. “Each time, everybody says, ‘This is it; one more wave and we’ll be down to a handful of large, national providers.’ Then things quiet down, time passes and we repeat the process.”

The immediate impact is that a concentrated industry—a mere 20 providers administer almost 90% of America’s DC savings—is likely to get more concentrated. In the long run, some predict—and hope—that we’re headed toward a new, more transparent era of paying for plan administration directly with flat fees rather than indirectly through asset-based fees, but it’s still too early to tell.

A game of concentration

The DC recordkeeping business, like the banking, insurance and mutual fund businesses to which it is a handmaid, consists of a few superstars and thousands of role players. That was true even before the 2013-2014 round of consolidation got started.

The chart at the right (data from PlanSponsor magazine, June 2014) shows the top ten providers. In terms of overall assets ($1.3 trillion) and numbers of participants (16.6 million), Fidelity Investments has a commanding lead. Its pursuers included one giant rival fund complex (Vanguard), five big insurance companies, two mega-banks and a global HR consulting firm (Aon Hewitt). Top 10  RKPRS chart 2014

Even before two top-ten players merged last spring, when Great-West bought JP Morgan’s retirement plan business, this business was concentrated. Fidelity alone controlled about a third of the assets. The top 10 accounted for 68% of the assets ($5.6 trillion), 58% of the participants and virtually all of the large plans. The top 20 control over 80% of the assets, 80% of the participants and half the 740,000 plans.

If that sounds like oligopoly, it merely reflects the concentration of employment in the U.S., where Fortune 500 companies traditionally employ about half of American workers and countless mid-sized and small companies employ the rest. The smaller DC recordkeeping companies focus on those smaller companies; Paychex, the payroll administration firm, administers the most plans, with 64,000. 

This small world got even smaller in 2014, which ended with Toronto-based ManuLife’s John Hancock unit buying New York Life’s recordkeeping business ($42 billion in assets, 1.03 million participants, at the end of 2013). John Hancock now has $135 billion in plan assets, 2.5 million participants and 55,000 plans (second highest in U.S.). That deal followed the JP Morgan/Great-West deal, and two 2012 moves that saw Hartford sell to MassMutual and Aegon to fold its Diversified Retirement business into its Transamerica Retirement Solutions.   

High costs and low margins drive firms out

There were micro and macro reasons behind all this activity. At the micro level, it made sense for New York Life to stop pouring money into new proprietary technology for its fussy large-plan clients, especially when it wasn’t capturing a lot of rollovers from its 401(k) plans. By reinsuring John Hancock’s in-force life insurance business, New York Life also expanded its capacity to issue more deferred income annuities, a fast-growing product niche that it dominates.

It also made sense for John Hancock to broaden its business by adding New York Life’s bundled (asset management and recordkeeping) large plans (1,600 plans averaging 640 participants and $26 million in assets per plan) to its mass of unbundled (using third-party administrators) smaller plans (55,000 plans averaging only 37 participants and $1.84 million per plan). The deal also helped broaden ManuLife’s business internationally.

But what macro trends are driving consolidation in DC administration? RIJ talked to a number of people in the business and got a variety of answers. The short answer was “shrinking profit margins” on the one hand and a reach for economies of scale on the other. The longer answer included a lot of specific reasons why some players are cashing in their chips while others are doubling down.

“Recordkeeping costs a lot, it’s complicated and,  done properly, it’s relatively low-margin,” NAPA.Net’s Adams, a former editor of PLANSPONSOR magazine and executive at the Employee Benefit Research Institute, told RIJ. “Eventually it gets to a point where asset managers who were hoping for an expanded asset management opportunity aren’t getting as much of that opportunity as they thought they would and get tired of trying to keep up with the required investments in technology and people.”

A company’s ability to control the costs of recordkeeping, which means holding down the costs of technology, is apparently critical to its survival. Some companies build their own proprietary information systems, others buy systems and others outsource the heavy data lifting.

For those who build or buy, years of customization and piece-meal updates can result in an inefficient, expensive and ultimately unsustainable “Frankenstein’s monster” of a system, according to Peter Littlejohn, direct of strategic partnerships at InspiraFS, a Pittsburgh-based recordkeeper.

“Very few people make money in recordkeeping,” he said in a recent interview. “You make money on the investments. But when unit costs are going up because of customization, and regulation adds new compliance costs on the banks, and revenue from asset-based fees goes away, and you can’t control a larger percentage of the client’s wallet,” it doesn’t make much sense to stay in the business.   

Revenue from asset-based fees is currently under pressure. Observers agree that new Department of Labor regulation on fee disclosure, the “excessive fee” litigation by the Schlichter law firm and others, perhaps coupled with rising competition from index funds and ETFs, has hurt margins by raising costs for some recordkeepers and making participants and plan sponsors much more conscious of fees.   

 “The 408(b)(2) plan disclosure regulation and the 404a-5 participant disclosure regulation were costly for recordkeepers—particularly initially, but also on an ongoing basis,” said Fred Reish, the well-known ERISA attorney at Drinker, Biddle & Reath. “In addition, 408(b)(2) regulation heightened awareness of recordkeeping fees and the revenue sharing they received and, as a result, probably negatively impacted their ability to price plans.

“Also, the DOL regulatory agenda includes the possibility of a ‘guide’ for 408(b)(2) disclosure, which would be expensive.  Another example is the anticipated proposed regulation on projecting retirement income on participant statements. While that would likely be very helpful to the 401(k) industry, it will be expensive for the recordkeepers.”

NAPA Net DC consolidation chartJames Holland, an independent fiduciary at MillenniuM Investment and Retirement Advisors in Charlotte, NC, thinks that fee disclosure requirements are having a gradual but persistent effect in driving down fees.   

“The disclosure document traditionally provided minimal information, so nobody read them,” he told RIJ. “But now, you can see on the statement that you paid $2,000 in fees last year. So, after maybe the eighth time you’ve seen it, you mention to your colleague Jane that you paid $2,000 and she says, I only paid $200. Everyone was expecting an earthquake from fee disclosure, but I see the industry building toward a Malcolm Gladwell-type ‘tipping point.’”

Holland believes that the business model that involves covering the cost of administration by charging high asset-based fees on the investments is doomed. If so, firms that relied on it will leave the recordkeeping business. “Revenue-sharing is about to become a thing of the past, so some are shedding the administrative parts of their business to focus on other areas where they can make more money,” he said

Small company owners, whose core business is plan design and administration, like rural folk who see the summer crowd come and go, say they are accustomed to turnover among big companies who enter the recordkeeping business as a path to large asset pools without considering the risks or the complexities. Since these same big companies often underprice them to capture plan administration business, the small company owners aren’t very surprised when the venture fails.   

 “Insurance companies and brokerages tend to go in and out of the business over the years,” said Lawrence Starr, president of Qualified Plan Consultants Inc. in West Springfield, Mass. “When they aren’t in it, they think it’s an easy business and see all those dollars that they can capture. When they are in the business, somebody in the actuarial department figures out that their internal return on investment is not high enough and decides the company would be more profitable if it invested that money in, say, Greek reinsurance. So they get out.

“Five or ten years later, somebody in the company says, ‘Why aren’t we in that business? We ought to be; look how much money we can make.’ By that time, everyone previously involved in that business is gone, along with all the institutional memory as to why they got out in the first place. So, they decide to get back in somehow. And the cycle starts all over again. When two companies at different points in the above cycle get together… Whoosh! You get consolidation. I’ve watched this cycle now for over 30 years. It is as predictable as the sun rising in the morning.”

 “Every insurance company has said, ‘There’s gold in them thar hills—let’s throw up a tent and bring in a lot of money,’” said Jeff Feld, a CPA and principal at Alliance Pension Consultants in Chicago. “The approaches they all took were different. Some retrofitted their annuity or life insurance people and tried to adapt them to retirement plans. Making money was easy because there was so much fat in the system. But, as in any maturing space, people eventually start to scrutinize the costs. The inability to make easy money is driving out those with less than ideal models and sending business to those with more ideal models.”

“Fee disclosure was the straw on the camel’s back, as it removed the ability to bundle services,” said Mark Fortier, who has held senior retirement plan positions at AllianceBerstein and State Street Global Advisors. “But on the service side of the 401(k) business, the [consolidation] trend had been ongoing for decades. Thin margins and the need for ongoing and large investment in technology and people has been the long-term driver.” 

“Asset retention has been the elusive ‘Holy Grail’ for years as well, since it can turn thin to negative margins into positive. Another factor is risk. Insurers in particular have liked the service business because it is lower risk and requires less capital than, say, the variable annuity business.  However, class action lawsuits that sweep in service providers remind them that it is not riskless.”

The elephant-in-the-room might simply be the fact that assets are steadily leaving the 401(k) system and going into retail IRAs, noted Littlejohn. That hurts recordkeepers that don’t have a strong rollover business; and if they don’t have one, they have little reason to build one. “When there’s outflow, you lose both the recordkeeping fee and the asset management fee. If your unit costs were too high on the institutional side, it’s not going to be any cheaper on the retail side,” he told RIJ.

Distributors may also be driving consolidation in recordkeeping. In a recent blogpost, NAPA.Net’s Fred Barstein divided the retirement plan providers into direct-sold firms (Vanguard and Fidelity) and advisor-sold firms, and said that as advisors are reducing the number of plans they do business with to “five or six” from “20 or more,” and that those five or six need expertise in serving plans of all sizes.

“The question now is whether the consolidation heats up,” he wrote. “Will those without a secure seat at the advisor sold DC table (defined by the ability to serve multiple markets and plan types) seek to acquire smaller fish?”

 “The 401(k) industry is a maturing industry. It’s not uncommon for maturing industries to consolidate and to compete on price,” said Reish. “With the increased competition on price—as well as the ongoing focus that the Department of Labor and court cases have placed on costs—it’s not surprising that the smaller, more marginal recordkeepers are having difficulty competing—particularly when you consider the need for ongoing capital investment to keep up with other providers.”

Who will remain?

So who will stay in the recordkeeping business? According to Littlejohn, we can assume that the leading target date fund companies will stay in the recordkeeping business, because the certification of TDFs as qualified default investment alternatives in DC plans ensured that they will always earn asset-based fees in their plan administration business. A list of the top TDF providers, from a 2014 Morningstar report, overlaps quite a bit with the top DC recordkeeper list. (Voya was ranked twelfth and Great-West fourteenth on the Morningstar list.) 10 largest rkpers, 10 largest TDF providers

Vanguard and Fidelity, which market themselves directly to plan sponsors rather than through advisors or brokers, have, in addition to economies of scale and strong TDF offerings, strong IRA platforms for capturing rollovers. Vanguard has the added advantage of being the low-cost indexing leader at a time when low-costs and indexing are in ever-increasing demand.

Other firms, for one reason or another, dominate specific niches. Aon Hewitt, as a benefits consultant, and Xerox HR Services, a unit of the technology firm, serve the same large firms with the core businesses and their recordkeeping business. Each has an average of over 10,000 participants in their plans. TIAA-CREF has a secure niche in the educational market (part of the non-profit 403(b) plan market). Among the insurance carriers, OneAmerica (through its Paychex unit), Voya, Principal, John Hancock, Nationwide and MassMutual have tens of thousands of small and mid-sized plans.  

In the long run, those with the greatest scale will endure, said Larry Kiefer of DST Systems, the IT firm. “I think size will matter in the end,” he said. ERISA attorney Tom Clark, who thinks the fee litigation has had a big impact on recordkeeping firms, agrees. “Those who invested in technology to get economies of scale and efficiencies will win,” he told RIJ. “Those who used revenue sharing to prop up their primary business and even secondary businesses will not win.”

“Consolidation will continue,” said Littlejohn. “Recordkeepers without fund families will also go out.” Reish said, “I suspect that the largest providers will be the consolidators and the smallest, most entrepreneurial recordkeepers will do relatively well. But that leaves the recordkeepers that are in middle in terms of size. They may be the most exposed and, therefore, the most likely to decide to sell.”

© 2015 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

What Are We Betting On?

When I consider the prospects for the global economy and markets, I am taken aback by the extent to which the world has collectively placed a huge bet on three fundamental outcomes: a shift toward materially higher and more inclusive global growth, the avoidance of policy mistakes, and the prevention of market accidents. Though all three outcomes are undoubtedly desirable, the unfortunate reality is that they are far from certain – and bets on them without some hedging could prove exceedingly risky for current and future generations.

The first component of the bet – more inclusive global growth – anticipates continued economic recovery in the United States, with a 3% growth rate this year bolstered by robust wage growth. It also assumes China’s annual growth rate will stabilize at 6.5-7%, thereby enabling the risks posed by pockets of excessive leverage in the shadow-banking system to be gradually defused, even as the economy’s growth engines continue to shift from exports and public capital spending toward domestic consumption and private investment.

Another, more uncertain assumption underpinning the bet on more inclusive growth is that the eurozone and Japan will be able to escape the mire of low growth and avoid deflation, which, by impelling households and businesses to postpone purchasing decisions, would undermine already weak economic performance. Finally, the bet assumes that oil-exporting countries like Nigeria, Venezuela, and especially Russia will fend off economic implosion, even as global oil prices plummet.

These are bold assumptions – not least because achieving these outcomes would require considerable economic reinvention, extending far beyond rebalancing aggregate demand and eliminating pockets of excessive indebtedness. While the US and China are significantly better placed than others, most of these economies – in particular, the struggling eurozone countries, Japan, and some emerging markets – would have to nurture entirely new growth engines. The eurozone would also have to deepen integration.

That adds up to a tough reform agenda – made all the more challenging by adjustment fatigue, increasingly fragmented domestic politics, and rising geopolitical tensions. In this context, a determined shift toward markedly higher and more inclusive global growth is far from guaranteed.

The second component of the collective bet – the avoidance of policy mistakes – is similarly tenuous. The fundamental assumption here is that the untested, unconventional policies adopted by central banks, particularly in advanced countries, to repress financial volatility and maintain economic stability will buy enough time for governments to design and deliver a more suitable and comprehensive policy response.

This experimental approach by central banks has involved the conscious decoupling of financial-asset prices from their fundamentals. The hope has been that more buoyant market valuations would boost consumption (via the “wealth effect,” whereby asset-owning households feel wealthier and thus more inclined to spend) and investment (via “animal spirits,” which bolster entrepreneurs’ willingness to invest in new plant, equipment, and hiring).

The problem is that the current economic and policy configuration in the developed world entails an unusual amount of “divergence.” With policy adjustments failing to keep pace with shifts on the ground, an appreciating dollar has assumed the role of shock absorber. But history has shown that such sharp currency moves can, by themselves, cause economic and financial instability.

The final element of the world’s collective bet is rooted in the belief that excessive market risk-taking has been tamed. But a protracted period of policy-induced volatility repression has convinced investors that, with central banks on their side, they are safe – a belief that has led to considerable risk-positioning in some segments of finance.

With intermediaries becoming reluctant to take on securities that are undesirable to hold during periods of financial instability, market corrections can compound sudden and dramatic price shifts, disrupting the orderly functioning of financial systems. So far, central banks have been willing and able to ensure that these periods are temporary and reversible. But their capacity to continue to do so is limited – especially as excessive faith in monetary policy fuels leveraged market positioning.

The fact is that central banks do not have the tools to deliver rapid, sustainable, and inclusive growth on their own. The best they can do is extend the bridge; it is up to other economic policymakers to provide an anchoring destination. A bridge to nowhere can go only so far before it collapses.

The nature of financial risks has morphed and migrated in recent years; problems caused by irresponsible banks and threats to the payment and settlement systems have been supplanted by those caused by risk-taking among non-bank institutions. With the regulatory system failing to evolve accordingly, the potential effectiveness of some macro-prudential policies has been undermined.

None of this is to say that the outlook for markets and the global economy is necessarily dire; on the contrary, there are notable upside risks that could translate into considerable and durable gains. But understanding the world’s collective bet does underscore the need for more responsive and comprehensive policymaking. Otherwise, economic outcomes will remain, as former US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke put it in 2010, “unusually uncertain.”

© 2015 Project Syndicate.

NAFA Throws a Hail Mary on QLACs

Baffled. That’s how I felt after reading the letter that the National Association for Fixed Annuities has apparently sent to the Treasury Department asking that indexed annuities receive so-called QLAC status. George Bostick and Mark Iwry, the Treasury officials to whom the letter was addressed, are probably going to feel something similar.

The letter, which was signed by NAFA president and CEO Kim O’Brien and vetted by a respected authority on indexed annuities, isn’t likely to be persuasive. It just doesn’t make a whole lot of sense. Here’s a link to the letter. You can decide for yourself.

There are good reasons why deferred indexed annuities and variable annuities won’t ever be qualified longevity annuity contracts (QLACs). The QLAC regulations that the Treasury Department announced last year were intended to solve a specific problem:   Near-retirees and retirees couldn’t use qualified money to buy deferred income annuities whose income streams started after age 70½. Why? Because DIAs are illiquid, and owners had no way to take required minimum distributions (RMDs) from them.       

Deferred VAs and FIAs don’t suffer from that problem. As currently sold, they produce income through guaranteed lifetime income riders (GLWBs). Unless they’re annuitized—which never happens—they stay liquid. A person who buys them with qualified money doesn’t have to break the contract to comply with the RMD rule. So those products don’t need the regulatory relief that qualified DIAs needed. The QLAC rule specifically excludes annuities that have cash value.

Since the letter doesn’t mention DIAs or GLWBs at all, it’s hard to tell exactly what NAFA’s reasoning is. Maybe it wants Treasury to let its members sell FIAs that, like DIAs, require a commitment to annuitization by age 85. If they do, the letter doesn’t say so. (O’Brien received an interview request from RIJ, but responded, in real time, that “I am out this week.”)

Instead of talking about DIAs, NAFA focuses on declared rate deferred annuities and deferred variable annuities. “Fixed annuities with a set interest rate are eligible to be qualified longevity annuity contracts (QLACs), but fixed annuities with an indexed rate are not,” the first paragraph of the letter said.

That isn’t true—“declared rate deferred annuities,” which are safe accumulation vehicles like CDs, have nothing to do with the QLAC rule. NAFA also attacks variable annuities as unworthy of QLAC status because they’re risky, without acknowledging that it’s the reliance on the liquid GLWB riders (complex, non-standardized riders) to create income that makes the QLAC rule irrelevant to both FIAs and VAs, as currently sold.

Not entirely trusting my own interpretation of the letter—the tax and annuity fields are landmined with Rumsfeldian “unknown unknowns”—I emailed copies to three people on whom I rely on for their annuity expertise. They were as baffled by the letter as I was. “Though NAFA in this letter establishes that an FIA provides a substantially equal lifetime income payment to the contract owner,” one wrote back, “it does not address one fundamental requirement of the regulations, irrevocability of the qualified assets being used to fund the QLAC.”

This letter sounds like a “Hail Mary” pass, and it is. Liquidity is the main selling point of deferred annuities that produce income through GLWBs, and no annuity product can have liquidity and QLAC status at the same time. 

NAFA isn’t responding to questions, so we don’t know exactly what they’re thinking. O’Brien referred me to three NAFA members, but they haven’t responded either. The other person whom I know worked on the letter declined to comment. Since the letter is already public, they may prefer to let it speak for itself. And it does. As one of my readers wrote, “There is only one opportunity to make a good first impression and they may have blown it. Their only chance is to follow up with an appropriate product.”

© 2015 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

MetLife sues FSOC over “SIFI” designation

MetLife has filed a civil suit against the Financial Stability Oversight Council in U.S. District Court, District of Columbia, contesting the FSOC’s designation of the giant publicly-held global insurance company as a non-bank “systemically important financial institution” or (SIFI).

The SIFI designation is both a curse and a blessing. It raises capital requirements and other profit-reducing restrictions on designated companies to make them safer, because their failure could jeopardize the entire U.S. financial system. On the positive side, it implies that the company will never be allowed to fail.

MetLife has long argued that the SIFI restrictions are designed for banks, and are inappropriate for insurance companies, however large, because their risks are fundamentally different from banks, and because insurers are already tightly regulated by the individual states in which they do business.

Prudential Financial and AIG are the only other insurers to have been designated as SIFIs by the FSOC.

The lawsuit claims that “The traditional business of life insurance in which MetLife engages differs dramatically from the traditional business of banking. In general, banks borrow short term and lend long term—for example, by taking liquid, short-term deposits and wholesale funding and investing in illiquid long-term assets, such as commercial loans.

“In contrast, life insurers generally write long-term policies and invest premium dollars in long-term assets to make good on those obligations when they come due….  Because life insurers do not depend as banks do on short-term deposits and short-term wholesale funding, they are not subject to the “run” risks (and corresponding liquidity crises) to which banks are subject.”

On the issue of the damage that the SIFI designation could do to MetLife as a business, the lawsuit says, “An empirically-based estimate shows that the annual consumer cost of applying additional capital requirements to nonbank SIFI and thrift-owning insurers could be as great as $8 billion, depending on the capital requirements applied…. In particular, it has been estimated that imposing bank-centric capital requirements on MetLife would require the Company to raise its capital reserves by tens of billions of dollars, ultimately harming consumers.”

© 2015 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

GAO recommends changes to “automatic rollover” practices

Reflecting a concern among some legislators about “leakage” from defined contribution plans and its potential damage to individual retirement security, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), made public a research report in late December, “401(K) Plans: Greater Protections Needed for Forced Transfers and Inactive Accounts.”

GAO found that when small (under $5,000), forgotten or neglected accounts held by former employees are forced out of 401(k) plans and rolled over to IRA custodial accounts, the IRAs tend to lose value over time because the returns from the safe investments that, by law, the forced-out assets must be placed in.

GAO also discovered that a plan can force out an account with a balance of, for instance, $20,000 if less than $5,000 is attributable to contributions other than rollover contributions.

GAO recommended that Congress consider amending current law to permit alternative default destinations for plans to use when transferring participant accounts out of plans, and repealing a provision that allows plans to disregard rollovers when identifying balances eligible for transfer to an IRA.

Among other things, GAO also recommends that DOL convene a taskforce to explore the possibility of establishing a national pension registry. DOL and SSA each disagreed with one of GAO’s recommendations, but GAO said it maintains the need for all its recommendations.

In its research, GAO reviewed policies regarding forced transfers of inactive accounts in six countries policies in six countries, including the U.K., Australia, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium. 

Officials in two countries told GAO that inactive accounts are consolidated there by law, without participant consent, in money-making investment vehicles. Officials in the United Kingdom said that it consolidates savings in a participant’s new plan and in Switzerland such savings are invested together in a single fund.

In Australia, small, inactive accounts are held by a federal agency that preserves their real value by regulation until they are claimed. In addition, GAO found that Australia, the Netherlands and Denmark have pension registries, not always established by law or regulation, which provide participants a single source of online information on their new and old retirement accounts.

© 2015 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Independent advisors will manage more than wirehouses by 2019: Cerulli

The combined asset market share of the independent advisory channels will surpass the wirehouse marketshare in the next 5 years, according a new report, Advisor Metrics 2014, from Cerulli Associates, the Boston-based global analytics firm.

 “More than two-thirds of advisors indicate they would prefer the independent broker/dealer, registered investment advisor, or dually registered models if they decided to leave their current firms,” said Cerulli associate director Kenton Shirk in a release.

Advisors like the flexibility, autonomy and economics of being independent, Shirk said. “Payouts are higher and advisors become responsible for their own overhead decisions. Independent advisors can build long-term enterprise value.”

The Advisor Metrics 2014: Capitalizing on Transitions and Consolidation report focuses on advisor trends and consumer information, including market sizing, advisor product use and preferences, and advice delivery, Cerulli said.

“Many independent broker/dealers and custodians have sufficient scale to offer broad and deep service offerings,” said Shirk, noting that access to practice management resources, financial planning support, and investment research—where wirehouse advisors used to have an edge–are now readily available to independent advisors.

Cerulli expects the wirehouse and independent broker-dealer channels to lose “significant asset market share” to RIAs and dually-registered advisors over the next five years.

© 2015 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.  

Another longevity reinsurance deal for Prudential Retirement

Prudential Retirement, a unit of Prudential Financial, announced this week that it will reinsure the longevity risk of eight pension plans managed by Rothesay Life Limited and its affiliates. The transaction marks Prudential Retirement’s fifth longevity reinsurance deal since 2011 with Rothesay Life and the second in the past six months, according to a release.

The transaction covers longevity risk associated with pension liabilities of $450 million (about 288 million Pounds Sterling) for some 25,000 retirees and deferred members in the U.K.

In August 2014, Prudential announced a $1.7 billion (about 1 billion Pounds Sterling) transaction covering 20,000 annuitants. The Rothesay transactions followed Prudential’s agreement in July to reinsure $27.7 billion of longevity risk associated with BT Pension Scheme liabilities.

© 2015 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Security Benefit adds high-dividend stock index to fixed indexed annuity

Security Benefit Life has added one-year and two-year interest crediting options based on the BNP Paribas High Dividend Plus Index (HD Plus Index) to its Total Value Annuity (TVA), the company announced this week.

The HD Plus Index is made up of high-dividend stocks, chosen through a “rules-based” strategy that adds “yield-enhancement” and “risk-reduction” overlays to a dividend-focused stock portfolio, according to Security Benefit.  

Every month, the HD Plus Index tries to buy stocks it expects to pay strong, consistent dividends. On average, the HD Plus Index is comprised of 75 to 80 highly liquid, non-financial U.S. stocks. The Index also aims for a targeted volatility rate of 6%—about half the S&P500’s historical volatility—through actively adjusted cash exposure.

© 2015 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Illinois Mandates Workplace Retirement Plans

After several years of fitful steps toward the establishment of mandatory state-sponsored IRAs by legislatures in a handful of “blue” states, one of those states—Illinois—has finally closed the deal. Its Secure Choice Savings Program was signed into law this week. 

How the law will affect the market for retirement plan services in Illinois remains to be seen. Now that private-sector employers with 25 or more full-time employees must offer access to a retirement plan by June 1, 2017 (and workers must be defaulted into it), the question arises: Will employers comply by hiring private-sector service providers or simply use the new state-sponsored investment trust?

Brian Graff, head of the American Society of Pension Professionals and Actuaries, has expressed confidence, at least in reference to a similar program in Connecticut, that private sector providers will outcompete the state-sponsored program. “I guarantee that they will,” he told RIJ at the statehouse in Hartford, Conn., last March.  

But it’s also possible that most employers will do the minimum that the new law obligates them to do, and merely tweak their payroll administration systems to allow automatic deferrals into the funds in the state-sponsored IRA. In that case, there would be little uptick in demand for private plan services.

That’s the business side of the story. On the policy side, state legislators Sen. Daniel Biss and Rep. Barbara Flynn Currie, who sponsored the Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program (SB2758), and lame-duck Governor Pat Quinn, the Democrat who signed it, will probably be satisfied if the bill achieves its goal of expanding retirement plan coverage in their state. Employers with fewer than 25 employers are encouraged but not required to use Secure Choice. Workers can opt-out of participation if they wish.

The Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program had support from some 60 labor-related and retirement-related groups in Illinois, including the Illinois Asset Building Group, the Heartland Alliance, the Woodstock Institute, the Sargent Shriver National Center on Poverty Law, SEIU Healthcare, and AARP Illinois.

Efforts to create similar state-sponsored retirement plans have been underway for some time in other Democratic-majority states, like California and Connecticut, where initiatives that help labor are most likely to get legislative traction. The federal government, with its MyRA and Auto-IRA programs, has made efforts of its own toward improving retirement plan coverage in the U.S., where only about half of full-time workers have access to a 401(k)-like program at any given time. 

Retirement savings mandates, much like the employer mandates in the Affordable Health Care Act, have been controversial. Critics of such plans have variously said that they do too much or too little. Free marketers say they create redundant bureaucracies, crowd out private sector providers, and heap new costs on employers.

On the other side of the political divide, liberals say the plans’ default deferral rates are too low (3%, in Illinois’ case) to produce nest eggs big enough to generate adequate income in retirement and that they fall short by not requiring firms with less than 25 employees to offer plans. Despite the criticisms, the chronic low pension coverage in the U.S.—analogous to the incomplete health insurance coverage—has kept such efforts alive.

According to SB2758, all employers in Illinois must offer the program by June 1, 2017, if they have: 

  • Operated for at least two years 
  • At least 25 employees
  • No existing employer-based retirement plan  

Unless their employers offer an employer-based plan, employees will be automatically enrolled in the state plan; however, they may opt out. All accounts will be pooled together and will be managed professionally. 

There will be a 3% deduction from Secure Choice participants’ pay to be put into an IRA; however, participants will be able to adjust the percentage of their earnings that is set aside. Participants also can select an investment option from those the Illinois Secure Choice Savings Board makes available to them. 

Employers participating in Secure Choice will be required to provide an open enrollment period at least once a year to allow employees who opted out of the program to enroll in it. This will be the only annual chance such employees have to do so, unless their employer allows them to do so earlier than that. 

Employers that do not offer their own retirement plan and fail to offer Secure Choice will be subject to a penalty equal to either: 

  • $250 for each employee for each calendar year or portion of a calendar year during which the employee neither was enrolled nor had opted out of it; or 
  • For each calendar year beginning after the date a penalty has been assessed regarding an employee, $500 for any portion of that calendar year during which such an employee continues to be unenrolled without having opting out. 

The Illinois Secure Choice Savings Board will oversee the program. Four of the board’s seven members will be appointed by the governor: two with expertise in retirement savings plan administration or investment, or both, and one each representing participating employers and enrollees.

© 2015 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Trial Date Set for “Excessive fee” Suit against Boeing

Unless the parties settle before then, the lawsuit of Spano v. Boeing, one of the first “excessive fee” cases brought by retirement plan participants against a large American employer and retirement plan sponsor, will go to trial next spring—eight years after it was initially filed.

A May 20, 2015 trial date in U.S. District Court in East St. Louis was set after Boeing’s attorneys’ motions for summary judgments were either denied or partially denied last December 30, according to a report on The Fiduciary Matters blog by ERISA attorney Thomas E. Clark, Jr. this week.

“This decision reflects the pendulum that has clearly swung in the participants’ favor in recent years…,” Clark writes, noting that no one would have expected such a trend when Spano v. Boeing was filed. “Betting a dollar that a decision such as this would be likely someday would have been a waste of a perfectly good dollar.” 

The fact that Spano v. Boeing has been allowed to proceed to trial is consistent, however, with a recent wave of legal judgments and decisions that have discredited common business practices in retirement plans—practices that in many cases resulted in participants paying high and in some cases even non-competitive prices for services they thought were free.

One of those practices is revenue sharing. It involves offering of mutual fund share classes with high fees in order to subsidize the cost of administering plans. In several class-action suits by participants against plan sponsors and plan providers in recent years, judges and juries have decided that sponsors and providers that practiced revenue sharing were violating the sponsors’ responsibilities to operate the plans solely in the interests of the participants.

The cases and related decisions haven’t outlawed revenue sharing. But they have shined light on it, showed that it is prone to conflicts of interest, and inspired plan sponsors to look for cheaper, more transparent and more fiduciary-minded ways to cover plan administration costs. That trend, in turn, has squeezed profit margins in the 401(k) service provider business and is said to be a factor in the recent decisions by some companies to sell their retirement plan services units.

In Spano v. Boeing, plan participants charged that:

  • Until 2006, Boeing selected and retained mutual funds as plan investment options that charged excessive investment management expenses and that Boeing used them to “funnel” excessive Plan recordkeeping and administrative fees to State Street/CitiStreet via revenue sharing.
  • The Small Cap Fund provided additional revenue sharing fees to State Street/CitiStreet and charged its investors 107 basis points per year in fees, which was grossly excessive, in order to benefit Boeing’s corporate relationship with State Street/CitiStreet.
  • Boeing failed to monitor and remove an imprudently risky concentrated sector fund, i.e. the Technology Fund, and instead retained this fund for the purpose of benefiting its corporate relationship, rather than for the sole benefit of the Plan Participants.
  • The Boeing Company Stock Fund incurred excessive fees and held excessive cash, impairing the value of the Plan assets. With regard to this fund, Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants failed to remedy the resulting transaction and institutional drag.

© 2015 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.