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Deficient Frontier

A Vanguard investor went online the other day to check his account balance—sadly, it was off 3.5%—and read the fund giant’s familiar reminder that his allocation to stocks was about half the “suggested target… for people in his age group.”

Adjacent to those words, however, the emptor saw this caveat: “The illustration and tools on this page are educational only, and do not take into consideration your personal circumstances or other factors that may be important in making investment decisions.”

OK, so what was this self-directed investor supposed to do? Obey Vanguard’s initial suggestion to hike his equity exposure? Or, as Vanguard’s disclaimer seemed to allow, follow his gut, which was based partly on his native conservatism but also on the knowledge that his spouse was taking a lot of risk with her retirement portfolio. 

This is the sort of dilemma that Meir Statman, Ph.D. (right), and Joni L. Clark, CFP/CFA, seem to be addressing in “End the Charade: Replacing the Efficient Frontier with the Efficient Range,” a research paper to appear in the July issue of the Journal of Financial Planning.

Meir StatmanA professor at Santa Clara University in California and author of What Investors Really Want (McGraw-Hill, 2010), Statman is one of the behavioral economists who have argued that Harry Markowitz’ mean-variance optimization algorithm, which generates the efficient frontier, excluded certain valid real-world qualifiers even as it refined a powerful insight.

As Statman and Clark, chief investment officer at Loring Ward in San Jose, Calif., write in their current paper:

 “Mean-variance portfolio theory is not a ‘consumption’ theory as it is silent about investors’ consumption goals, such as a secure and comfortable retirement, college education for children and grandchildren, and bequests to family and charities. Ultimately, however, investors care about their consumption goals, and portfolios are merely production means for reaching consumption goals.”

“End the Charade” suggests that the concept of the efficient frontier should be replaced—and in practice is often replaced by many financial planners and advisors—by the concept of the “efficient range.” They define efficient range as “the location of portfolios that acknowledge imprecise estimates of mean-variance parameters and accommodate investor preferences beyond high mean and low variance.”

By investor preferences, the two authors give the examples of socially-conscious investors who might want to avoid shares in certain companies no matter how profitable they may or who might want to under-weight international equities for no other reason than that they’d rather invest in their home country.

By “imprecise estimates,” the authors are referring to the arbitrary assumptions that almost by necessity go into any individual calculation of the efficient frontier. In fact, they say, advisors sometimes make whatever assumptions are necessary to arrive at the results they want. Hence the title, “End the Charade.”

“We place the estimated parameters in the mean-variance optimizer and give it a spin. Out comes an efficient frontier with portfolios such as the one with 70 percent in European stocks and 30 percent in gold. We find this portfolio unappealing, so we push down the estimated return of European stocks or add a constraint that limits European stocks to 10 percent of portfolios. We give the optimizer another spin and get another efficient frontier. We continue spinning until we get an efficient frontier with portfolios that really appeal to us, the ones we wanted all along,” they write.

But the article has good news for advisors: Their instincts that inspire them to “massage” the parameters are valid:

 “Advisers share a guilty feeling. They are eager to note that asset allocation matters most in investment success, and that they derive their asset allocation from the mean-variance portfolio optimizer of Nobel Prize winning modern portfolio theory.

“Yet advisers find asset allocation in optimized portfolios unappealing. They modify optimized portfolios by constraints, whether maximum constraints on commodities or minimum constraints on bonds. But they often feel guilty for straying from modern portfolio theory. We argue that advisers’ guilt is misplaced.”

“The argument is that any diversified portfolio, such as the ones offered by Vanguard, is in the efficient range,” Statman told RIJ in an email. “In other words, we should use the mean-variance optimizer as a calculator rather than as an optimizer.”  

© RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Details of Hartford’s VA benefit rollback

 The Hartford filed a new variable annuity prospectus last May 1 with the Securities Exchange Commission, asking the SEC to approve some changes that it wants to make to in-force variable annuity contracts that would curtail some contract owner privileges but would also reduce the risk that the Hartford could end up losing money on the lifetime income riders in the contracts.

The new restrictions would be effective on October 4. According to the new prospectus, “These restrictions are intended to reduce the risk of investment losses that could require the Company to use its General Account assets to pay amounts due under the rider.”

As of the end of the first quarter of 2013, the Hartford still had about $65.5 billion in VA assets, which generate fees. But it wants to reduce the size of the shortfall that might occur if those contract assets won’t be large enough to meet the contract obligations.

To prevent or minimize those losses, it is not only no longer selling new contracts, but also taking advantage of whatever escape clauses it wrote into the original contracts—which may shock some contract owners and advisors.

“It is a surprise to many and I’m sure some never imagined that it could happen,” said Tamiko Toland, an annuity expert at Strategic Insight, who has reviewed the new Hartford filing. But she said that Hartford is only doing things that the contract’s fine print allowed them to do all along.

Clients still have options, she added. They can accept the changes in the contract (which mainly require more conservative investments) and preserve the rider, they can reject the changes and let the income rider expire, or they can surrender the contract and take their money somewhere else.

“[Hartford is] giving people a few months to make the adjustment. Then there is a 15-day [grace] period,” she added. Of course, Hartford will be just as happy to see go away—but they don’t necessarily want them to go away mad. Yet that seems to be the risk the company is willing to take to avoid or reduce potential billion-dollar losses down the road on guarantees that are under water.

“I’m not saying that it wouldn’t be beneficial, actuarially, to the Hartford to have people default on their benefits. [But] as much as they are happy to let VA clients fade away, I doubt that they want to get a reputation for conniving with their other clients. Though they don’t have a VA reputation to protect [since the divestiture], they do have a reputation to protect.”

Here are the new VA contract restrictions for which the Hartford has requested SEC approval: 

Fixed accumulation feature. Effective October 4, 2013, we will no longer accept new allocations or Premium Payments to the Fixed Accumulation Feature.  The following information applies only for Contract Value allocated to or in the Fixed Accumulation Feature prior to October 4, 2013.

We guarantee that we will credit interest to amounts you allocate to the Fixed Accumulation Feature at a minimum rate that meets your State’s minimum non-forfeiture requirements. Non-forfeiture rates vary from state-to-state. We reserve the right to prospectively declare different rates of excess interest depending on when amounts are allocated or transferred to the Fixed Accumulation Feature. We will account for any deductions, Surrenders or transfers from the Fixed Accumulation Feature on a “first-in, first-out” basis. The Fixed Accumulation Feature interest rates may vary by State. 

Dollar cost averaging. Effective October 4, 2013, the DCA Plus program will no longer be available and we will no longer accept initial or subsequent Premium Payments into the program. Contract Owners who have commenced either a 12-month or 6-month Transfer Program prior to October 4, 2013 will be allowed to complete their current program, but will not be allowed to elect a new program.  These programs allow you to earn a fixed rate of interest on investments. These programs are different from the Fixed Accumulation Feature. We determine, in our sole discretion, the interest rates to be credited. These interest rates may vary depending on the Contract you purchased and the date the request for the program is received. Please consult your Registered Representative to determine the interest rate for your Program.

Reinstatement. Effective October 4, 2013, we will no longer allow Contract Owners to reinstate their Contracts (or riders) when a Contract Owner requests a Surrender (either full or Partial).

Commencement date extension. Effective October 4, 2013 we will no longer allow Contract Owners to extend their Annuity Commencement Date even though we may have granted extensions in the past to you or other similarly situated investors.

Investment restrictions. Effective October 4, 2013, we are exercising this contractual right for the products described in Appendix D to require that you allocate your Contract Value and future Premium Payments in accordance with the investment restrictions described in Appendix D. Your selected allocations will be automatically re-balanced quarterly. If your allocations do not currently comply with the investment restrictions described in Appendix D, we must receive allocation instructions from you prior to October 4, 2013 that comply with the investment restrictions described in Appendix D. These restrictions are intended to reduce the risk of investment losses that could require the Company to use its General Account assets to pay amounts due under the rider.

If your allocations do not currently comply with the investment restrictions described in Appendix D, we must receive allocation instructions from you prior to Oct. 4, 2013 that comply with the investment restrictions described in Appendix D.

These restrictions are intended to reduce the risk of investment losses that could require the Company to use its General Account assets to pay amounts due under the rider.  We may modify, add, delete, or substitute (to the extent permitted by applicable law), the asset allocation models, investment pro-grams, Funds, portfolio rebalancing requirements, and other investment requirements and restrictions that apply while the rider is in effect.

For instance, we might amend these asset allocation models if a Fund (i) merges into another fund, (ii) changes investment objectives, (iii) closes to further investments and/or (iv) fails to meet acceptable risk parameters. These changes will not be applied with respect to then existing investments. We will give you advance notice of these changes. Please refer to “Other Program considerations” under the section entitled “What other ways can you invest?” in Section 4.a for more information regarding the potential impact of Fund mergers and liquidations with respect to then existing investments within an asset allocation model. 

15-day reinstatement window. If the rider is terminated by us due to a failure to comply with these investment restrictions, you will have one opportunity to rein-state the rider by reallocating your Contract Value in accordance with then prevailing investment restrictions.

You will have a 15-business day reinstatement period to do this. The reinstatement period will begin upon termination of the rider. Your right to reinstate the rider will be terminated if during the reinstatement period you make a subsequent Premium Payment, take a partial Surrender or make a Covered Life change. Upon reinstatement, your Payment Base will be reset at the lower of the Payment Base prior to the termination or Contract Value as of the date of reinstatement. Your Withdrawal Percentage will be reset to equal the Withdrawal Percentage prior to termination unless during the reinstatement period the relevant Covered Life qualifies for a new age band.

Investment in any asset allocation model could mitigate losses but also hamper potential gains. The asset allocation models that you must invest in under the rider provide very different potential risk/reward characteristics. We are not responsible for lost investment opportunities associated with the implementation and enforcement of these investment requirements and restrictions. If the restrictions are violated, the Withdrawal Benefit will be revoked but the Guaranteed Minimum Death Benefit will continue to apply.

Investment restrictions. You must allocate your Account Value in accordance with the following investment restrictions prior to October 4, 2013: 

  • CATEGORY 1: FIXED INCOME     RULE: MINIMUM 40% OF ALLOCATION
  • CATEGORY 2: ACCEPTABLE INVESTMENT OPTIONS (EQUITY OR MULTI-ASSET RULE: MAXIMUM 60% OF ALLOCATION, MAXIMUM 20% IN ANY ONE FUND
  • CATEGORY 3: LIMITED INVESTMENT OPTIONS (EQUITY, MULTI-ASSET, OR BOND) RULE: MAXIMUM 20%OF ALLOCATION, MAXIMUM OF 10% IN ANY ONE FUND.

© 2013 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Harbinger unit offers fixed deferred annuity with GLWB

Fidelity & Guaranty Life Insurance Co., the Baltimore-based annuity issuer that diversified holding company Harbinger acquired from Old Mutual two years ago, has introduced a line of one-year guaranteed rate fixed annuities that offers a guaranteed minimum withdrawal benefit like that of a variable annuity or fixed indexed annuity.

The concept seems counter-intuitive, considering that fixed income investments are paying next to nothing, fixed deferred annuities are in an unprecedented sales slump, and nobody in recent memory, if ever, has tried it. 

The new product line is called the Simplicity Elite series. According to a product brochure for Simplicity Elite 10, a single person who buys the product with a $100,000 at age 65 and waits 10 years, can take an income of $11,600 a year for life at age 75. For a couple, the payout would be based on the age of the younger of the two, and be $10,600 at age 75. This rider’s price is 85 basis points per year. There’s a guaranteed minimum death benefit available for 40 basis points a year.

F&G is aiming the product at people who want a flexible guaranteed income product but balk at the complexity of fixed indexed annuity. “Agents have told us that they want to lead with the income story and don’t want to complicate it with indexing methods. A traditional fixed annuity chassis provides that simplicity—pun intended,” said Brian Grigg, Fidelity & Guaranty Life’s vice president, annuity distribution, in a release.

 “Consumers tell us they want a product they can easily understand,” he added. “They want to know the dollars in simple terms. With the built-in guaranteed minimum withdrawal benefit rider, as an example, we can say that on a guaranteed basis, $100,000 from a 55-year-old provides annual income of $9,600 for life starting at age 65. Consumers understand this.”

“It’s almost like a deferred SPIA,” said Paul Tyler, a Fidelity & Guaranty Life spokesman. “You don’t buy this product for accumulation.” Fidelity & Guaranty carries a B++ rating from A.M. Best. Addressing the topic of whether fixed deferred annuities can generate enough gain to fund a generous income guarantee, Tyler said: “We think rates are going to go up.”

The guaranteed interest rate for the initial product year is 2%, he said, and it will reset annually. Simplicity Elite will sell mainly through independent insurance agents, but the issuer thinks it may appeal to broker-dealer reps who want a lifetime income guarantee but aren’t comfortable with indexed products. “One advantage of a fixed deferred annuity is that some of the broker-dealers won’t sell FIAs,” Tyler told RIJ.

He also rejected the idea that because Fidelity & Guaranty is owned by Harbinger, a holding company, that the product reflects a risk-taking culture. “Yes, our money originally came from a hedge fund, but our parent’s stated objective is to build a diversified conglomerate like a Berkshire Hathaway or Loews Corp.”

Simplicity Elite is available in 7, 10 and 14 year durations. All contracts in the series offers minimum guarantees and guaranteed minimum death benefit (GMDB) rider. A vesting premium bonus is available on the 10 and 14-year product. The minimum premium is $10,000. and Simplicity Elite is available in 7, 10 and 14 year durations.

Fidelity & Guaranty Life and an independent marketing organization collaborated to develop Simplicity Elite “with the soon-to-be-retiree in mind,” Grigg said. Harbinger Group completed its acquisition of F&G from Old Mutual plc in April 2011 for $350 million. Old Mutual had earlier paid $635 million for it.

© 2013 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

ARIA, PIMCO and Transamerica partner on bond-based CDA

A new contingent deferred annuity product (CDA)—aka stand-alone living benefit (SALB) aka unbundled guaranteed lifetime withdrawal benefit (GLWB)–has been jointly announced by Aria Retirement Solutions, Transamerica Advisors Life and bond giant PIMCO.

[News of this product broke close to deadline for the June 21 issue. More news and analysis of the latest ARIA/Transamerica/PIMCO CDA will be forthcoming.]

Transamerica filed a prospectus for the new product on May 15 with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The product, which doesn’t appear to have a trade name at this time, would be marketed to fee-based registered investment advisors (RIAs) who want to offer their typically high-net-worth clients a loose, flexible lifetime income guarantee.

If it works like ARIA’s RetireOne program, each of the three partners plays a different role. ARIA will administer the product through its online platform; PIMCO will provide the underlying pool of fixed income investments, and Transamerica will provide the guarantee that the pool will provide income for life as long as the end-client (or couple) doesn’t exceed a designated annual spending limit.  

CDAs are a compromise built specifically for RIA channel, which isn’t receptive to annuities because they’re too restrictive in terms of investment options and because RIAs, unlike broker/dealer reps, don’t sell products for commission; they earn management fees based on the value of the assets they manage.

But the insurers and RIAs have a motive for working together. Insurers can’t afford to ignore the rich and growing RIA channel, and RIA’s can’t ignore their older clients’ need for lifetime income protection. CDAs are designed to be a compromise. The RIA client gets a lifetime income guarantee and the client’s assets remain with the RIA instead of in an insurance company separate account. (Variable annuities create tax problems; all withdrawals are taxed as ordinary income.)

The asset provider (PIMCO in this case) earns fees based on the market value of the product they supply, the insurance company (Transamerica Advisors Life in this case) earn fees based on the size of the guarantee, and the RIA earns a percentage of the client’s portfolio for financial advice and portfolio management. 

There’s a bit of a catch for the RIAs and their client. They can’t buy a lifetime income rider for any bundle of assets they happen to manage. Risk exposure and insurance costs would be prohibitively high. Instead, the CDA offers RIAs an insurable range of investment options; the riskier the option, the higher the insurance fees. The RIAs, it is hoped, will accept that minor loss of choice as long as the assets are under their control and not in a variable annuity separate account.

© 2013 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

European employers ponder ways to cut pension costs

Pension funds thinking to switch from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) could get the best of both worlds by managing for income risk rather than investment risk, according to Jan Snippe, the pensions adviser at Dimensional Retirement Europe.

Speaking at a conference held by the employers’ organization AWVN (General Employers’ Association Netherlands), Snippe said that DC investment management could take into account possible future sources of income, including possible DB rights and “human capital.”

Snippe runs the Dimensional Fund Advisors SmartNest business in Europe. He came to the firm from Royal Philips Electronics, where he was head of corporate pensions. (Philips pioneered SmartNest, which has ties to Nobelist C. Robert Merton.) In this role, he was responsible for developing a company-wide pension strategy and ensuring that pension risk exposures were consistent with the company’s overall risk policies.

He said these additional sources of income might allow participants to take investment risk in DC plans, although he stressed that investment decisions should not be left to participants.

But he also recommended giving participants more influence over their mandatory minimum pensions by giving them more options on increased saving, later retirement or increased investment risk. The administration of such tailor-made DC plans would still be “relatively easy,” Snippe said.

Also during the event, AWVN’s Willem van de Rotte urged employers to use the pending changes in the pensions legislation to drop “expensive and complicated” transitional arrangements for early retirement.

These arrangements, he said, caused workers to be more “inflexible” and increased the cost of pension provision by as much as 30%. “These transitional schemes are hardly appreciated by workers,” he said.

Leon Mooijman, head of AWVN’s advisory team on pensions, said that at least 80% of workers in an early retirement plan had decided to keep on working, earning approximately 180% of their salary as a result.

He argued that employers should compensate their staff for the government plans to limit the tax-facilitated pensions accrual to a salary of €100,000 and decrease the yearly pensions accrual. He also suggested employers’ pensions cost could be decreased by returning at least a part of the contribution to the employer.

The information in this article originally appeared at IPE.com.

The Bucket

Transamerica webinar will focus on DC in-plan income solutions 

Transamerica Retirement Solutions will host a webinar at 2 p.m. June 27 for financial advisors on in-plan income solutions. Titled “In-Plan Retirement Income Solutions: Understanding Participant Interest,” it will focus on a survey of defined contribution (DC) plan participants nearing retirement.   

According to the survey 65% of survey respondents ages 50 and older were interested in having a guaranteed income option in their DC plan. Interest was higher among those 40-49 years old.

Concerns about individual retirement readiness have made guaranteed in-plan income solutions an attractive option for many plan participants. This webinar will help financial advisors understand what drives that interest and how these solutions can be an important part of a participant’s retirement portfolio.

Financial advisors can register for the webinar by calling Transamerica at 888-401-5826 and selecting option one, Monday – Friday, 9:00 a.m. – 7:00 p.m. Eastern Time.

New Genworth FIA guarantees at least 104% of principal after 5 years

Genworth said it has added a five-year, single premium, fixed deferred annuity with a four percent guaranteed minimum accumulation floor to its lineup of SecureLiving fixed index annuities.     

SecureLiving Index 5 is linked to the S&P 500 Index and guarantees 104% of the premium at the end of the surrender charge period, less adjustments for withdrawals.  

After the first contract year ends, contract owners may withdraw up to 10% of the contract value per year without a surrender charge or market value adjustment.

A “bailout provision” allows the annuity owner to withdraw the entire contract value of the annuity, without penalty, if the declared annual cap on the annual cap strategy falls below the contract’s bailout cap. The bailout cap is declared at contract issue and will not change during the life of the contract.  

SecureLiving Index 5 has two fixed-rate interest crediting options and four index crediting rate options, including Genworth’s patent-pending CapMax interest crediting methodology. The CapMax option provides the potential for the contract value to grow more quickly than with traditional index crediting methods in years of consecutive positive index growth. Each year, SecureLiving Index annuity contract owners can change their strategy allocations. 

The five-year fixed interest crediting strategy is available only at contract issue; in subsequent years, the contract owner can only allocate out of this strategy. The one-year fixed interest crediting strategy is available to allocate into after the first contract year.

© 2013 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

NIRS webinar to review study: ‘Retirement Crisis Worse Than We Think?’

The National Institute on Retirement Security will host a webinar on Thursday, June 20, 2013, at 11:00 AM ET to review the findings of a new study, “The Retirement Savings Crisis: Is it Worse Than We Think?

The study uses the U.S. Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances to analyze retirement plan participation, savings, and overall assets of all working U.S. households aged 25 to 64. The study also compares these results to industry benchmarks for retirement savings by age and income to reveal the true magnitude of the retirement savings crisis for working-age families.

The research will be available in advance of the webinar beginning at 8 AM ET on June 20th at www.nirsonline.org. A webinar replay will be available.

The National Institute on Retirement Security is a not-for-profit organization established to contribute to informed policymaking by fostering a deep understanding of the value of retirement security to employees, employers, and the economy.

Waiting for the DoL’s Fiduciary Do-Over

Anyone looking for conflicts of interest in the retirement world need look no farther than the conflict between the advisors who render advice to 401(k) plan sponsors and participants, on the one hand, and federal regulators like Assistant Labor Secretary Phyllis Borzi, director of the Employee Benefit Security Administration (EBSA), on the other.

Ms. Borzi, a regulator in a Democratic administration and a champion of ERISA (the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974), has positioned herself as a defender of the interests of rank-and-file participants—and especially of their interest in achieving the highest possible income during retirement at the lowest possible cost.

[To hear and see Ms. Borzi’s response to a question from Insured Retirement Institute President and CEO Cathy Weatherford at the IRI Government, Legal and Regulatory Conference in Washington, D.C. this week, see today’s lead feature in RIJ.]

So since 2009 she’s been pushing for a so-called “fiduciary standard” that would require the brokers and similar intermediaries who work with plan sponsors, plan providers and plan participants to set aside all interests except those of the plan participants when they render advice to either the plan sponsor or the plan participants.

The intermediaries, however, would prefer to work under the prevailing caveat emptor or “suitability” standard. Such a standard allows them to put their own direct (or indirect, if they work for a broker-dealer) financial self-interest ahead of that of the participants whom they advise and whose decisions they can easily influence—as long as it doesn’t harm the participants.

But it does harm the participants. In the ERISA-governed retirement plan setting, such a standard leaves room for intermediaries to err on the side of enriching themselves or their firms at the expense of plan participants. It lets them rescommend that plan sponsors select investment options that shift costs to participants. It lets them encourage participants who are no longer employed by the plan sponsor to transfer money from the plans to rollover IRAs, where it can generate higher fees for the intermediaries or their firms.

Pragmatic differences

At first glance, this debate might seem to raise philosophical questions that are ultimately unanswerable. Can anyone, for instance, other than a saint or a Solomon be equally faithful to two masters at the same time, especially when those two masters’ interests are not aligned? Or can a fair-minded intermediary render a solution that maximizes everyone’s interest?

But the question is not really that abstract. It’s comes down to whether you believe that establishing, in the retirement plan space, a standard of zero tolerance for abuse of trust, zero tolerance for asymmetry of information between buyer and seller, and zero tolerance for any mis-labeling of sales pitches as “advice” will A) Clean up Dodge City for the benefit of all or B) Sterilize Dodge City of all commercial activity, to the detriment of all. (Or, as Woody Allen might put it: If you drive the money-changers out of the temple, how will you break a $20?)

Ms. Borzi evidently takes position A. The financial services industry (or the segment of the industry that’s vocal on this issue) takes position B. It’s the more pragmatic position. It says that if you try to create a marketplace where service-providers can’t make a good living, then the intermediaries will leave and you won’t have any services at all.

Reasonable people might eventually be able to compromise here—and perhaps they will. But only to a point. That non-negotiable point will probably involve the acceptability of sales commissions. The sales commission or load is as fundamental to financial services as alcohol is to the 6 p.m. networking sessions at industry conferences. And a strict fiduciary rule would have to outlaw all but capped commissions.

Commissions can’t exist under a fiduciary standard, for at least three reasons. First, there’s no clear relationship between the services rendered and the amount of the compensation. (Sales sessions, it should be universally agreed upon, do not qualify as advisory services. It’s a canard to equate sales with financial advice.)

Second, commissions and similar arrangements like revenue-sharing can’t tolerate sunlight. They deliberately obscure the influence of third-party interests. They rely on so-called asymmetrical information, and always to the disadvantage of the client. Third, manufacturers and distributors calibrate commissions explicitly to satisfy their own interests and not the customers’. Participants don’t have a seat at the table.

It’s been argued, by supposedly serious people, that commissions are good for people with smallish account balances. The idea is that intermediaries can’t afford to spend time with them any other way. But this idea makes no sense. If the IRS, for instance, were to use the same logic, then income tax rates would be graduated in reverse, just as break-points on sales commissions are, on the grounds that the government can’t afford to provide public services to low-income people any other way. You can make that argument—flat-tax advocates do—but it represents a mean-spirited brand of public policy. You can’t claim with a straight face that it’s good for modest earners. You’ll certainly never get a Democratic Department of Labor official to believe that a bad sale is better than no sale.

A strange game

Nonetheless, the odds that the DoL will succeed in establishing a strict fiduciary standard for advisors are not very high. Ms. Borzi’s initial regulatory proposal was withdrawn under a superstorm of negative feedback from corporate attorneys and financial industry lobbyists. Her office has been slow to offer a revision, and at the IRI conference this week she was vague about when it will do so. It’s possible that a new fiduciary rule with enough exemptions might satisfy the retirement industry and squeak through. But Ms. Borzi might as well try to reinstate Prohibition as try to establish a standard of conduct that prohibits sales commissions. 

A very real problem for Ms. Borzi is the lack of solidarity within the government on the fiduciary question. The Securities and Exchange Commission, which regulates the activities of investment advisors outside of retirement plans, also needs to weigh in on the fiduciary issue. Its thinking isn’t necessarily aligned with the DoL’s, and its definition of fiduciary conduct is likely to be quite different. (Given the unique legalities of the ERISA world, the chances for a single, “harmonized” standard are nil, one lawyer at the IRI conference said privately.) Meanwhile, industry lobbyists are already working through sympathetic members of Congress to frustrate Ms. Borzi’s designs. Republican legislators seem especially disinclined to let a mere bureaucrat dictate the rules of the $9 trillion 401(k)/IRA game. 

Financial services itself is a strange and serious game. The fees and commissions, which look so small at first, produce mountains of tangible take-home pay for industry professionals. The gains for the amateurs, which loom so potentially limitless at first, can turn out to be insignificant, especially after fees, inflation, volatility, taxes, and unfortunate timing take their toll. In so many cases, only one of the two parties to an investment transaction fully understands how the game is played.

© 2013 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Wirehouses still widest distribution pipeline: Cerulli

Despite their higher costs and the shrinkage of their share of financial asset sales since 2007, wirehouses are still the most inviting sales pipeline for product manufacturers, according to the June edition of the Cerulli Edge-U.S. Asset Management Edition, from  Boston-based Cerulli Associates.

The four remaining wirehouses are Merrill Lynch Wealth Management, Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, UBS and Wells Fargo & Co. Their estimated share of sales has fallen to 41% from 48% since 2007, but that’s still more than double the market share of the next largest channel, regional broker/dealers, with 16%.


“Despite well-publicized market share losses, wirehouses still control the largest share of assets among advisor channels. Asset managers should consider these firms the single best opportunity to gain flows today,” said Bing Waldert, director at Cerulli Associates, in a release.  

“Our proprietary Opportunity Index helps asset managers and product manufacturers understand how to best allocate their resources among various distribution channels,” he added. “The index considers addressable assets, projected growth, and profitability. We analyze additional factors when evaluating the attractiveness of these opportunities, including advisor openness to working with wholesalers, use of packaged products, and predominance of proprietary products.”

“Cerulli still considers the wirehouses to be the most attractive distribution opportunity, with a score of 129, largely owing to their dominant asset market share,” Walters said. “Insurance broker/dealers, with minimal assets and heavy use of proprietary products rank last. The quickly growing registered investment advisor channel ranks on par with regional and independent broker/dealers.”

© 2013 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Bucket

Number of cash balance retirement plans grows 500% in 10 Years

Kravitz’s 2013 National Cash Balance Research Report shows a 500% increase in new plans over the decade and a 12% increase for the most recent year. This growth rate surpasses all other sectors of the retirement plan market, including 401(k) plans, which declined 3% in the same period.

10 largest cash balance plansAlso known as “hybrid” plans, cash balance plans combine features of defined benefit plans, such as high contribution limits, with features of defined contribution plans, such  as investment flexibility and portability. Cash balance plans now make up 20% of all defined benefit plans, up from 2.9% in 2001.

There were 7,926 cash balance plans active in 2011 (the most recent year for which complete IRS reporting data is available), up from 1,337 in 2001. There are 11.1 million participants in cash balance plans nationwide, with $724 billion in assets.

 “With 401(k) contributions limited to $17,500 a year and tax rates rising, cash balance plans offer welcome relief for business owners who need to increase tax-deferred retirement savings,” said Dan Kravitz, President of Kravitz.  

The 2013 National Cash Balance Research Report showed that:

  • Companies more than double contributions to employee retirement savings when adding a cash balance plan. The average employer contribution to staff retirement accounts is 6.2% of pay in companies with both cash balance and 401(k) plans, compared with 2.5% of pay in firms with 401(k) alone.
  • Small businesses continue to drive cash balance growth; 86% of cash balance plans are in place at firms with fewer than 100 employees.
  • The 30-year Treasury rate remains the most popular interest crediting rate (ICR). While the 2010 cash balance regulations introduced a wider range of allowable ICR options, most plan sponsors have stayed with the 30-year Treasury safe harbor rate to avoid unexpected cost issues with the new ICR options.

Prudential’s board authorizes share repurchases

Prudential Financial, Inc. (NYSE: PRU) today announced that its Board of Directors has authorized the repurchase of up to $1.0 billion of its outstanding Common Stock during the period from July 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014.

In June 2012, the Board authorized the repurchase of up to $1.0 billion of its outstanding Common Stock through June 30, 2013. The Company has repurchased approximately $150 million of its Common Stock through March 31, 2013 under that authorization.

Management will determine the timing and amount of any share repurchases under the share repurchase authorizations based on market conditions and other considerations. The repurchases may be effected in the open market, through derivative, accelerated repurchase and other negotiated transactions, and through plans designed to comply with Rule 10b5-1(c) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

Ameriprise advisors have new retirement engagement tool

Ameriprise Financial has launched Confident Retirement, a client engagement tool for its affiliated advisors that “leads clients to an understanding of their retirement needs based on their individual dreams and goals, and helps advisors figure out how to utilize their assets in retirement to help them achieve their expectations,” according to an Ameriprise release.

The Confident Retirement approach concentrates on four fundamental areas that advisors can address with their clients:

  • Covering Essentials
  • Ensuring a Lifestyle
  • Preparing for the Unexpected
  • Leaving a Legacy

Recent research revealed in the Retirement Check-In® survey found that on average, Americans nearing retirement report a gap of nearly $200,000 between what they have saved for retirement and what they believe they will need to live comfortably in retirement. The same survey shows that many Americans also lack confidence about being able to cover the essential expenses in retirement such as housing, food and taxes.

© 2013 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

IRI releases its 2013 Fact Book

The Insured Retirement Institute, the Washington advocacy group that evolved in 2008 from the National Association of Variable Annuities, has published its 2013 Fact Book, an annual “guide to information, trends, and data in the retirement income industry.”

The book contains useful descriptions of the retirement income market, historical sales data on variable and fixed annuities, definitions of the types of annuities and explanations of how they work, and demographic breakdowns of annuity ownership, among other information.

A wide range of readers—from insurance company executives looking for trends as well as individual investors trying to understand the differences between variable annuity share classes—is likely to find something useful in this 190-page spiral bound book.

According to an IRI press release, “The IRI Fact Book is published each year to help public policymakers, the media, advisors and their clients, and the entire insured retirement industry understand and keep current on changes in the retirement marketplace. The IRI Fact Book also is designed as a training tool and resource for those new to the business.”

Though designed for the public at large, the book doesn’t appear to be priced for maximum distribution. IRI members can obtain a free digital download of the Fact Book here or order a print copy for $74.95. Non-members can set up an account at IRI and purchase either a digital download or print copy at non-member rates ($249.95 and $149.95, respectively), according to IRI.  

To its credit, the book contains the good, the bad and the ugly about annuities and annuity trends, including a frank discussion of the impact of low interest rates on the annuity market and a discussion of the reasons for the withdrawal of some former variable annuity issuers from the marketplace.

Many insurance and investment companies contributed information to the book. Other contributors include many of the research firms in the retirement income space, such as Advantage Compendium, Beacon Research, Cerulli Associates, Cogent Research, Corporate Insight, GDC Research, Morningstar, and Practical Perspectives. 

© 2013 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

More advisors use ‘behavioral finance’ techniques: Brinker Capital

Behavioral finance—the fancy name for client irrationality—was the focus of Brinker Capital’s regular proprietary survey of financial advisor sentiment this spring. The survey showed that many advisors are consciously and formally incorporating elements of behavioral finance into their relations with clients.

For instance, the April 2013 edition of the Brinker Barometer, showed that 27% of the 289 advisors surveyed said they develop a written “Investment Policy Statement” for every client, and that 45% use one with some clients. The rest do not use such a tool.

Such tools are designed to help clients stick to an agreed-upon investment plan when market volatility spikes or when an upsetting newspaper article appears (such as the recent New York Times article warning that $1 million is not enough savings to retire on).   

Of the advisors at insurance companies, independent broker-dealers and in one-person offices whom Brinker surveyed, 77% said they have discussed behavioral finance issues with their clients. “Loss aversion” is “the single most important behavioral finance tenet they integrate into their client work,” they said.  

Brinker found no consensus among advisors regarding their clients’ responses to a financial setback:  

  • 47% of advisors said that when a client is upset with a poorly performing investment, their next investing decision is likely to be “charged with emotion.”
  • 31% said the next decision would be “a wiser one since they’ve learned from the bad experience.”
  • 22% believed that “poor investment performance has little to no effect on the next investment decision.”

Advisors were almost unanimous (94%) in saying that they speak with their clients about the concept of “purchasing power” in retirement—i.e., what the income from their investments might buy in retirement. Only 38% believed that the Consumer Price Index (CPI) was a satisfactory gauge of future spending power. A majority thought that using the CPI “plus three or four percent” was more effective.

Asked what asset classes they intend to allocate more to in 2013:

  • 48% of respondents said “absolute return” (vs. 46% in Q4 ’12)
  • 45% said “equities” (vs. 54% in Q4 ‘12)

Asked what asset classes they intend to allocate less to this year:

  • 58% said “fixed income” (vs. 51%)

Asked what asset classes they intend to allocate “about the same” to this year:

  • 60% said “private equity” (vs. 65%)
  • 49% answered “international” (vs. 57%)
  • 44% noted “emerging markets” (vs. 48% who said they’d allocated more to that asset in Q4 ’12)

© 2013 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Vanguard issues its annual DC report: “How America Saves”

The 2013 edition of How America Saves, Vanguard’s annual compendium of data on its own full-service defined contribution business, which includes some 1,600 plan sponsors with three million participants and about $500 billion under management, or about one-eighth of all dollars in DC plans in the U.S. 

This year’s results show the steady growth in the use of target-date funds and managed account solutions by plan participants. “At year-end 2012, 36% of all Vanguard participants were solely invested in an automatic investment program—compared with just 17% at the end of 2007. Twenty- seven percent of all participants were invested in a single target-date fund; another 6% held one traditional balanced fund; and 3% used a managed account program,” the report said.

Vanguard expects the trend to continue. “Among new plan entrants (those participants entering the plan for the first time in 2012), a total of 73% of new participants were solely invested in a professionally managed allocation. Because of the growing use of target-date options, we anticipate that 55% of all participants and 80% of new plan entrants will be entirely invested in a professionally managed allocation by 2017,” the report said.

In terms of accumulations, there’s a “barbell” shape to the distribution of account values over participant income levels. For instance, 24% of accounts have $100,000 or more and 31% of accounts have less than $10,000. In between, the percentages drop to the single digits.

The average and median balances hide those extremes. “In 2012, the median participant account balance was $27,843 and the average was $86,212. Vanguard participants’ median and average account balances rose by 9% and 10%, respectively, during 2012. Over the five-year 2007–2012 period, median and average balances rose 11% and 10%, respectively,” the report said.

If an average participant had contributed nothing between the end of 2007 and the end of 2012, his or her account value would have gone up by a combined total of 12%, Vanguard’s data tabulators found. “Reflecting strong stock market performance in 2012, the median 1-year participant total return was 13.3%. Despite the dramatic decline in stock prices during the 5-year period, 5-year participant total returns averaged 2.3% per year or 12% cumulatively,” the report said.

The data show that about $150 billion of the $500 billion in Vanguard’s DC plans belongs to people who no longer work for the plan sponsor but who haven’t moved their money out of the plan. That’s $150 billion in potential IRA rollover money for competing fund companies and custodians.

“Participants separating from service largely preserved their assets for retirement,” the report said. “During 2012, about 30% of all participants could have taken their account as a distribution because they had separated from service in the current year or prior years. “The majority of these participants (82%) continued to preserve their plan assets for retirement by either remaining in their employer’s plan or rolling over their savings to an IRA or new employer plan. In terms of assets, 96% of all plan assets available for distribution were preserved and only 4% were taken in cash.”

© 2013 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Ultra-Easy Money Experiment

The world’s central banks are engaged in one of the great policy experiments in modern history: ultra-easy money. And, as the experiment has continued, the risk of failure – and thus of the wrenching corrections and deep economic dislocations that would follow – has grown.

In the wake of the crisis that began in 2007, policy rates were reduced to unprecedented levels, where they remain today, and measures were taken to slash longer-term rates as well. Nothing like it has ever been seen before at the global level, not even in the depths of the Great Depression. Moreover, many central banks’ balance sheets have expanded to record levels, although in different ways and for different rationales – further underscoring the experimental character of the monetary easing now underway.

The risks implied by such policies require careful examination, particularly because the current experiment appears to be one more step down a well-trodden path – a path that led to the crisis in the first place.

Beginning with the sharp monetary-policy easing that occurred following the 1987 stock-market crash, monetary policy has been used aggressively in the face of every economic downturn (or even anticipated downturn) ever since – in 1991, 1998, 2001, and, with a vengeance, following the events of 2007. Moreover, subsequent cyclical tightening was always less aggressive than the preceding easing. No surprise, then, that policy rates (both nominal and real) have ratcheted ever downward to where they are today.

It can, of course, be argued that these policies produced the “Great Moderation” – the reduction in cyclical volatility – that characterized the advanced market economies in the years leading up to 2007. Yet it can also be argued that each cycle of monetary easing culminated in a credit-driven “boom and bust” that then had to be met by another cycle of easing. With leverage and speculation increasing on a cumulative basis, this whole process was bound to end with monetary policy losing its effectiveness, and the economy suffering under the weight of imbalances (or “headwinds”) built up over the course of many years.

The Swedish economist Knut Wicksell raised concerns about such problems long ago. He suggested that a money rate of interest (set in the banking system) that was less than the natural rate of interest (set in the real economy) would result in inflation. Later, economists in the Austrian tradition noted that imbalances affecting the real side of the economy (“malinvestments”) were of equal concern.

Later still, Hyman Minsky contended that credit creation in a fiat-based monetary economy made economic crises inevitable. Finally, many economists in recent decades have identified how excessive leverage can do lasting damage to both the real and financial sides of the economy.

Looking at the pre-2007 world, there was ample evidence to warrant such theoretical concerns. While globalization was holding down inflation, the real side of the world economy was exhibiting many unusual trends. Household saving rates in the English-speaking economies fell to unprecedented levels. Within Europe, credit flows to peripheral countries led to unprecedented housing booms in several countries. In China, fixed capital investment rose to an astonishing 40% of GDP.

Moreover, similar unusual trends characterized the financial side of the economy. A new “shadow banking” system evolved, with highly pro-cyclical characteristics, and lending standards plummeted even as financial leverage and asset prices rose to extremely high levels.

The monetary policies pursued by central banks since 2007 have essentially been “more of the same.” They have been directed toward increasing aggregate demand without any serious concern for the unintended longer-term consequences.

But it is increasingly clear that ultra-easy monetary policy is impeding the necessary process of deleveraging, threatening the “independence” of central banks, raising asset prices (especially for bonds) to unsustainable levels, and encouraging governments to resist making needed policy changes. To their credit, leading central bankers have stated repeatedly that their policies are only “buying time” for governments to do the right thing. What is not clear is whether anyone is listening.

One important impediment to policy reform, on the part of both governments and central banks, is analytical. The mainstream models used by academics and policymakers differ in important respects but are depressingly similar in others. They emphasize short-term demand flows and presume a structurally stable world in which probabilities can be assigned to future outcomes – thus almost entirely ignoring uncertainty, stock accumulations, and the financial imbalances that characterize the real world.

Recalling John Maynard Keynes’s dictum that “the world is ruled by little else” but “the ideas of economists and political philosophers,” perhaps policymakers need new ideas. If so, the immediate prognosis for the global economy is not good. The latest fashion in policy advice is essentially still more of the same.

The call for “outright monetary financing” involves raising government deficits still further and financing them through a permanent increase in base money issued by central banks. Targeting the level of nominal GDP (or the unemployment rate, as in the United States) is a way of convincing financial markets and potential spenders that policy rates will remain very low for a very long time. All of these policies run the risk of higher inflation and/or still more dangerous economic imbalances.

Sadly, a fundamental mainstream reassessment of how the economy works is by no means imminent. It should be.

William White, a former deputy governor of the Bank of Canada and a former head of the Monetary and Economic Department of the Bank for International Settlements, is chairman of the Economic and Development Review Committee at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

© 2013 Project Syndicate.

The Fed at a Crossroads

I first entered the System as a neophyte economist in 1949. Then, as now, the Federal Reserve was committed to maintaining a pattern of very low interest rates, ranging from close to zero at the short end to 2½ percent or less for Treasury bonds. If you feel a bit impatient about the situation now, quite understandably so, recall that the earlier episode lasted 15 years.

The initial steps taken in the midst of the 1930’s continuing depression were at the Fed’s initiative. The pattern was held through World War II in explicit agreement with the Treasury. Then it persisted right in the face of double-digit inflation after the war, increasingly under the duress imposed by the Treasury and Presidential pressure.

The growing restiveness of the Federal Reserve was reflected in testimony by Mariner Eccles in 1948: “Under the circumstances that now exist, the Federal Reserve System is the greatest potential agent of inflation that man could contrive.”

That was pretty strong language by a sitting Fed governor and a long-serving Board Chairman. But it was then a fact that there were many doubts about whether the formal legal status of the central bank could or should be sustained against Treasury and Presidential importuning. At the time, the influential Hoover Commission on government reorganization itself expressed strong doubts. At any rate, over time calls for freeing the market met strong resistance.

Treasury debt had ballooned in the War, exceeding 100% of GDP, so there was concern about an intolerable impact on the budget if interest rates rose strongly. Ending Federal Reserve support might lead to panicky and speculative reactions, and declines in bond prices would drain bank capital. Main line economists, and the Fed itself, worried that a sudden rise in interest rates could put the economy back in recession.

All of that resonates today, some 60 years later, even if few now take the extreme view of the first report of the then new Council of Economic Advisors: “Low interest rates at all times and under all conditions, even during inflation” would be desirable to promote investment and economic progress. Not exactly a robust defense of the Federal Reserve and independent monetary policy.

Eventually, the Federal Reserve did get restless, and finally in 1951 rejected overt Presidential pressure to continue the ceiling on long-term Treasury rates. In the event, the ending of the “peg” was not dramatic. Interest rates did rise over time, but long bonds, with markets habituated for years to a low interest rate, remained at moderate levels. Monetary policy, free to act against incipient inflationary tendencies, contributed to 15 years of stability in prices, accompanied by strong economic growth and high employment. The recessions were short and mild.

No doubt, the challenge of orderly withdrawal from today’s broader regime of “quantitative easing” is far more complicated. The still-growing size and composition of the Fed’s balance sheet implies the need for, at the least, an extended period of “disengagement.” Moreover, the extraordinary commitment of Federal Reserve resources, alongside other instruments of government intervention, is now dominating the largest sector of our capital markets, that for residential mortgages. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to note that the Federal Reserve, with assets of $3.5 trillion and growing, is, in effect, acting as the world’s largest financial intermediator, acquiring long-term obligations and financing short-term, aided and abetted by its unique privilege to create its own liabilities.

Beneficial effects of the actual and potential monetization of public and private debt, the essence of the QE program, appear limited and diminishing over time. The old “pushing on a string” analogy is relevant. The risks of encouraging speculative distortions and the inflationary potential of the current approach plainly deserve attention. All of this has given rise to debate within the Federal Reserve itself. In that debate, I trust sight is not lost of the merits—economically and politically—of an ultimate return to a more orthodox central banking approach.

I do not doubt the ability and understanding of Chairman Bernanke and his colleagues. They have a considerable range of tools and instruments available to them to manage the transition, including the novel approach of paying interest on excess reserves, potentially sterilizing their monetary impact. What is at issue—what is always at issue—is a matter of good judgment, leadership, and institutional backbone. A willingness to act with conviction in the face of predictable political opposition and substantive debate is, as always, a requisite part of a central bank’s DNA.

Those are not qualities that can be learned from text books. Abstract economic modeling and the endless regressions of econometricians will be of little help. The new approach of “behavioral” economics itself is recognition of the limitations of mathematical approaches, but that new “science” is in its infancy.

A reading of history may be more relevant. Here and elsewhere, the temptation has been strong to wait and see before acting to remove stimulus and then moving toward restraint. Too often, the result is to be too late—to fail to appreciate growing imbalances and inflationary pressures before they are well ingrained.

There is something else beyond the necessary mechanics and timely action that is at stake. The credibility of the Federal Reserve, its commitment to maintain price stability, and its ability to stand up against pressing partisan political pressures is critical. Independence can’t just be a slogan. Nor does the language of the Federal Reserve Act itself assure protection, as was demonstrated in the period after World War II. Then, the law and its protections seemed clear, but it was the Treasury that for a long time called the tune.

In the last analysis, independence rests on perceptions of high competence, of unquestioned integrity, of broad experience, of non-conflicted judgment and the will to act. Clear lines of accountability to the Congress and the public will need to be honored.

Moreover, maintenance of independence in a democratic society ultimately depends on something beyond those institutional qualities. The Federal Reserve—any central bank—should not be asked to do too much, to undertake responsibilities that it cannot possibly meet with the appropriately limited powers provided.

© 2013 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Disaster Flick

With an orange Volkswagen bus, a film crew and a poster inviting people to “Be part of the movie,” Chad Parks took off on a six-week journey last year to interview ordinary Americans about retirement. He cruised the Las Vegas Strip, hung out in Boulder’s pedestrian mall and waylaid passersby in a New Orleans park. He heard many versions of a single story: typical Americans aren’t ready for retirement.

Parks’ videotaped interviews are the substance of “Broken Eggs” (www.brokeneggsfilm.com), a new documentary that explores what he calls “the looming retirement crisis.”

The film, as the video clips posted on the website demonstrate, will introduce viewers to the flesh-and-blood people behind the familiar dry statistics: that nearly half of American workers have saved less than $10,000 for retirement and fewer than 30% have saved eshannonven $1,000, at a time when pensions are disappearing, Social Security’s trust fund is shrinking and 401(k) plans are proving susceptible to volatility.    

“This fatal combination of outsourcing our futures to the government, corporations abandoning their pensions, and people not taking personal responsibility and saving enough will hit us hard,” he told RIJ recently. “The term ‘a perfect storm’ has been overused, but that’s what it is. No one is taking a top down look and tying all these trends together so we can have a clear picture of the reality of the way people retire.”

Broken Eggs is intended to add detail to that picture. The documentary, which he produced, aims to delve deeply into the retirement problem and spark some ideas for solutions. The film records the struggles of Baby Boomers, Gen-Xers and Millennials as they cope with the chore of saving for retirement. By the end of this summer, Parks hopes to begin distributing the film, perhaps through Netflix, Hulu, PBS or one of the cable channels. He also plans to distribute copies to financial companies as well as to universities and schools for use as an educational tool.

“For me, a good documentary makes me change my behavior,” said Parks. “I hope that people who watch will really stop and think, yeah, I got to do something.”

Wobbly three-legged stool

 “Broken Eggs” was conceived as a marketing campaign for Parks’ own company, The Online 401(k), a San Francisco-based company that specialized in web-based 401(k) plans for small businesses. Parks and his marketing director, Sylvia Flores, envisioned a promotional film. But as they researched their topic, they gradually realized the immense scope of it.  

Parks now describes the film as a non-profit “artistic” project, independent of his company (the company contributed $400,000 to the production). To provide the filmmaking experience he lacked, he brought in former CNN producer Emily Probst Miller. Miller signed on, she said, because CNN had never addressed the topic, although she considers it “one of the biggest social issues of our time.”

The story is about the insecurity and fear that many Americans feel about retirement. If Social Security, private pension plans and 401Ks each represent a leg of the theoretical “three-legged stool,” there’s a widespread sense that the stool is tottering.

“Every age group now has a different expectation of what retirement means,” said Parks. “People in their 60s and 70s generally have the three-legged stool. People in their 50s and 40s maybe have two out of the three legs, maybe Social Security and personal savings.  People in their 30s and 20s and even younger may have nothing but their personal savings to count on. They don’t even know where to begin.”

The retirement dilemma is often described in terms of averages—average savings, average performance, average household debt load and so forth. But, except for that fact that most of the people who appear in Broken Eggs seem to come from the western half of the U.S., there’s not much about them that’s average. Every story is unique.

Meet Rusty, Terry and Shannon

In the film, for instance, you’ll meet Rusty (above right), a 50-something bearded motorcyclist who has managed a small motel in Colorado since a disability sidelined his career in construction work. He never believed his mother’s advice about saving for a rainy day, and seems to take each day as it comes. But you’ll also meet Terry (below, right)  an engineer in his 70s, who despite the fact that he prudently saved 10% of his income and earned a small pension from an aircraft manufacturerJeanne , finds himself still working because he lost over a million dollars betting on Nevada real estate.

Among the women interviewed in the film, there’s Shannon (above, left), a practical-minded Canadian who works for the Canadian government there but who worries that the conservative administration, which has already raised the full retirement age to 67, might reduce her pension further. Her situation was nothing like that of Jeanne (left)  a 41-year-old cellist in a professional orchestra with a three-year-old child, whose lawyer husband recently jolted her confidence in the future by asking for a divorce.

For comic relief, two struggling young stand-up comedians are interviewed on a sidewalk in Austin, Texas. They joke with occasional profanity—this footage is semi-raw—but offer a few serious insights that people seldom share, such as the disillusionment one of them felt when he lost his job and half of his 401(k) account balance at the same time, because the employer’s matching contribution wasn’t vested yet at the time of termination.

Still no answers

Americans have begun to adapt to the new reality, Parks has found. Families have compensated for tight budgets by living in multi-generational households that include grandparents, parents, children and extended family, all under one roof. But the future, as always, holds lots of unknowns. Will Boomers throttle back their consumption when they realize that their savings may have to last for 30 years or more?  How will that affect the economy? And will today’s workers, Terrymany of whom struggle with student loan debt, even be able to contribute to a 401(k)? Some wonder if a 401(k) is even the proper vehicle for one’s life savings.

There are no easy answers to most of the questions posed in “Broken Eggs.” Parks himself favors a hybridized 401(k) system in which the government requires each individual and employer to contribute automatically to an individual retirement fund. Australia has such a system and Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa has proposed a similar plan, he said.

“The looming retirement crisis will affect all of us, but it is avoidable,” writes Parks on the “Broken Eggs” website. “We need to redefine what retirement means, we need to think about our family structures, and we need to be willing to make short-term sacrifices for the greater good. We all need to save in order to literally save ourselves.”  

© 2013 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Money managers are bullish on global equities

Institutional investors around the globe say they have a better handle on risk, but most worry about the challenges of rising volatility, inflation and low yields, according to a study by Natixis Global Asset Management (NGAM), which oversees more than $785 billion worldwide.  

The results, released by NGAM’s Durable Portfolio Construction Center, include insights from more than 500 institutional investors that collectively manage more than $11.5 trillion in assets.

Five years after the financial crisis upended markets, many institutional investors say the old rules of investing no longer apply in today’s markets. In the U.S., institutional investors (88%) feel strongly that traditional portfolio construction and diversification strategies aren’t ideal for most investors, and 60% of global institutions agree. Additionally, more than 70%, including a high concentration of sovereign wealth funds, say that setting asset allocation and taking tactical advantage of market movements is difficult.

The widespread attraction to equities continues, with investors particularly drawn to global stocks. Asked to project which asset class will perform best this year, the top choice was global equities (27%), followed by domestic stocks (19%) and emerging market equities (15%).

This optimism is reflected in most investors’ allocation plans for 2013, as 58% plan to increase their exposure to global stocks, 46% will add to their emerging market equity holdings and 42% will increase their weighting in domestic stocks.

Lower yields have made the risk-reward tradeoff of bonds less appealing for many investors, as 43% say they plan to scale back on their domestic bond exposure in 2013 and 42% will reduce their global bond allocations. U.S. investors are slightly more optimistic within their own borders, with only 29% saying they will reduce their domestic bond allocations. Investors worldwide are bearish on gold and cash, as more than 80% anticipate lowering or maintaining their current allocations to each.

Institutional investors have an above-average comfort level with alternative assets such as hedge funds, real estate, private equity and commodities. A large majority (85%) report that they own alternatives, and three in four say it is essential to invest in these strategies in order to diversify portfolio risk.

Most (60%) plan to add to their alternative investments, or other assets that don’t correlate with the broader market, in the next 12 months, with the most popular target areas being real estate (41%), private equity (36%) and infrastructure (30%).

Most are also bullish on the near-term performance prospects for alternatives, with 71% predicting that the assets they own will perform better in 2013 than they did last year. Institutional investors in the U.S. are more cautious, with less than half (48%) projecting better year-over-year performance.

While 89% of institutional investors are confident in their ability to meet their own future obligations, that confidence does not extend to individuals saving for retirement. A large majority of institutions (81%) in the U.S. say the average citizen won’t have enough assets in retirement, and seven in 10 (70%) globally say the same – a powerful message considering that many respondents manage retirement assets professionally. Institutional Investors expressed greater concern in Latin America (88%) and the United Kingdom (84%).

© 2013 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Advisors’ main goal: More wealthy clients

More advisors are optimistic about the economy than in previous years, but are concerned with rising interest rates and tax burdens, and few advisors rank social media as a priority for them, according to the Curian Advisor Survey: 2013 Outlook for Advisor Priorities.”

Curian is a registered investment advisor affiliated with Jackson National Life, a unit of the UK’s Prudential plc. In its sixth annual advisor survey, the firm polled 2,088 independent financial advisors with average AUM of $96.2 million at 186 firms.

Among the survey findings:

  • Acquiring more affluent clients was advisor’s most frequently stated goal for 2013 (72%). When asked the single biggest challenge advisors face, respondents reported growing and attracting clients and generating referrals (49%).
  • Fixed annuities ranked as the product that advisors were expecting to increase their usage of the least (at 2.5%)
  • 83% of advisors reported that they have access to adequate investment products to meet their clients’ retirement income needs.
  • More than 30% of advisors said they have 10% or more of their assets under management allocated to alternatives.
  • More than 87% of respondents said that tax efficiency and after-tax performance are important aspects of the solutions they propose to clients, while nearly 9% said they were not important (4% said they were unsure).
  • 54% of respondents believe the economy will improve in the next 12 months, while 26% were unsure. Only one-fifth of respondents reported they were pessimistic. In December 2011, only 34% of respondents felt optimistic.
  • Unemployment topped the list of the economic issues that advisors believe are the biggest threats to their clients’ wealth management plans at 23%, followed by government spending at 20%.
  • 30% of respondents reported that their clients also feel unemployment is the biggest threat to their wealth management plans, while 14% believe their clients perceive market volatility as the biggest threat. Declining Social Security benefits ranked as the lowest perceived threat for both advisors and their clients.
  • Nearly 95% of respondents were moderately or very concerned about rising interest rates and the impact this may have on the value of clients’ fixed-income investments; close to 6% were not concerned.
  • 63% of advisors also said they have access to and actively use tools and strategies to reduce the impact of taxes on clients’ investment portfolios. However, more than 28% of respondents said they have access to such tools but don’t use them.
  • 27% of advisors surveyed expect to increase their usage of separately managed accounts (SMAs) this year, while 24% said they expect to increase their usage of alternative investment products.
  • More than 31% of advisors report that they plan to increase their usage of alternative investments this year by 5-10%, and one-fifth of advisors plan to increase their usage by 10-15%.
  • 57% of advisors use multi-strategy open-end mutual funds, and 38% of advisors use single-strategy open-end mutual funds, to gain access or exposure to alternative asset classes.
  • More than three-fourths of advisors said they value ease-of-use of the platform and technology as the most valuable service from their advisory solutions provider, closely followed by strong performance history of the investment options provided (nearly 68%).
  • 94% of advisors said their existing clients garner them the most leads, followed by referrals from industry professionals such as CPAs, attorneys, insurance professionals and mortgage/real estate professionals (nearly 50%).
  • Only 6% of respondents selected social media, and fewer than 5% chose traditional media advertising, as one of their top three sources of leads.
  • Most advisors do not use social media within their practices, but those who do said they most frequently use LinkedIn (35%).
  • When asked what type of mobile device advisors would like to see from an asset management firm, the response was split; 49% preferred apps that mimic a firm’s primary website and 46% preferred calculators or tools for business purposes.
  • While one-third of advisors don’t use a tablet device, more than 50% of respondents reportedly prefer to use an Apple iPad or Apple iPad Mini; 7% use a Samsung Galaxy tablet, fewer than 3% use an Amazon Kindle Fire and other tablet devices had reported usage of less than 2% each.

© 2013 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Emerging market securities can boost a retirement portfolio: BNY Mellon

Adding real assets, emerging market equities and debt, and liquid alternatives to defined contribution plan investment line-ups could improve risk-adjusted returns, reduce volatility and protect against inflation, according to a recent white paper from BNY Mellon.  

The paper is entitled, Retirement Reset: Using Non-Traditional Investment Solutions in DC Plans. It claims that defined benefit (DB) plans tend to outperform DC plans primarily because DB plans include non-traditional assets and DC plans don’t.    

The report notes non-traditional approaches could enhance the success of investors in the current environment, which it expects to be characterized by lower long-term expected returns, higher volatility and heightened inflation risk. 

“If DC plans were constructed more similarly to DB plans, approximately 20% of the DC plan assets would be allocated to non-traditional strategies such as real assets, total emerging markets (which combine equities and fixed income) and liquid alternatives,” BNY Mellon said in a release.

“Equities comprise a higher percentage of the DC portfolios than they do of DB portfolios,” said Capone.   “We believe that applying the best DB practices to DC plans would reduce equity risk and home country bias as well as thoughtfully incorporating alternative investments to increase diversification, return potential and downside risk management.”

The real asset portion of the DC portfolio proposed by BNY Mellon is designed to hedge against inflation and would include Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS), real estate investment trusts (REITS), commodities and natural resource equities. 

“Combining emerging markets equity and fixed income would provide a more blended and balanced approach than allocating only to emerging markets equities… The more balanced approach has the potential to reduce portfolio volatility and diversify country and currency risks,” according to the report.

BNY Mellon sees liquid alternatives as a way for DC participants to diversify with assets that have a low correlation with the equities market.  “There is a wide range of liquid alternative strategies. We are using three hedge fund indices as proxies for this asset class,” the release said.

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