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Pension experts assess ‘OregonSaves’

With only about half of the US private-sector workforce currently covered by an employer-sponsored retirement plan, public policymakers and academics have been looking at the causes of this gap and at the success of measures taken to close it.

A team of prominent pension experts recently analyzed the records of the OregonSaves, a state-sponsored, employer-based, payroll-linked, auto-enrolled Roth IRA for workers whose employers didn’t actively sponsor a tax-deferred retirement savings plan for them. 

For their paper, “Auto-Enrollment Retirement Plans for the People: Choices and Outcomes in OregonSaves,” John Chalmers, Olivia S. Mitchell, Jonathan Reuter and Mingli Zhong assessed the success of the program by analyzing participation choices, account balances, and inflow/outflow data using administrative records between August 2018 and April 2020.

Their findings:

“Within the small to mid-sized firms served by OregonSaves, estimated average after-tax earnings are low ($2,365 per month) and turnover rates are high (38.2% per year). We find that younger employees and employees in larger firms are less likely to opt out, but that participation rates fall over time. 

“The most common reason given for opting out is “I can’t afford to save at this time,” but the second most common is “I have my own retirement plan.” At the end of April 2020, 67,731 accounts had positive account balances, holding $51.1 million in total assets. 

The average balance is $754, but there is considerable dispersion, with younger workers accumulating the fewest assets due to higher rates of job turnover.

“Overall, we conclude that OregonSaves has meaningfully increased employee savings by reducing search costs. The 34.3% of workers with positive account balances in April 2020 is comparable to the marginal increase in participation at larger firms in the private sector. 

“Nevertheless, there are significant constraints to the savings that auto-enrollment savings plans can achieve when provided to workers in industries and firms with low wages, volatile wages, and high turnover. Our evidence suggests that employees who are opting out of OregonSaves are often doing so for rational reasons.”

© 2022 RIJ Publishing LLC. 

Breaking News

Income Lab launches ‘Life Hub’

Income Laboratory, Inc., a retirement income planning software provider, has introduced Life Hub, an interactive tool for that allows clients of financial advisers to “visualize their financial lives on one page, at any level of detail, and at any point in time.” 

Life Hub is the only tool that seamlessly integrates dynamic retirement income plans and tax-smart distribution strategies. More than 200 advisors have been beta testing Life Hub for the past six months and the tool has just gone live, an Income Lab release said. 

Financial advisors use Income Lab’s advanced technology to build and monitor dynamic retirement income plans that help retirees adjust for evolving economic and market conditions and make tax-smart distribution decisions. Income Lab’s software monitors retirement plans monthly to see whether circumstances have changed sufficiently to warrant modifications and then notifies advisors, who can discuss any adjustments with clients.

Life Hub is currently included as part of the Income Lab retirement planning software available to advisors at rates ranging from $159 per month for a single advisor to $139 per month for large teams of advisors.

Ubiquity and Paycor announce 401(k) partnership

Ubiquity, one of the first fintech firms to set up retirement plans for small businesses for a flat fee, is partnering with Paycor HCM, Inc., a provider of human capital management (HCM) software, to expand its market reach.

Paycor will refer small business owners and startups to Ubiquity to provide retirement benefit solutions with less of the usual administrative burden of starting a 401(k) plan.

Ubiquity also plans to rollout a suite of IRA solutions this year to meet the needs of companies where a 401(k) may offer more savings than is needed, and to satisfy state retirement plan mandates. Additionally, a Pooled Employer Plan (PEP) solution will be available.

Amber Williams to lead Lincoln ESG initiatives

Lincoln Financial Group has appointed Amber Williams, CFA, as senior vice president and head of Client Investment Strategies. She will serve as  Chief Sustainability Officer, the Philadelphia-based life/annuity company has announced.

Williams will oversee Lincoln’s Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) efforts and disclosures, “guiding the continuous improvement of the environmental impact of company operations, advocating for and supporting the integration of ESG priorities across business areas and encouraging a sustainability mindset across the enterprise,” a Lincoln release said.

At Lincoln since 2019, Williams developed the Client Investment Strategies team. Prior to Lincoln, she worked in a variety of investment product management and investment consulting roles at Nationwide Investment Management Group. Most recently, she served as Head of Product Management.

Williams holds a BA in Accounting from the University of Phoenix, is a member of the CFA Society of Philadelphia, and holds her Series 6, Series 7 and Series 24 securities licenses.

© 2022 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Demographics and interest rate policy favor annuities: LIMRA

Heartened by first quarter 2022 US annuity sales, which rose 4% to $63.3 billion, LIMRA said this week that it expects the current momentum to continue for several years. LIMRA is the life insurance industry’s marketing and research arm.

“The outlook for rising interest rates and fairly level equity markets will have investors continuing to look for the balance between protection, growth, and guaranteed income, creating a strong potential for individual annuity sales to break the all-time record levels of sales experienced in 2008,” said Todd Giesing, assistant vice president, LIMRA Annuity Research, in a new release.

Rising interest rates will allow manufacturers the ability to add more value to their solutions, leading to higher sales, according to Giesing. “We see steady growth in both fixed and deferred annuity sales with the potential for seeing over $300 billion in sales in just two short years,” he said. 

A growing market
The US population aged 65 or over is expected to grow by more than 8.5 million by 2026, LIMRA said, citing data from Oxford Economics. LIMRA data show individual annuity product sales clustering around the traditional retirement age of 65. In addition, the COVID pandemic accelerated the decision to retire.

“We saw a massive amount of unemployment in the US due to COVID-19 events, resulting in a portion of Americans near retirement altering their initial plans and retiring earlier than anticipated,” Giesing said.

The traditional variable annuity (VA) market rebounded in 2021, with sales increasing 16% from the prior year. Sales of products without income riders (guaranteed living benefits, or GLBs) grew 28% and sales of structured variable annuities—also known as Registered Index-Linked Annuities or RILAs—rose 62% during the year.

“By 2023, traditional VA sales will flatten out as economic conditions continue to improve. There will be continued pressure not only on investment-focused traditional VAs, but also on traditional VAs with guaranteed living benefits from carriers that have shifted their focus to registered index-linked annuities, or RILAs,” Giesing said.

He expects an increase in RILA product offerings with guaranteed living benefits.

“After the challenges faced during the height of the pandemic, the indexed annuity market rebounded with 2021 sales increasing 15%,” the release said. Similar to the traditional VA market, sales of products without guaranteed living benefits grew at a faster clip as investors were looking for the balance of principal protection and growth.”

© 2022 RIJ Publishing LLC.

How Annuity Risks Get Passed to the Bermuda Triangle

To assess the role of reinsurance in the today’s annuity industry, RIJ recently obtained and analyzed key pages from the most recent state statutory filings of the ten life insurance companies or financial groups that sold the most fixed indexed annuities (FIAs) in 2021. 

FIAs, if you’re unfamiliar with them, are structured products inside insurance wrappers. Using options strategies to bet on equity or blended indexes, they’re built to capture part of the gains when equity markets rise over specified periods; they return zero when equity markets fall. 

Invented only about 25 years ago, FIAs are now a bread-and-butter product for certain life insurers, with $63 billion in 2021 sales. They flourished after the Great Financial Crisis, thanks in part to their safety. They pose little risk either to the life insurers that issue them or the older investors who typically buy them. 

A decade ago, giants in the private equity (PE) and private credit businesses began investing in or partnering with life insurers that issue FIAs. FIAs provide deposits for what RIJ calls the “Bermuda Triangle” strategy, which also involves reinsurance and the creation of private credit.

This week, we look at the 2021 data regarding the reinsurance leg of the triangle. The data comes from the annual statutory filing that life insurers are required to file in the state in which they are legally domiciled. 

The numbers here show that leading private equity-linked FIA issuers ceded the risk (the liability) of 95% of their 2021 annuity sales off their own balance sheets and onto the balance sheets of affiliated or co-owned reinsurers located mainly in Bermuda.

At the same time, using a special form of reinsurance, the annuity issuers retained ownership of 61% of the assets backing those liabilities; the affiliated or co-owned Bermuda reinsurers (and their third-party investors) make up the difference. In most cases, the same private equity/private credit firm manages all or a large portion of the assets of both the annuity issuer and the reinsurer. These relationships form the Bermuda Triangle. 

Private equity firms dominate FIA sales

The first column of Table 1 shows the largest FIA issuers: The total amount of annuity premium it gathered in 2021, including all types of annuities; the total amount of annuity premium it moved off its balance sheet to a reinsurer; and (in the last three columns) the amounts of annuity premium it reported. 

In the first column, the top issuers of FIAs are listed. The results from Sammons Financial Group  includes sales of two companies—Midland National and North American. The results from American Equity Investment Life also include two companies—American Equity and Eagle Life. Most of these insurance companies work closely with asset managers, who either started or purchased them, are part owners, or have investment agreements with them.  

Asset manager-led life insurers now dominate the FIA industry. Apollo Global Management owns Athene and its reinsurers. Blackstone works closely with Fidelity & Guaranty Life. Eldridge Industries (led by former Guggenheim Partners president Todd Boehly) owns Security Benefit. 

Sammons is a significant but minority owner of Guggenheim Partners. Brookfield Re owns 16% of American Equity, according to the Des Moines Register. KKR owns Global Atlantic, which owns Forethought (formerly part of The Hartford). Blackstone has a minority stake in AIG, and will be a part owner of Corebridge, which will be the trade name of AIG’s retirement business after an initial public offering planned for this year.

Only three FIA leaders here without prominent PE ties appear on the top-10 list: Allianz Life (a subsidiary of Allianz of Germany), Nationwide (the household-name multi-line insurer), and SILAC (created in 2015 by former Conseco CEO Steve Hilbert out of Sterling Investors Life).

Reinsurance reduces reported premium

In the next three columns on Table 1, to the right of the company names, note their total annuity sales (of all contract types), the level of “reinsurance ceded” (which is deducted from gross sales on Schedule T of the statutory filings) and the level of total annuity sales net of reinsurance ceded. This is the amount of annuity premium that the issuer “ceded” to its reinsurer(s), another life insurance company or specialized reinsurer. The reinsurance ceded, in effect, changes the amount of premium that reaches the carrier’s balance sheet.  

The PE-affiliated companies ceded the most. Athene ceded $18.78 billion of its $22.43 billion in premium; American Equity ceded $10.13 billion; Fidelity & Guaranty Life ceded $6.67 billion; Security Benefit Life ceded $4.98 billion; Midland National (Sammons) ceded $3.46 billion; and Forethought ceded $3.33 billion. American Equity and Fidelity & Guaranty Life ceded so much that they ended up reporting negative premium for the year. 

The last two columns in Table 2 show the new FIA premium that each life insurer reported on its statutory filing for 2021 and the 2021 FIA sales it reported to Wink, Inc., which gathers and syndicates annuity sales data and other information. A side-by-side comparison of the two columns shows a correlation between the PE-affiliation, the use of reinsurance, and large differences between the FIA premium reported to the state regulators and to Wink. It’s not clear yet what this correlation might mean.   

By contrast, Allianz Life ceded only $600 million and Nationwide ceded only about $90 million. American General itself acted as a reinsurer in 2021, assuming over $2.2 billion in premium from three British insurers. The differences between the FIA premium on their statutory filings and the figures reported to Wink were smaller for these three life insurers than for the other FIA issuers, but the significance of that difference isn’t immediately clear.

Together, the companies in Table 1 reported total annuity sales (group and individual) of $87.3 billion and ceded $52.1 billion, or just over 60%, to reinsurers. The seven PE-linked companies reported total annuity sales of $51.87 billion in 2021 and reported ceding $49.67 billion in 2021. In other words, they ceded the equivalent of 95% their new annuity business to reinsurers.

Affiliated reinsurers

But not to independent reinsurers. The data in the first three columns of Table 2 includes the leading FIA issuers, their home states, their reinsurers (in red, if affiliated), and the amount of annuity business that they reinsured (“reinsurance ceded,” as reported in Table 1). The table shows that PE-linked life insurers ceded their annuity business mainly to affiliated reinsurers.  

Athene moved business onto the balance sheet of two affiliated insurers within Athene Holding, whose parent is Apollo. American General, a subsidiary of AIG, ceded business to Fortitude Re, which had been AIG’s own reinsurance division until its sales to a group of investors led by the Carlyle Group in 2020. Fortitude Re is domiciled in Bermuda.

Sammons created SFG Bermuda in 2021 in order to establish its own Bermuda Triangle synergies. American Equity used Brookfield Re, which owns part of American Equity. American Equity affiliate Eagle Life used American Equity as its reinsurer. Forethought and Security Benefit each used its parent’s reinsurer, Global Atlantic and SkyRidge, respectively.  

Bermuda-based reinsurers

Most of the reinsurers listed here—Athene Re, Brookfield Re, Fortitude Re, SkyRidge, SFG Bermuda, Kubera, Aspida Life Re, and Global Atlantic—are based in Bermuda. The exceptions are Talcott Resolution Life (which was The Hartford until 2018), and Heritage Life, a Arizona-domiciled life insurer created to serve annuity issuers in need of a specialized type of reinsurance. Bermuda, Arizona, and Vermont are among the jurisdictions where insurers and reinsurers can use different or more flexible accounting standards.

“Modco” reinsurance

A specific type of once-rare type of reinsurance is used in these transactions. “Modco” reinsurance allows FIA issuers to shift liabilities from its own balance sheet to reinsurers while keeping the premium (or assets purchased with the premium) backing the liabilities. These “withheld” funds are still owned by the “ceding company”—the company that sold the annuities in the first place—and are listed as a liability on the ceding company’s balance sheet. (Ownership of the withheld funds may vary from one reinsurance deal to another.)

In more conventional reinsurance negotiations—between unrelated companies—an independent reinsurer wouldn’t accept the risks (investment risk, lapse risk, longevity risk, mortality risk, or interest rate risk, for example) of ceded business without simultaneously receiving enough cash or assets to offset the risks (i.e., to pay the policyholders’ claims and generate a reasonable profit for itself). We’ll describe the purpose of less-than-arm’s-length modco reinsurance between members of the same holding company in a forthcoming article.

What it means, why it matters

None of this would be important if not for two facts about FIAs. They are now the bread-and-butter product for many life insurers. And they have become a sought-after source of funds for private equity and private credit firms like Apollo for lending to high-risk borrowers. Asset managers bundle the loans, slice them into risk-ranked tranches, and sell the tranches to investors who want higher fixed-income yields than public-market bonds with comparable risk profiles offer.

Along with the asset managers and annuity issuers, the Bermuda reinsurers represent the third leg of the Bermuda Triangle strategy—serving as a device for processing US insurance liabilities (annuities, in this case) into high-yield assets for global distribution. Financial firms that control all three corners of the triangle have come to dominate the FIA business. 

But why do companies cobble together these legally and financially complex cross-border arrangements? Next week, RIJ will examine the benefits and potential hazards of the reinsurance leg of the Bermuda Triangle. 

© 2022 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

You Can’t Eat Your Own Head

Every so often the Penn Wharton Budget Model sends out a depressing new report about the un-sustainability of US government finances. The PWBM often depicts the federal government (though not in so many words) as up to its neck in ink that’s as red as Uncle Sam’s trouser stripes.

Based in Philadelphia, PWBM is a non-partisan econometrics group that analyzes proposed federal legislation and estimates the impact of new fiscal initiatives on the nation’s long-term budget. Its latest release describes US finances as not sustainable. PWBM’s economists wrote: 

“We estimate that, under current law, the US federal government faces a permanent present-value fiscal imbalance of $244.8 trillion, or 10.2% of all future GDP… A positive permanent fiscal imbalance implies that federal debt payments continue to increase indefinitely relative to the size of the economy, which is not fiscally sustainable.”

Those numbers come from a projection to perpetuity. The present value of the imbalance projected over just the next 75 years is a more manageable $104.3 trillion. That includes $27.5 trillion in US Treasury debt, $36.3 trillion in payouts in excess of tax receipts by Social Security, and [federal purchases of public goods and services] of $77.5 trillion. The total is reduced by the $37 trillion the government owes itself (intra-governmental debt).

“That [$104 trillion] is the extra resources that, if available today, would permit maintenance of current receipt and expenditure laws for the next 75 years (2021-95),” the new report said.

To solve this shortfall, the PWBM economists say:

“The government would save this money at the long-term borrowing rate, like a very large trust fund, and spend it down over time as needed, reaching full depletion by the 75th year.”

These numbers make the US government look like a household with lousy credit, or a private business not productive enough to earn its way out of its hole. That outlook is depressing—it implies that the US might need to sell its public lands, for instance, and put the money aside somewhere.

Fortunately, this analysis isn’t the only way to describe our situation.

Yes, the US would probably appear fiscally healthier if as a nation we manufactured more domestically, imported less, and financed more public expenditures with tax revenue than debt.  

But PWBM’s bleak portrait of America’s financial future—despite the scholarly chops of the authors, the undoubted precision of the calculations and the internal logic of the underlying model—just doesn’t ring true. 

History doesn’t validate it.

Over the past 15 years, we’ve seen repeated financial crises where the Federal Reserve and Treasury bailed out the private sector (and not the other way around). For more than 40 years, we’ve heard many predictions that our national “Don’t Tread on Me” snake is eating its own financial tail (and will eventually reach the head). 

But the head never gets around to eating itself. Why?

Those who hold Treasury debt consider it wealth, not a burden. Lending to the government doesn’t make individuals or banks poorer. Just because the federal government spends all the money it borrows, and doesn’t “save” money, that doesn’t mean that it can ever be “broke.” (State and local governments are a different story.) 

That’s a clue to the way our monetary system works. US money is borrowed into existence—by citizens, businesses and the federal government—from the banking system, which creates it through the act of lending. Money goes out of existence when loans are repaid or when federal taxes are paid. During the weeks, years or decades between its birth and disappearance, money passes (digitally, for the most part) from hand to hand and catalyzes essential activity. 

To avoid an excessive build-up of demand, the federal government taxes some of the money it spent into the economy back out of the economy. So it’s easy to frame the government as a destroyer of precious liquidity. 

That accusation can be made persuasive—but only by obscuring the roles of federal borrowing and taxing in the larger monetary cycle.

The US government could stop spending, lower taxes, pay down its debt, balance its budget, and fund only a military. But the deflation associated with such a deleveraging would devastate us all. It would make the US economy—not just the government—small enough to drown in the fiscal hawks’ proverbial bathtub. 

© 2022 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Bermuda ‘confident’ in regulating reinsurers

Bermuda’s premier told a Risk.net reporter this week that the Bermuda Monetary Authority (BMA) had addressed the concerns of Sen. Sherrod Brown (D-OH) and investigated the activities of insurers and reinsurers owned by private equity (PE) firms on the island.

The investigation turned up nothing. “We have examined these particular issues,” Bermuda’s premier David Burt said. “We are confident that we are regulating these companies appropriately.”

David Burt

But Burt did not provide any documentation of an investigation by the BMA, which regulates $707 billion of life insurance assets reinsured on the island, according to Risk.net.

It was not clear why Bermuda authorities responded to a query that Brown sent in March to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and the Federal Insurance Office.

Brown, the chairman of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, inquired about the growing role of private equity firms in the life/annuity industry. The NAIC responded on May 31 to Brown’s request, and described the state-based oversight of private equity firms in the US insurance industry as adequate and effective.  

Regarding Bermuda, “Insurers reinsured an additional $163 billion of pension and annuity assets on the island in 2020, the biggest annual influx of new business in a decade, according to the BMA’s latest annual report published on June 13. For the first time, life insurance assets reinsured on the island overtook assets under management held against property and casualty policies. In another first, capital held against pension and annuity business climbed above $100 billion,” according to Risk.net.

Much of that growth has come from private equity owned insurers. Apollo Global Management was the first to spot Bermuda’s potential. It set up Athene Life Re, the reinsurance arm of its in-house insurer Athene, in 2009.

© 2022 RIJ Publishing LLC.  

Robo-advice settlement costs Schwab $185 million

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) this week charged three Charles Schwab investment adviser subsidiaries for not disclosing that they were allocating client funds in a manner that their own internal analyses showed would be less profitable for their clients under most market conditions. The subsidiaries agreed to pay $187 million to harmed clients to settle the charges.

Without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings, Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., Charles Schwab Investment Advisory, Inc., and Schwab Wealth Investment Advisory, Inc., agreed to a cease-and-desist order prohibiting them from violating the antifraud provisions of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, censuring them, and requiring them to pay approximately $52 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest, and a $135 million civil penalty. 

The subsidiaries also agreed to retain an independent consultant to review their policies and procedures relating to their robo-adviser’s disclosures, advertising, and marketing, and to ensure that they are effectively following those policies and procedures.

According to the SEC’s order, from March 2015 through November 2018, Schwab’s mandated disclosures for its robo-adviser product, Schwab Intelligent Portfolios, stated that the amount of cash in the robo-adviser portfolios was determined through a “disciplined portfolio construction methodology,” and that the robo-adviser would seek “optimal return[s].” 

In reality, Schwab’s own data showed that under most market conditions, the cash in the portfolios would cause clients to make less money even while taking on the same amount of risk. Schwab advertised the robo-adviser as having neither advisory nor hidden fees, but didn’t tell clients about this cash drag on their investment.

Schwab swept money from the cash allocations in the robo-adviser portfolios to its affiliate bank, loaned it out, and then kept the difference between the interest it earned on the loans and what it paid in interest to the robo-adviser clients, the SEC said.

“Schwab claimed that the amount of cash in its robo-adviser portfolios was decided by sophisticated economic algorithms meant to optimize its clients’ returns when in reality it was decided by how much money the company wanted to make,” said Gurbir S. Grewal, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement.  

According to a release from Schwab:

The Charles Schwab Corporation reached a settlement with the US Securities and Exchange Commission to resolve an investigation into historical disclosures related to the Schwab Intelligent Portfolios (SIP) advisory solution, according to a release this week.

Under the terms of the settlement, Schwab will deposit $186.5 million into a Fair Fund account for distribution to affected investors. Schwab will also retain an Independent Compliance Consultant to review its current supervisory, compliance, and other policies and procedures concerning SIP-related disclosures, advertising, and marketing communications with clients or potential clients.

As disclosed in a Form 8-K filing dated July 1, 2021, Schwab’s second quarter 2021 financial results included a liability and related non-deductible charge of $200 million in connection with the settlement.

Excerpts from the company’s official statement include:

Schwab has resolved a matter with the SEC regarding certain historic disclosures and advertising related to Schwab Intelligent Portfolios between 2015-2018, and we are pleased to put this behind us. The SEC Order acknowledges that Schwab addressed these matters years ago.

In entering the settlement, Schwab neither admits nor denies the allegations in the SEC’s Order. SIP was designed to provide clients competitive returns across different market environments, and the ability to help weather volatility or challenging market conditions over time. The service recommends a diversified portfolio based on a client’s goals, time horizon and risk profile, and keeps the allocation consistent through automated rebalancing as markets.

We are proud to have built a product that allows investors to elect not to pay an advisory fee in return for allowing us to hold a portion of the proceeds in cash, and we do not hide the fact that our firm generates revenue for the services we provide. We believe that cash is a key component of any sound investment strategy through different market cycles.

The settlement with the SEC involves Schwab Wealth Investment Advisory, Inc., Charles Schwab Investment Advisory, Inc. and Charles Schwab & Co., Inc.

The Charles Schwab Corporation (NYSE: SCHW) provides 33.8 million active brokerage accounts, 2.3 million corporate retirement plan participants, 1.7 million banking accounts, and approximately $7.28 trillion in client assets. Its operating subsidiaries provide wealth management, securities brokerage, banking, asset management, custody, and financial advisory services to individual investors and independent investment advisors. 

© 2022 RIJ Publishing LLC. 

Breaking News

Fed hikes benchmark rate to 1.65%  

The Federal Reserve announced its decision to implement the monetary policy stance announced by the Federal Open Market Committee in its statement yesterday, June 15, 2022. The Fed’s Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System voted unanimously to raise the interest rate paid on reserve balances to 1.65%, effective June 16, 2022. A summary of the Fed’s economic projections can be found here.

[The price that banks pay each other for reserves at the Fed—reserves that they need in order to cover checks written by their depositors (including borrowers)—has just gone up. The increase in the cost of money will ripple through the economy, not only raising borrowing costs, but also reducing the market value of existing bonds and sending panic through leveraged investors in the equity markets. It also means that innocent people will lose their jobs—for the sake of reducing inflation. Inflation lowers the real yield on investments, which many Americans don’t own.]

As part of its policy decision, the Federal Open Market Committee voted to authorize and direct the Open Market Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, until instructed otherwise, to execute transactions in the System Open Market Account in accordance with the following domestic policy directive:

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System voted unanimously Wednesday to approve a 3/4 percentage point increase in the primary credit rate to 1.75%, effective June 16, 2022, according to Wednesday’s statement from the Fed. In taking this action, the Board approved the request to establish that rate submitted by the Board of Directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Effective June 16, 2022, the Federal Open Market Committee directs the Desk to:

  • Undertake open market operations as necessary to maintain the federal funds rate in a target range of 1.5% to 1.75%.
  • Conduct overnight repurchase agreement operations with a minimum bid rate of 1.75% and with an aggregate operation limit of $500 billion; the aggregate operation limit can be temporarily increased at the discretion of the Chair.
  • Conduct overnight reverse repurchase agreement operations at an offering rate of 1.55% and with a per-counterparty limit of $160 billion per day; the per-counterparty limit can be temporarily increased at the discretion of the Chair.
  • Roll over at auction the amount of principal payments from the Federal Reserve’s holdings of Treasury securities maturing in the calendar months of June and July that exceeds a cap of $30 billion per month. Redeem Treasury coupon securities up to this monthly cap and Treasury bills to the extent that coupon principal payments are less than the monthly cap.
  • Reinvest into agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) the amount of principal payments from the Federal Reserve’s holdings of agency debt and agency MBS received in the calendar months of June and July that exceeds a cap of $17.5 billion per month.
  • Allow modest deviations from stated amounts for reinvestments, if needed for operational reasons.
  • Engage in dollar roll and coupon swap transactions as necessary to facilitate settlement of the Federal Reserve’s agency MBS transactions.

The New York Times reported,”Officials predicted that the unemployment rate would increase to 3.7% this year and to 4.1% by 2024 and that growth would slow notably as policymakers push borrowing costs sharply higher and choke off economic demand.

“The Fed’s policy rate is now set in a range between 1.50 to 1.75 and policymakers suggested more rate increases to come. The Fed, in a fresh set of economic projections, penciled in interest rates hitting 3.4 percent by the end of 2022. That would be the highest level since 2008 and officials saw their policy rate peaking at 3.8 percent at the end of 2023. Those figures are significantly higher than previous estimates, which showed rates topping out at 2.8 percent next year.

“Fed officials also newly indicated that they expected to cut rates in 2024, which could be a sign that they think the economy will weaken so much that they will need to reorient their policy approach.”

NWL and Achaean Financial introduce SPIA with upside 

National Western Life Insurance Company (NWL) and Achaean Financial Holdings have launched what they call launch “a new and innovative single premium immediate annuity” or SPIA. RIJ reported on an earlier Achaean income product in September 2021.

Introduced as NWL Income+, the new product, to come onto the market in the third quarter of 2022, will provide lifetime income that delivers on two key features advisors and their clients are looking for in an income product: a highly competitive initial annual payment, and an innovative growth component that presents an opportunity for increasing income to help policyholders keep pace with inflation. 

The NWL Income+ is planned to be marketed as a stand-alone product to secure an immediate income stream today, and may be offered as an option on select deferred annuity products in the future.

National Western Life Group, Inc. is the parent organization of National Western Life Insurance Company, which is the parent organization of Ozark National Life Insurance Company, both stock life insurance companies in aggregate offering a broad portfolio of individual universal life, whole life and term insurance plans, as well as annuity products. 

As of March 31, 2022, the Company maintained consolidated total assets of $13.8 billion, consolidated stockholders’ equity of $2.3 billion, and combined life insurance inforce of $20.6 billion.Achaean Financial is a business-to-business licensing and marketing organization with an objective to address the multiple dislocations within US retirement market, using innovative proprietary products, software and marketing expertise.

Protective Life and Michael Finke in retirement education co-venture 

Protective Life Corporation, a US subsidiary of Dai-ichi Life Holdings, Inc., announced today the launch of a new goals-based income planning program with Michael Finke of The American College of Financial Services.

The program will supply financial professionals with the strategies needed to evaluate clients’ income needs, better understand key income risks and develop specialized strategies that will help protect their clients’ goals in retirement.

To learn more about the growing need for guaranteed income in retirement and gain additional insights and tools visit finpro.protective.com/retirement.

Michael Finke, Ph.D. is a professor of wealth management and Frank M. Engle Distinguished Chair in Economic Security at The American College of Financial Services. 

He received a doctorate in consumer economics from The Ohio State University in 1998 and in finance from the University of Missouri in 2011. He leads the O. Alfred Granum Center for Financial Security at The American College of Financial Services and is a Research Fellow at the Retirement Income Institute, and a member of the Defined Contribution Institutional Investment Association Academic Advisory Council.

Edelman expands its ‘Income Beyond Retirement’ program for 401(k)s

Edelman Financial Engines, the independent wealth planning and investment advisory firm, has launched Income Beyond Retirement (IBR), a retirement income solution designed for 401(k) plan participants in or near retirement.

“IBR combines portfolio management and technology-enabled analysis with financial advisor support to create highly personalized, flexible retirement income plans and investing strategies to match the individual needs of employees,” Edelman said in a release. 

IBR is currently offered by Boeing, Lenovo, Equifax, Milliken and Prime Therapeutics and many of the FORTUNE 500. Edelman Financial Engines said it is working with its 401(k) provider partners to make IBR available to plan sponsors. Currently, the solution is live with its direct provider partners and will be available across all partners soon.

Near-retirees aged 55 and older are offered a complimentary Retirement Checkup with an advisor, and together they develop a plan that manages to the employees’ anticipated needs while planning for the unexpected. IBR focuses on critical decisions, such as claiming Social Security and evaluating income and growth preferences.

Nationwide enhances RILA’s beneficiary features  

Nationwide has added two new complimentary, automatic death benefit features to its registered index-linked annuity (RILA), the Nationwide Defined Protection Annuity (DPA). The product was co-developed by Nationwide and Annexus, the indexed annuity designer.

  • Under the Return of Premium (ROP) death benefit feature, beneficiaries will receive no less than the original premium invested in the annuity. It is automatically added if the annuitant and co-annuitant are both 75 or younger on the application sign date. 
  • The Spousal Protection feature protects both spouses and provides a death benefit on both of their lives, even on qualified contracts. 

Nationwide DPA also provides three defined protection levels which limit negative performance. Clients can select how much of their investment—90%, 95% or 100%—will be protected from market losses and helps determine their performance opportunities. DPA also features a variety of index strategies whose performance determines the owner’s gains or losses.  

Under the Return of Premium Death Benefit, the Death Benefit is equal to the greater of the Contract Accumulation Value, or the purchase payment amount adjusted proportionately for any withdrawals, the Nationwide release said. 

Upon the first spouse’s death, the Contract Accumulation Value will be set equal to the purchase payment amount (adjusted for withdrawals), if greater. Upon the surviving spouse’s death, the Death Benefit (including the ROP if applicable) will be paid to the beneficiaries.

Under the Spousal Protection feature, a surviving spouse may continue the contract and name new beneficiaries. From that point on, any withdrawals will be treated as Preferred Withdrawals, and will receive full gains/losses and will not be subject to surrender penalty or market value adjustment. 

New three-year FIA from Midland National

Midland National Life Insurance Company and Midland Retirement Distributors have launched Summit Focus 3, a new three-year fixed index annuity, the two member companies of Sammons Financial Group announced this week.  

The Summit Focus 3 fixed index annuity offers:

  • A term length of only three years
  • Crediting rates that are guaranteed for the three-year term
  • Protection against losses during a market downturn
  • Growth potential based on the performance of quality index options
  • No taxes until a withdrawal is taken

“The contract period is designed for clients who need a short-term solution during a time of transition, or who may be looking for more upside potential than a traditional fixed-rate product can offer. The product is aimed at clients with concerns about the potential for annually declining rates in subsequent years of a longer-term contract,” the companies said in a release.

A subsidiary of Sammons Enterprises, Inc., Sammons Financial Group is privately owned. Its  member companies include Midland National Life Insurance Company (including Sammons Corporate Markets); North American Company for Life and Health Insurance; Sammons Institutional Group (including Midland Retirement Distributors and  Sammons Retirement Solutions), and Beacon Capital Management, Inc. 

© 2022 RIJ Publishing LLC.

The Bear That Ate My Grandfather

One fine evening in 1957, after stock prices collapsed and my grandfather’s railroad shares cratered, he took a rope down to the basement of his house in the Oxford Circle section of northeast Philadelphia–a basement smelling of scorched cotton from the mangle that my grandmother ironed sheets with–knotted the rope around an overhead pipe and hanged himself.

According to family lore, he had just told my grandmother, nonsensically, that “There’s enough for one but not for two.” “He did it, he did it,” my grandmother screamed at her sons through the mouthpiece of her black rotary phone.

The market bounced back quickly but not the family. When my grandfather died, I lost an intimate. I had sat on his lap and watched him smoke a cigar and read the Evening Bulletin, licking his thumb to turn the page. I lost a champion. He paraded me down Castor Avenue, introducing me to every shop keeper as the world’s single most remarkable grandchild. The deli owners paid tribute to the dauphin with a slice of salami handed over the counter, a pickle from the fragrant barrel, a delicacy from a wire nest of cookies. My grandfather took me to the broker’s too, to sit and watch the flickering marquee lights of the “ticker.”

Life was good, then it wasn’t. Most photographs of my grandfather, with his deceptive grin and his ‘big lunch’ ties, disappeared. From then on, the only words I heard my grandmother say about her late husband, whom she married in 1913 and outlived by 35 years, was, “Money, money, money. That was all the man talked about.” Of course, the dress shop on Kensington Avenue never yielded much, and my grandmother’s younger brothers were clerking for judges and moving to Scarsdale, but that’s another story. When I read ‘Death of a Salesman’ in high school, the characters were, spookily, people I’d known.

There’s a point to this sad tale. When I saw on Bloomberg yesterday that the stock market had fallen into “bear market territory,” I paid a little attention, but not much. I know the worst that a crash can do, and it’s not about money. A bear had eaten my grandfather. I also know, grimly but with no doubt, that despair over the stock market is never justified. Markets recover faster than families, and most families do too, eventually.

© 2022 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Why ‘Offshoring’ Annuity Risk Is Wrong

Any investor or adviser who relies on the products or services of the life insurance/annuity industry today should be aware that assessing the financial integrity of a company in that industry is more difficult now than in the past.

There are three reasons why: 

  • Certain annuity issuers are investing high percentages of their surplus in high-risk, affiliated or opaque assets. 
  • Certain life/annuity companies are reducing the costs of new business and the riskiness of new assets—or appearing to reduce them—by moving new assets and liabilities off their balance sheets through “reinsurance” with their own affiliates. 
  • The types of reinsurance practiced by certain life/annuity companies— especially “modified coinsurance”—are not like yesterday’s arm’s length reinsurance between unaffiliated, independently capitalized reinsurers. These new types of reinsurance make the balance sheets of life/annuity companies less transparent.

Tom Gober

These trends are making it harder for agents, advisers, and investors to evaluate the financial strength and the trustworthiness of the life/annuity companies whose products they use.

That’s why I and my colleague developed the Transparency, Surplus and Risky-assets Ratio, or TSR Ratio. It establishes a new, easy-to-interpret benchmark that shows the relationship of a company’s higher-risk and off-balance sheet assets to its surplus. 

Let me explain.

We need to measure each life/annuity company’s holdings of high-risk, affiliated or opaque assets by its percentage of its surplus; not its total assets 

The National Association of Insurance Commissioners concedes that life/annuity companies hold more risky, illiquid investments today than they once did. But regulators tried to minimize the threat of higher risk investments. Using CLOs as an example, the NAIC said CLOs were 2.6% of life/annuity industry’s total assets. 

That figure offers false comfort. It obscures the fact that risky or illiquid investments are concentrated at a handful of private equity-led annuity issuers. More important, it obscures the fact that risky assets often constitute a dangerously high percentage of those companies’ surplus.  

The NAIC also downplays the increasing amount of affiliated assets that some companies are holding. When a life insurer buys an asset from (invests in) an asset management subsidiary of its own holding company, it’s difficult for outside analysts to evaluate the value or riskiness of the asset. Its price or risk hasn’t been determined in the public marketplace, but by sister firms.

 In 2021, for instance, Athene Annuity and Life of Iowa, the top seller of fixed indexed annuities, held $10.36 billion in stock and IOUs from affiliated companies—sister companies in the same holding company. In my opinion as a forensic accountant and certified fraud examiner, that amount of affiliated paper should be compared with Athene’s surplus of only $1.28 billion. 

If just 12% of their reported affiliated paper became un-collectable in an economic downturn, Athene’s surplus—its buffer against insolvency—would vanish. If one of Athene Annuity and Life’s affiliates were to come under financial stress and not be able to pay Athene back, the negative impact on the other affiliates could be similar to a general national market downturn. 

I don’t take issue with moderate risk-taking in an insurers investment portfolio. But if all of a company’s high-risk and affiliated and off-balance sheet reinsurance were compared to its surplus, its true financial strength would be more readily seen.  

Reinsurance ceded to affiliates within Athene Holding. Source: Tom Gober, June 15, 2022.

 

Certain companies are moving large portions of their new business “off-balance sheet” through reinsurance. This allows them to write more new business and invest in riskier assets than if the new business and risky assets stayed on their own balance sheets. 

If a life insurance company sold $4 billion in new annuities in one year with a surplus of only $250 million to support it, state insurance regulators would be concerned that the company might be taking on more new business than its balance sheet could safely support. 

But regulators are less likely to be alarmed if that company moves most of those sales off its balance sheet; the volume of new business suddenly looks more manageable. I call this “lulling” the regulators.

The US companies can dramatically reduce the surplus required for new liabilities (i.e., sales) and eliminate the penalties for holding riskier assets in its general account, by sending the new business to an affiliated reinsurer in a favorable jurisdiction. If they sent the business to an independent reinsurer, that reinsurer would demand top dollar for assuming the liabilities, and the transaction wouldn’t yield any great savings for the original issuer. Absent fraud, most transactions with independent reinsurers are generally arms-length or fair and reasonable.

So, many for-profit US companies do not use independent reinsurers. They use a friendlier affiliated or captive reinsurer in a jurisdiction like Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Vermont, or Arizona. In these locations, because of differences in accounting standards, the required surplus and/or the risk-based penalties appear lower. In addition, the affiliated reinsurer might be less choosy when accepting risky assets in support of the liabilities, because they are all under common control and the savings all accrue to the same holding company.

Reinsurance in affiliated, unauthorized or offshore reinsurers is reducing the financial transparency of life/annuity companies, making it difficult for the public to determine the financial strength of annuity issuers.   

Leading issuers of FIAs today are using unorthodox types of  reinsurance to increase their ability to hold risky or affiliated assets and to increase their sales capacity without increasing their capital requirements. Virtually all the larger for-profit annuity carriers are engaged in medium to high levels of affiliated and offshore reinsurance; most of which I consider to be more for financial engineering than bona fide risk transfer. 

Reinsurance, done properly, can assist insurers in long-term planning and help avoid spikes in claims. In traditional reinsurance, the carrier cedes” blocks of business liabilities (death claims, annuity payouts) to another independent company. That assuming company takes on current and future claims liabilities and stands ready to pay to the ceding company all claims made on those blocks of business. 

Unfortunately, some insurance executives have found ways to game the already complex and arcane reinsurance process. I consider these transactions of offloading liabilities (future death claims or annuity payouts) to be a greater risk to annuitants because of the complex, arcane and opaque nature of captive or offshore affiliated reinsurance. The magnitude of such opaque deals is troubling.  

Some carriers create domestic, affiliated captive reinsurers in jurisdictions such as Vermont or Arizona where their financial information is statutorily made confidential. This lets them fund their liabilities with far less assets than the ceding carrier itself would need to fund the same liabilities in their own state. Some cede or offload large amounts of liabilities to affiliate reinsurers in  secrecy jurisdictions” like Bermuda, Barbados, the Cayman Islands, or even Malta. 

Typically, this strategy allows a form of regulatory or accounting arbitrage. A life insurer knows that if it can reinsure annuity business under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in Bermuda, for example, instead of Statutory Accounting Principles (SAP) in Iowa or New York, it will enjoy certain advantages. Its required reserves for new liabilities might be smaller, penalties for holding risky assets might be lower, and the recognition of certain large expenses (such as commissions) might be spread over many years instead of in the current year actually paid.  

The TSR

Matt Zagula

To convert all of these factors into a metric that advisers and policyholders can use to distinguish low-risk, transparent annuity issuers from higher-risk, opaque annuity issuers,  I and a colleague, Matt Zagula of Smart Advisor Network, have turned the relationship between risky assets, offshore reinsurance, and surplus, to a single ratio: the TSR.

TSR stands for Transparency, Surplus and Riskier Assets. To calculate this metric, we add a company’s dollar amount of higher-risk, less-transparent investments plus its  dollar amount of higher-risk, less transparent ceded reinsurance and divide the sum by the surplus reported on the insurer’s annual statutory filing. The lower the ratio, the lower the exposure to excessive risks. Weve seen TSR scores ranging from the lowest at 25% to the highest of 8,300%. 

With a TSR of 25, a company could write off the entire amount of higher risks and it would still have 75% of its surplus. But with a TSR of 8,300%, if only 1.6% of the higher risks had to be written down, the surplus would go to zero. 

Annuity carriers have seen their total assets skyrocket in recent years; so, too, have their liabilities. This has left them with even thinner surplus. The TSR ratio puts both asset and reinsurance risks in perspective by comparing them with surplus. The work necessary to arrive at the final TSR is complex and requires peeling back many layers of numbers, but our single ratio makes it easier for agents, advisers and investors to assess risks relative to surplus.

Tom Gober is a forensic accountant and certified fraud examiner based in Virginia.

© 2022 RIJ Publishing LLC.  

Nationwide is 13th life insurer nabbed by New York

Nationwide has agreed to pay $5.64 million to settle charges brought against it by the New York regulators for selling new income annuities to people who could have annuitized their existing deferred annuities, possibly at higher income rates than the new annuities paid.

On May 20, Superintendent of Financial Services Adrienne A. Harris announced today that the Department of Financial Services (DFS) entered into a consent order with Nationwide Life Insurance Company for violations of New York Insurance regulations with respect to deferred to immediate annuity replacement transactions. 

Nationwide will pay approximately $3.4 million in restitution to New York State consumers as a result of the settlement in addition to $2.24 million in penalties. Impacted consumers will also receive higher monthly payouts for the remainder of their contract terms. 

Nationwide said in a statement:

Nationwide remains committed to protecting people, businesses and futures with extraordinary care. We continue to urge the NYDFS to focus on promoting clearly articulated regulatory expectations for all industry participants in a manner that protects consumers while concurrently protecting their access to affordable and innovative product offerings. We will continue to work with NYDFS to further develop and maintain clearly defined standards as it relates to transactions that may involve the replacement of an existing annuity. We are pleased to put this matter behind us.

The settlement is the latest result in DFS’s industry-wide investigation into deferred to immediate annuity replacement practices in New York State. To date, the industry-wide investigation has resulted in settlements with thirteen life insurance companies, totaling approximately $29 million in restitution and penalties.  

DFS’s investigation found that Nationwide failed to properly disclose to consumers income comparisons and suitability information, causing consumers to exchange more financially favorable deferred annuities with immediate annuities. Hundreds of New York consumers—primarily elderly individuals—received incomplete information regarding the replacement annuities, resulting in less income for identical or substantially similar payout options.  

A former life insurance company executive told RIJ this week that his then-employer was fined by New York a decade ago for the same reason. “[Our company] was guilty of replacing deferred annuity contracts with our ‘new issue’ immediate annuity contracts after our agents claimed our immediate rates were better than the deferred annuity settlement rate on the official NY Reg 60 replacement documents (required in NY),” he said. 

“Because our annuity new issue department didn’t verify the agents’ written claims of our immediate annuity rate superiority, our penalty, leveled by NY State at the time, was to make up the entire payment differential between what our SPIAs paid versus what was guaranteed by the existing but replaced contracts for the life of the payment duration,” he added. 

“We had to manually adjust our SPIA administration system and post additional dollar reserves to force/support higher payments. In a further company embarrassment, we were also required to contract each contract holder (owner) and explain why we were giving them higher payments and apologize for our lack of oversight,” he told RIJ.  

“But many other carriers were guilty of the same practices. In reality this goes on in all states, not just New York.  It’s terrible to say, but I believe there may be an unwritten carrier conspiracy to perhaps ‘indirectly’ cheat consumers out of their guaranteed income rights.”

Annuities are contracts between life insurance companies and consumers that provide guaranteed payments for the remainder of an individual’s lifetime or for a specified period. Immediate annuities provide periodic income payments that begin within thirteen months after the annuity is issued, while deferred annuities allow consumers to earn interest on their premium before receiving payments at a future date. 

Recommending that consumers replace existing deferred annuities with immediate annuities without proper disclosures may cost consumers substantial lifetime income.

Nationwide has also agreed to take corrective actions, including revising its disclosure statements to include side-by-side monthly income comparison information, and revising its disclosure, suitability, and training procedures to comply with New York regulations.

© 2022 RIJ Publishing LLC. 

A New Kind of RIJ is on the Way

Retirement Income Journal is changing its business model. 

After more than 13 years (and almost 650 issues) as a subscription-based weekly publication, the RIJ website will become a free-standing online library and information resource, effective July 1. That’s just three weeks from now.

Over the next few months, I plan to redesign the site. My goal will be to make the material that I’ve written and collected since April 2009 more accessible to visitors. The focus will still be on retirement income and annuities.

Beyond that, I will continue to write about annuities and retirement financing. I’ll make new articles or books available on the site. Access to the new material will be limited for a certain period to RIJ’s current and recent paid subscribers. 

Many of the details of the redesign are still to-be-determined. The upshot is that I’m taking a break from the pressure of a weekly news cycle. 

Dozens of readers, subscribers, contributors, sources, advertisers, family members and friends helped RIJ survive and thrive. It’s premature to start thanking people, however; the show will still go on, but with a different format. 

© 2022 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

False Narratives Will Cost You Money

You know that recession narratives abound when Cardi B is tweeting “When y’all think they going to announce that we going into a recession?” Even more pronounced is the “stagflation” hysteria.

Major investment banks are publishing stagflation primers; an institutional investment client has asked us for custom research on the topic. Unsurprisingly, the bull-bear ratio very much remains skewed towards “The End of Times,” with a reading lower than at the height of the pandemic. 

We are taking the other side of the bearish bet after being definitively alarmists since our November 2021 missive. While stagflation is likely the end point of the current cycle, we are not there… yet. The world remains very much in a high nominal growth macro context that we have dubbed the Hydrogen Economy.

 The gap between nominal GDP growth and the Fed’s response—simulated by the T-bill yield—remains vast. Yes, the Fed is flagging three further 50bps hikes, but it is doing so off a low base with inflation expectations at multi-decade highs. [For the complete version of this article, with charts, click here.]

Nominal GDP growth matters. It is the price paid for goods and services. The “real” GDP only begins to matter when consumers can no longer afford to pay for the nominal prices. Yes, a segment of the population is starting to hurt, but not the segment that actually pays for the vast majority of goods and services. 

On a macro level, cumulative personal savings are at $2.6 trillion higher than pre-pandemic trend, with consumers more than happy to eat into those savings to afford to keep pace with nominal price moves. What’s more, the private sector is beginning to re-leverage after a decade of deleveraging, with no sign of delinquency anywhere in the system. 

At these levels of CPI—and given our view that inflation is likely to ease by year end— consumers have more than enough savings accumulated thanks to the Buenos Aires Consensus orgy of 2020-2021 to keep up with higher prices. This is particularly the case with gasoline, whose share of the overall consumer expenditure is much lower today than in the days when presidents won and lost their elections at the pump (i.e., the 1970s).

The market is already signaling the bottom, with growth sensitive indexes and sectors putting in a bottom over the past month. Part of the reason for the relief may also be that yields have peaked, as we have argued over the past two months. The too much, too fast move in the 10-year yield is likely to pause, with both the US growth slowdown and the carnage in China contributing to the moderation in yields, giving stocks room to breathe. 

At some point, the combination of rising borrowing costs, exhausted savings, and real income decline will arrest the cycle, but we don’t see that moment on a 12-month horizon. Especially with 5-year real yields still deeply negative and financial conditions tightening, but still easier than the pre-pandemic levels. 

This is where the bears would point out that the Fed is engineering a recession: That precisely because financial conditions have not tightened sufficiently, the Fed must go “full Volcker.” That the Fed must raise its policy rate above neutral as quickly as possible in order to anchor inflation expectation. 

We are not Fed experts so we remain open minded about this Apocalyptic scenario. However, there are two reasons to expect the Fed to think twice about raising interest rates as fast as it has currently flagged. 

First, the obvious reason. The S&P 500 correction is flagging that the US economy will be flirting with a recession by year’s end. Are investors supposed to believe that unelected technocrats are willing to be blamed—in this Age of Populism—for ushering in a recession? (Side question: What is worse… paying $7 a gallon for gasoline out of a declining real wage or not paying $3 a gallon for gasoline because one is unemployed?) 

We just don’t believe that the Fed has the guts to go all the way and cause a deep recession. As such, investors are experiencing peak hawkishness at this particular moment. 

Second, we also don’t believe that the Fed should raise interest rates as fast as they are flagging. Now, this is a tricky argument. “Should” is a four-letter curse word for the denizens of the Clocktower Group Strategy Team. As such, a caveat is in order. 

We do not mean that it is pareto optimal to run the economy “hot.” Rather, we mean that if the Fed’s goal is to ensure that inflation is corralled over the long term—say the rest of this decade—then causing a recession now would be folly. 

In fact, we would go as far as to guarantee to our readers that raising interest rates now and causing a recession would ensure that inflation spikes later in the decade. 

Bottom line: The US stock market has likely put in a bottom. We expect a rotation out of growth to value. Will S&P 500 make all-time highs by the end of the year? It is quite possible given our view that the Fed will ease the pace of rate hikes as inflation ebbs and growth slows. 

© 2022 The Clocktower Group.

How do 401(k) participants save? Vanguard knows.

Vanguard this week released the 2022 edition of “How America Saves,” its annual report on 401(k) plan design and retirement savings habits. It is based on data from the nearly five million 401(k) accounts administered by the institutional division of Vanguard, the $6 trillion mutual fund supermarket.  

“The report reveals additional plan design opportunities employers can address to further improve workers’ retirement readiness,” Vanguard said in a release. “While employers have made significant progress in adopting leading plan designs and features, many participants are facing increasingly complex financial situations and life events that can compromise their retirement savings efforts.”

Findings of ‘How America Saves’ include:

Automatic savings

The adoption of automatic enrollment has more than tripled since year-end 2007, the first year after the Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006 took effect. At year-end 2021, 56% of Vanguard plans had adopted automatic enrollment, including 75% of plans with at least 1,000 participants. 

In 2021, because larger plans were more likely to offer it, 70% of participants were in plans with an automatic enrollment option. Two-thirds of automatic enrollment plans have implemented automatic annual deferral rate increases. Additionally, automatic enrollment defaults have increased over the past decade. 

Fifty-eight percent of plans now default employees at a deferral rate of 4% or higher, compared with 32% of plans in 2012. Ninety-nine percent of all plans with automatic enrollment defaulted participants into a balanced investment strategy in 2021—with 98% choosing a target-date fund as the default. 

Managed accounts 

The rising prominence of professionally managed allocations has been essential to improvements in portfolio construction. Participants with professionally managed allocations have their entire account balance invested in a single target-date or balanced fund or in a managed account advisory service. 

At year-end 2021, 64% of all Vanguard participants were solely invested in an automatic investment program—compared with 7% at the end of 2004 and 36% at year-end 2012. Fifty-six percent of all participants were invested in a single target-date fund; another
1% held one other balanced fund; and 7% used a managed account program. 

Increased use of target-date funds 

Ninety-five percent of plans offered target-date funds at year-end 2021, up from 84% in 2012. Nearly all Vanguard participants (99%) were in plans offering target-date funds (TDFs). Eighty-one percent of all participants used TDFs and 69% of participants owning TDFs had their entire account invested in a single TDF.  An important factor driving the use of TDFs is their role as an automatic or default investment strategy.

Savings metrics: Participation 

The estimated plan-weighted participation rate was 85%, up from 78% in 2012. The participant-weighted participation rate was 81% in 2021, up from 74% in 2012. Plans with automatic enrollment had a 93% participation rate, versus 66% for plans with voluntary enrollment.

Savings metrics: Deferral rates

The average deferral rate was 7.3% in 2021, up from 6.9% in 2012. The median deferral rate was 6.1% in 2021, in line with the past 10 years. These statistics reflect the level of employee-elective deferrals. Most Vanguard plans also make employer contributions. 

Including both employee and employer contributions, the average total participant contribution rate in 2021 was 11.2%, and the median was 10.4%. These rates have increased slightly over the past five years. 

Including nonparticipants, auto-enrolled employees saved an average of 10.9%, considering both employee and employer contributions. Employees hired under a voluntary enrollment design saved an average of 7.3%, due to lower participation. 

Roth 401(k) adoption 

At year-end 2021, the Roth feature was adopted by 77% of Vanguard plans, and 15% of participants within these plans had elected the option. Vanguard anticipates steady growth in Roth adoption rates, given the tax diversification benefits. 

Account balances 

In 2021, the average account balance for Vanguard participants was $141,542; the median balance was $35,345. Vanguard participants’ average account balances increased by 10% since 2020, driven primarily by the increase in equity markets over the year. 

Portfolio construction 

Participant portfolio construction has improved dramatically over the past 15 years, with 78% of participants having a balanced strategy in 2021, up from 39% in 2005. Three percent of participants held no equities and 3% of participants had more than 20% allocated toward company stock in 2021. In 2005, 13% of participants had no equities and 18% of participants held a concentration in company stock. 

Participant trading  

During 2021, 8% of DC plan participants traded within their accounts, while 92% initiated no exchanges. On a net basis, there was a shift of 3% of assets to fixed income during the year, with most traders making small changes. Only 3% of participants holding a single target-date fund traded in 2021. 

Loan activity 

During 2021, loan use increased slightly when compared to 2020, but remained below the typical usage rates of years prior to COVID-19. Thirteen percent of participants had a loan outstanding in 2021, down from 16% in 2016. The average loan amount was about $10,600. 

Plan withdrawals 

In-service withdrawal activity was down in 2021from 2020, which was expected as access to assets through coronavirus-related distributions ended as of year-end 2020. Both traditional hardship and non-hardship withdrawals trended similarly to pre-pandemic levels in 2021. 

Most assets preserved for retirement 

Participants separating from service largely preserved their assets for retirement. During 2021, about one-quarter of all participants could have taken a distribution because they
had separated from service in the current year or prior years. 

Most of these participants (83%) preserved their plan assets for retirement by either remaining in their employer’s plan or rolling over their savings to an IRA or new employer plan. Only 2% of all plan assets available for distribution were taken in cash. In 2021, 64% of plans allowed retirees to take installments, and 37% of plans allowed for partial withdrawals. 

© 2022 RIJ Publishing LLC. 

Fixed Indexed Annuities: What’s Changed (or Not) in Ten Years

Ten years ago, sales of fixed indexed annuities (FIAs) were largely confined to the life/annuity industry’s ‘Wild West’ territory. Since then, the FIA has gained respectability and emerged as one of the industry’s flagship products. In this article, we’ll review and reflect on some of the changes that have occurred in this product category from 2011 to 2021.

A lot has changed in the FIA space over the past 10 years. A lot has stayed the same.

Many of the same life/annuity companies that dominated FIA sales 10 years ago dominate it today. Athene USA and Allianz Life are perennial leaders. But big private equity firms, also known as “alternative asset” managers, have revolutionized the way that leading FIA issuers manage their policyholders’ money. 

FIA sales have doubled over the past 10 years, to about $65.5 billion in 2021, according to Wink’s annual survey of issuers. Sales are diversified across more distribution channels. FIAs outsell fixed-rate annuities, registered index-linked annuities (RILAs), and income annuities. They are on track to outsell traditional variable annuities, whose sales have been in decline. 

The rise of FIAs has coincided with a period of historically low interest rates and rising demand for safe investments among aging Baby Boomers. Through the purchase of options on equity (and now “hybrid”) indexes, FIAs offer a chance for higher returns than bonds or certificates of deposits along with a guarantee against market-related losses. Their success is a sign of the times. 

Every June, RIJ and Wink, Inc., collaborate to analyze a slice of Wink’s proprietary data on annuity sales and distribution in the prior year. Last year, we reviewed RILAs. This year we return to FIAs because they’re a vital component of the life/annuity industry’s “Bermuda Triangle” business strategy (as we’ll explain below). 

The leading FIA issuers

In terms of FIA sales, the strong have gotten stronger. For the 12th time in the last 18 years, Athene USA, which is part of Apollo Global Management, and Allianz Life, the US subsidiary of Allianz of Germany, finished first or second in the FIA sales race. Reviewing the list of the 10 best sellers of FIAs for 2021, Moore said the list has been notably stable since 2011.

 “You’re seeing many of the same names at the top of the leaderboard. Jackson National and Lincoln National are no longer there,” she told RIJ. “But there are others—Athene, Allianz Life, American Equity—who have always appeared in the top 10 in sales.” 

Sammons is a newcomer in name only; it is the parent company of two perennially strong FIA issuers—Midland National and North American. Great American wasn’t on the leaderboard in 2021 only because it was purchased by MassMutual. If you added the FIA sales of MassMutual and Great American together in 2021, their $3.7 billion in sales would put them in sixth place, just ahead of American Equity.

The biggest life/annuity company to break into the top 10 FIA issuers since 2011 has been AIG. (AIG plans to spin off its retirement division in an IPO this year; Corebridge, as it will be called, may be on this list.) The largest FIA issuer to bow out since 2011 has been Jackson National Life. Fidelity & Guaranty Life and Security Benefit Life fell from the top 10 in 2016, but they dropped only to 11th and 12th place, respectively.

Private-equity companies have more become involved in the FIA business over the past decade. That’s not readily apparent from a quick glance at the names on the top-10 list. But as many as seven of the 10 leading sellers of FIAs now have ownership ties or strategic partnerships with large private equity companies. 

Athene USA, for instance, is a product of Apollo Global Management’s 2012 purchase of Aviva. Sammons owns part of Guggenheim Partners. Eldridge Industries, a holding company run by former Guggenheim Partners executive Todd Boehly, owns Security Benefit Life. Blackstone owns almost 10% of AIG’s retirement business (of which FIA sales are a part), and manages Fidelity & Guaranty Life’s investments. American Equity has been remaking itself into an investment-oriented company with the help of private equity firms. Global Atlantic is owned by KKR, the giant alt-investment firm.  

Are these FIA issuers successful because they have the backing of private equity firms, or have private equity companies merely snagged the best FIA issuers? Moore gives more credit to the latter part of that question.  

Sheryl Moore

“The companies that have been acquired by the private equity firms were already successful prior to being acquired. Their product competitiveness may have increased after they were purchased, but not to the point where you’d say, ‘Whoa. What happened here?’ They’re distinct from the start-ups, like SILAC, whose strategy is to capture fixed-rate annuity sales with a competitive rate, and then transition to an indexed product. SILAC is now in the top 10.”

Sales volume doubled in 10 years 

Like financial camels in a desert of yield, FIAs have shown themselves to be well-adapted to the low interest rates environment of the past 14 years. Sales rose from $32.387 billion in 2011 to $58.235 billion in 2016, to $65.513 in 2021. That was off the peak year of 2019 but up from 2020, when sales dropped to $58.142 billion amid the COVID epidemic.

“What impresses me is that the average premium has consistently gone up regardless of how sales are fluctuating,” she said. For the companies participating in her survey, the average indexed annuity premium in the fourth quarter of 2011 was $66,758, with a range of $1,700 to $142,966 and 92,703 contracts sold in the quarter. In 2016, the average premium was $105,264, with a range of $15,233 to $180,250 and 126,373 contracts sold in the fourth quarter. In 2021, the average premium was $147,860, with a range of $21,923 to $291,154, with 109,863 contracts sold in the quarter. “People are not only buying more indexed annuities, they’re also putting more of their assets into them. The low interest rate environment has fueled that trend.”

“Although the ownership and management of the company may be different, the same people are working there, and doing the same jobs. Some private equity firms have just let the companies they acquire run as usual. Others, like Athene, Sammons, and Fidelity & Guaranty, have been aggressive in increasing sales. American Equity, which was normally near the top in sales, has been down a little,” Moore said. All four of those companies now leverage the expertise of firms with private equity and private credit expertise.

For all annuity issuers, an inherent tension exists between sales volume and financial strength, Moore pointed out. “The companies ask themselves, ‘How badly do we want the new annuity sales and how much do we want to sacrifice strength?’” she added. Sales and financial strength are related, Moore said. To maintain a certain strength rating, a company might have to add capital when it takes on more annuity liability—in the form of new premium. “Each company sets a target for the amount of annuities it wants to sell and keep the same ratings. If they exceed that amount, it could hurt their ratings.”

The ‘Bermuda Triangle’ factor

After buying Aviva in 2012 and turning it into Athene, Apollo pioneered what RIJ has called the Bermuda Triangle model. Much copied since then, the strategy typically involves the coordinated activity of an FIA issuer, an asset manager skilled in originating high-risk “leveraged loans” and other alternative assets, and a Bermuda or Cayman Islands reinsurer. We focus on the reinsurance angle here.

Athene USA, for instance, used reinsurance in 2021 to move billions of new FIA sales off of its balance sheet and onto the balance sheets of reinsurers within its own holding company. 

On its annual statutory filing in Iowa, Athene Life and Annuity of Iowa reported about $22.4 billion in new annuity sales in 2021. Of that amount, Athene “ceded” about $18.8 billion to Athene Annuity Re of Bermuda and to an Athene affiliate in  Delaware.   

Source: Wink, Inc.

Athene USA reported $7.7 billion in indexed annuity sales to Wink, Inc., but only $775 million in indexed annuity sales on its statutory filing. (About $10 billion of Athene’s $22 billion in annuity sales involved group annuities, or pension risk transfer deals.)

Moore believes that reinsurance raises sales capacity for life/annuity companies, but she has no data on how it might do so. In any case, the same asset manager—Apollo—added $22.4 billion to its assets under management because it does the investment chores for Athene Life and Annuity, Athene Annuity Re, and Athene Delaware.

The rise of hybrid indexes

When you buy an FIA, the issuer puts your money in its general account for long-term investment (mainly in bonds). Then it takes the equivalent of about 3% of your investment (that’s about what your premium was expected to earn in the general account, minus fees and overhead) and buys a bracket of options on a market index. Typically, if the index rose during the next 12 months, you’d lock in a piece of that gain. If the index dropped, you’d get nothing and lose nothing—except the 3% that a comparable non-index-linked, fixed rate annuity would have paid you. [The term length of the contract may be five to 10 years, but credits are typically locked in each year.]

Most FIA contract owners used to bet routinely on the movement of the S&P 500 Price Index. (That’s the S&P 500 Index, minus the dividend yield. Options on the pure S&P 500 Index would be more expensive.)  In 2011, about 62% of all FIA premium was pegged to the S&P 500 Price Index. (Another 22% went into a fixed return account.) In 2016, about 47% of FIA premium went into the S&P 500 Price Index; 30% went into new, sophisticated, volatility-controlled hybrid or “custom” indexes.

Today, only about one-third of FIA premium is pegged via options to the S&P 500 Price Index. Almost 60% goes into hybrids, of which there are dozens. “When I started in this business, there were 12 indexes,” Moore said. “The last time I counted, there were 150. Sometimes I have to wonder if we are complicating the indexed annuity story with so many ways of earning indexed interest.”

Source: Safe Harbor Financial.

Most FIA contracts now offer one or more hybrids, in addition to more familiar ones. They are called hybrids because they may contain several different asset classes. They are called custom because investment banks like Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse, and BNP Paribas have created them specifically for FIA issuers.

The use of hybrid indexes has paralleled the growth in FIA sales over the past decades. That may not be a coincidence. Since the algorithm-driven hybrids often target a particular volatility rate, such as 5%, their up or down movements are inherently limited. Because the controls are internal and unseen, the issuers don’t need to declare strict external performance limits, such as single-digit caps or sub-100% participation rates.  

FIAs without caps or with participation rates in excess of 100% are particularly attractive to investors, because gains appear unlimited. As you can see by the list of top-performing hybrid indexes recently released by Safe Harbor Financial, an index annuity wholesaler, none of the indexes feature a cap and all of them have participation rates over 100%. “That’s a big sales incentive,” Moore said. 

Many of the hybrids are less than a few years old, and every hybrid in this chart require a commitment of 10 years. Unlike the S&P 500 Price Index, the hybrids have little or no track record. This doesn’t prevent promoters from “back-testing” hybrids against market history to arrive at flattering performance histories. The hybrids on the chart show average historical returns as high as 10.52% per year over the past 10 years. That’s a powerful lure, especially when coupled with a no-loss guarantee.

Historically, FIA marketers have advertised the product’s zero explicit fees and zero risk of loss. But some FIAs now feature annual fees. There are fees for riders that allow the contract owner to draw a guaranteed minimum lifetime income stream from the product. There are also fees that amplify the product’s option budget and allow the issuer to offer participation rates in excess of 100% of the index return. Over 10 years, those fees could produce a net loss of principal for the investors. “The old battle cry of ‘Zero is your hero!’ is no longer valid if clients are paying explicit fees,” Moore told RIJ. 

Commissions

Independent insurance agents can earn higher commissions from selling FIAs than they can from selling any other kind of insurance product. High commissions and other incentives, financed by the life/annuity companies (and recouped by them over the life of the product), jump-started the FIA business in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

Before the Great Financial Crisis, the average FIA commission exceeded 8% and commissions of 9% to 11% were not unusual. After the crisis struck, the average dropped. “The top-selling annuity pays a 6.5% street-level commission, which is the maximum that [wholesalers, such as field marketing organizations or FMOs] can advertise. The street-level rate doesn’t include the ‘override’ that the wholesalers receive, which can be as high 3%. The average all-in distribution cost is about 8% to 9%,” Moore said.

Surrender periods 

Commissions are higher when surrender periods are longer. (During the surrender period, the contract owner pays a penalty for withdrawing an amount that ranges from 5% to 15%, depending on the contract.) Over the past 10 years, the percentage of contracts sold with a 10-year surrender period has held steady at about 50%. 

In 2011, only 15% of contracts had surrender periods that were seven years or less. That figure rose to 25% in 2016 an 36% in 2021. “The decline in commissions is tied to the rising popularity of shorter surrender periods,” Moore said. 

“We are seeing more five-year and seven-year products in the independent agent channel. There are a lot of agents who say, ‘I won’t put my clients in a 10-year product today when interest rates are likely to go up in a few years.”

Distribution channels

Surrender periods tend to be shorter on contracts sold in the bank and broker-dealer channels. “Sales of five-year and seven-year have increased as we’ve seen more companies serving the bank and broker-dealer channel enter the market. The compliance departments of those banks won’t allow longer-term surrender periods,” Moore said.

Ten years ago, in the twilight of what had been known as the “Wild West” era of the FIA business, almost 90% of FIAs were sold by independent insurance agents. By 2016, other distributors, especially independent broker-dealers and banks, began carrying the product as a high-yield alternative to bonds. 

Insurance-licensed advisers at independent broker-dealers and at banks each accounted for about 14% of sales in 2016, as the insurance agent channel share fell to 61%. In 2021, sales in the independent broker-dealer channel had dropped to 10.8% and the independent agent share bounced up to 65%. Athene was the biggest seller in that channel last year.  

Income riders

FIA issuers have been adding “guaranteed lifetime withdrawal benefit” riders (GLWBs) to their contracts for several years. These riders typically require an explicit fee of 1% or more, and they often require a 10-year holding period in order to achieve their maximum value to the contract owner. Contracts can dip into their principal even after starting income, but their income may drop if they do. 

About half of the FIA contracts sold in 2021 had lifetime income riders, Moore said. In 2016, according to her data, among carriers in her survey that offer lifetime income riders on their FIAs, an average of 20.4% of the contract owners were drawing income. It’s difficult to say how many might plan to use them in the future. Very few, if any, owners of FIA contracts “annuitize” them—that is, convert them irrevocably to an income stream for the life of the owner.

Conclusion

Over the past 10 years, a lot has remained the same in the FIA business. People of the same age range—55 to 65—are buying them. Products with the highest crediting rate still attract the most interest from investors. When interest rates are low, FIAs can be expected out-yield certificates of deposits and bonds. Independent insurance agents still sell a majority of the contracts.

But a lot has also changed. Sales have doubled, and distribution has expanded beyond independent agents to the banks and independent broker-dealers. Big Wall Street firms like Apollo, KKR and Blackstone now have ownership shares in big FIA issuers. They have pioneered the investment of FIA premiums into private credit and other alternative assets. 

The mainstreaming of the FIA might be the biggest change in the last 10 years. With Wall Street’s help, it has emerged from the shadows into the spotlight. The FIA survived attempts by the SEC and the Department of Labor to regulate it more closely. It was more adaptable to the post-Great Financial Crisis economic climate than other annuities. Its strength and weakness are its link to the equity markets; as equities go, so goes the FIA. 

© 2022 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Breaking News

‘Constance,’ a CDA, gains new investment choices 

RetireOne, the leading platform for fee-based insurance solutions, and Midland National Life Insurance Company, have enhanced Constance—their zero-commission portfolio income insurance solution for Registered Investment Advisors (RIAs) and their clients.

Launched in October of 2021, Constance is a contingent deferred annuity or CDA. It allows RIAs to add a living benefit rider to client brokerage accounts, IRAs, or Roth IRAs. The rider works like the lifetime withdrawal benefit on a variable annuity, which involves a guarantee that an insurance company will provide income in an investor’s later years, if needed and if certain spending limits are obeyed.

This week, RetireOne and Midland National, part of Sammons Financial Group, announced the addition of 255 mutual funds, exchange-traded funds (ETFs), and model portfolios to the lineup of investment options that can be covered by the Constance guarantee.

New fund managers include Cambria Investments, Fidelity Investments, Inspire ETFs, Invesco, iShares, Nuveen and Schwab Asset Management. Constance now offers advisers a choice of 390 total funds. Additionally, 60 new model portfolios have been added to the lineup, including strategies from American Funds, Delaware Funds, Dimensional Fund Advisors, Dynamic Wealth Management, Horizon Investments, Inspire ETFs, and WealthCare Capital Management.

Constance certificate fees have also been reduced to lower the cost of insurance. In addition to new investment options and reduced certificate fees, RetireOne said it has developed a new Portfolio Builder tool to help RIAs construct portfolios of publicly traded mutual funds and ETFs covered by Constance.

Serving over 1,000 RIAs and fee-based advisors since 2011, ­­RetireOne, an independent platform for fee-based insurance solutions has served RIAs and fee-based advisers since 2011. It currently services over $1.5 billion of retirement savings and income investments.

Midland National has an A+ (Superior) financial strength rating from A.M. Best, the third-party independent reporting and rating company. This rating is the second highest out of 15 categories and was affirmed by A.M. Best for Midland National.

Envestnet acquires 401kplans.com

Envestnet has acquired 401kplans.com, a digital 401(k) retirement plan marketplace that facilitates retirement plan distribution and due diligence processes for financial advisors and third-party administrators. The acquisition is part of Envestnet’s “Intelligent Financial. Life” initiative. Terms of the deal were not disclosed.

The 401(k) plan sponsors and their plan advisers who work with 401kplans.com can employ Envestnet’s outsourced 3(38) or 3(21) fiduciary services to guide their investment selection process and their plan monitoring activities.

The 401kplans.com digital marketplace, available online and via mobile app, gives plan advisers a documented due diligence process for vetting considering plan providers. The platform eliminates manual proposal requests, quickly compares recordkeepers, and evaluates investment options. The innovative platform has direct integrations with more than 36 plan recordkeepers.

Under founder Scott Buffington, 401kplans.com has grown to nearly 28,000 advisors with accounts on the platform and working relationships with many of the largest broker-dealers. Buffington will join Envestnet as Head of Retirement Sales, reporting to Sean Murray.

Envestnet manages retirement asset data from more than 200,000 retirement plans. The 401kplans.com marketplace complements Envestnet’s retirement services strategy to become a major distribution channel for recordkeepers and investment managers.

Putnam repositions its target-date series for ESG

Putnam Investments intends to reposition its Putnam RetirementReady Funds target-date series as the Putnam Sustainable Retirement Funds, employing sustainability-focused or environmental, social and governance (ESG) principles and strategies.

Putnam Sustainable Retirement Funds will offer vintages ranging every five years from 2025 to 2065, along with a maturity fund, and will invest in active exchange-traded funds (ETFs) advised by Putnam. The new ESG-focused target-date series is expected to be available in the coming months.The firm also offers a second target-date series, the Putnam Retirement Advantage suite.

Putnam has been building out its sustainable investing efforts and related investment offerings since 2017. The firm launched two ESG-focused mutual funds a year later and introduced its first sustainable portfolios in an active ETF format in May 2021.

At the end of April 2022, Putnam had $180 billion in assets under management. Putnam has offices in Boston, London, Munich, Tokyo, Singapore, and Sydney.

Retirement tax breaks are unfair: NIRS

Current tax incentives fail to promote adequate retirement security for the middle class, according to “The Missing Middle: How Tax Incentives for Retirement Savings Leave Middle Class Families Behind,” from the National Institute on Retirement Security, a Washington research group.

The report considers marginal tax rates, retirement plan participation, and income distribution on retirement saving levels. It also offers potential solutions that could enhance retirement security for middle class families.

The analysis indicates that:

  • More than half of the tax breaks for defined contribution (DC) plans and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) go to those in the top 10% by income
  • The top 30% of workers by income receive 89% of the present value of tax benefits for DC plans and IRAs

This leaves a “missing middle” because the tax code offers meager benefits for these working Americans to save for retirement, the NIRS said in a release. These middle class workers face rising costs in retirement, often lack retirement plans at their jobs, and need more than just Social Security income in retirement to maintain their standard of living.

The report’s key findings are as follows:

While the progressive nature of the Social Security benefit does much to prevent old-age poverty, the level of income replacement from Social Security falls off far more quickly than private savings function to provide adequate retirement income for middle class workers.

Tax expenditures for various retirement programs are heavily skewed toward high-income earners. This stems from the design of the tax breaks themselves, and from the fact that high-income earners are more likely to participate in employer-provided retirement plans and have the financial resources to save for retirement.

The value of tax incentives for saving is much greater for those at higher income levels, For those at higher income levels who face higher marginal tax rates, the value of tax incentives for saving is much greater. These incentives are weaker for much of the middle class. 

Those who are able to invest earlier and at higher levels enjoy a greater advantage from the deferral of taxation on investment gains.

The tax expenditures for retirement saving, oriented around the defined contribution system, give rise to inequities beyond income and wealth. Geographic and racial inequities related to retirement are both exacerbated by the tax incentives for saving.

Solutions to these inequities should focus on increasing participation in the retirement savings system and ensuring working families also receive adequate incentives to save for retirement. 

Some potential solutions could focus on building upon Social Security, either through benefit changes or allowing the program to integrate lifetime income options for savers. Reforming the tax expenditures themselves, by eliminating the deduction-based system and replacing it with a refundable credit is another possibility. 

Other solutions could focus on increasing access and participation in savings plans, which some states are doing for workers who lack workplace plans, thereby making it easier to participate. 

Finally, curbing abuses of the existing system would ensure that the significant sums of federal tax revenue that are dedicated to retirement security are directed at generating retirement income.

Alternatives can hedge inflation risk: Cerulli 

Adviser allocations to strategies that protect against inflation and rising interest rates, including alternative investments, are discussed in the latest issue of The Cerulli Edge–US Monthly Product Trends for April 2022. Highlights of the report include:

Funds. The market value of mutual fund assets sharply dropped in April 2022 to $18.0 trillion, receding by more than 7% amid the broader market pullback. Since the end of 2021, mutual funds have shed 13.4% of their value. 

Exchange-traded funds also shrank, as values dropped 7.3% to $6.5 trillion, a nearly $500 billion loss over the month. Both vehicles suffered outflows during April, with mutual funds losing $78.3 billion and ETFs ceding $12.0 billion.

Inflation hedges. Cerulli expects allocations to the inflation-protected sub-asset class to increase throughout 2022, after receiving only 8% of US taxable fixed income allocations in 2021. For Series I Savings Bonds issued from May 2022 through October 2022, the interest rate is 9.62%.

Investors can purchase only up to $10,000 in I bonds through TreasuryDirect.gov each calendar year, in most cases. But an individual can purchase up to $5,000 in paper I bonds using a federal income tax refund each calendar year. 

Private assets. Offering alternative strategies as an inflation hedge continues to increase as an objective—58% of firms cite it as a key objective in 2021, compared to just 21% in 2019. 

Asset managers that offer private capital exposures to retail investors will experience stronger tailwinds in the coming years as inflation (and inflation-related interest-rate movements) dampens returns of traditional asset exposures, Cerulli predicted. 

In the long term, firms that can offer attractively priced exposures via best-fit structures—along with those that can communicate the benefits of inflation-hedges to advisors and end-investors—will be the most successful, Cerulli said.

© 2022 RIJ Publishing LLC. 

Annuities are Sorely Misunderstood

Most people, and I mean the average person-on-the-street, most of Congress, as well as many investment advisers and most mass-media journalists, don’t know much about today’s annuities. 

They may know the obsolete textbook definition of an annuity as an annual income. But they do not understand how annuities can be, should be, or are in reality, used.

There’s a fundamental misconception in the public mind. It isn’t just the normal discrepancy, true of any industry, between the tidy illusion that an audience sees and the messy reality backstage. It’s not just a matter of annuities being hard to grasp. 

My strong impression is that the most of the public believes that all annuities are used to generate lifetime income in retirement. And that’s just not true. Most aren’t. 

One of the first things I learned after joining an annuity marketing department 25 years ago was that almost no one ever annuitizes a deferred annuity contract. Since about 97% of all annuities sold are deferred annuities, this means that only immediate annuities, whose sales are a tiny percentage of overall sales, are true annuities. (Sales volumes of deferred income annuities, which the owner commits to convert to guaranteed income at some future date, are even smaller.)

All deferred annuities have a clause somewhere in the contract that allows the owner to convert the value of the contract to a lifetime income stream. That clause, and the fact that annuities are issued by life insurance companies (many of whom sell far more deferred annuities than life insurance policies), is the only reason we call them annuities at all. (By income stream, I don’t mean a source of interest yield such as a “fixed income” investment. I mean a guaranteed paycheck,)

At the risk of divulging common knowledge, it’s equally true that neither the life insurance agents or advisers at broker-dealers and banks, nor the purchasers of the deferred annuities themselves, nor the life insurers that manufactured the deferred annuities, rarely if ever request or recommend that a deferred annuity be converted to income at some future date.

This has to be confusing for the public. They believe that the product is about longevity insurance—protection against underestimating the length of time you will need an income during retirement—when in fact the product is about investment protection. 

The majority of deferred annuities are used as tax-favored investments, with some insurance features. The performance of almost all annuities that are sold—deferred variable annuities, fixed indexed annuities, and registered index-linked annuities—relies directly or indirectly on the growth of equity values. 

If contract owners want some protection against outliving their savings—the purpose of a real annuity—they have to pay an extra fee for a complicated “living benefit” rider that offers a weak version of a true annuity. These riders can make it more, not less, confusing to spend down your savings in retirement. A true life annuity makes that process simpler.

The widespread misunderstanding of today’s annuities has hurt progress toward resolving some important issues. Regarding annuities in 401(k)s: Congress gave a green light to any annuity in 401(k)s, apparently not understanding the differences between types of annuities. Plan sponsors aren’t likely to accept annuities in 401(k)s when they realize that today’s annuities are, mainly, a type of investment. Regarding Social Security reform: Will Americans vote to keep Social Security if they mis-believe that private deferred annuities with living benefits protect them just as well against outliving their money?

Mishandling these questions could be disastrous. And we can’t wait much longer for answers. More than half of the Boomers are already retired. Social Security’s fate could very well hang on the results of the 2024 election. What we don’t know about annuities is going to hurt us.

© 2022 RIJ Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.