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“Face-Off” at the IRI Marketing Conference

With the U.S. and Canadian Olympic hockey teams facing off in Vancouver, B.C., last Sunday night, a hockey metaphor seemed to pervade the Insured Retirement Institute’s annual marketing conference, held in New York early this week.

That was apt, given that much of the annual meeting could be characterized as a friendly face-off between annuity manufacturers and their third-party distributors. But in this case, of course, the product manufacturers don’t want to beat the distributors. They want to supply them.

Easier said than done. This year’s marketing conference, which drew some 530 or so registered guests and 22 listed exhibitors, wasn’t as crisis-stricken as last year’s meeting. But the basic marketing challenge facing annuity manufacturers hasn’t changed much in twelve months.

Manufacturers are still trying to convince brokers and advisors in every distribution channel from wirehouses to banks to independent broker/dealers to fee-based advisory practices that annuities are the financial products that aging Boomers need and—with proper education—will want.

But many intermediaries still regard insurance products as alien to their DNA. Because of complexities related to compensation, regulation, cultural differences and general unfamiliarity, annuities still trigger the equivalent of a negative immune response from the non-insurance world.

Advertisement Annuities, to continue the biological analogy, are still perceived as antigens—rather than, say, vitamins, life-saving drugs or legal stimulants—by much of the financial products distribution system. That’s why some observers think that the unbundled income guarantee, or “stand-alone living benefit,” applied to managed accounts, could turn out to be the dominant income “app.”

But it’s too early to tell who the winners and losers will be. There are so many uncertainties and so many strategies afoot in financial services today that it’s hard to see anything clearly through the fog of war. Or through the scrum of stick-waving hockey players, you might say.

The distributors’ perspective
Executives from big distributors like Wells Fargo, Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, UBS, and Edward Jones, were present in force at the conference. They made it clear that the retirement market is huge for them. But whether they will champion annuities was not as apparent.

Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, which was born when Morgan Stanley bought Smith Barney from a strapped Citigroup in January 2009, came across as especially receptive to annuities. With 20,400 advisors at a thousand brokerage locations, the combined firm has a big distribution footprint.

In a panel discussion called, “Retirement Income, Service or Product?” Mike Stern, a national sales manager at MSSB, said that his firm had established a Retirement Standard last September, which included a 10-point checklist for evaluating a client’s future income needs.

Over 1,000 advisors signed up to receive support materials and resources for the program, Stern said. The firm also adopted  a time-segmented, “bucket” approach to income planning after the start of this year. These efforts have produced “significant wins” in rollovers, attracting $250 million in new money so far, he said.

Certainly, wirehouse customers have an enhanced appetite for safety. “We’re hearing that the proposition of a guarantee is impactful,” Stern said, adding that he wants to integrate insurance solutions into income plans. “We’re working toward introducing an insured retirement solutions the same way as we introduce a large cap fund.”

Among registered reps, however, annuities are still new. If he questions a rep about a given mutual fund, Stern said, the rep can rattle off every detail of the prospectus. If he asks about a guaranteed lifetime withdrawal benefit, “I get a blank stare.” Going forward, he thinks a rising tax environment will lift variable annuities. “Tax efficiency will be big in 2011,” he said.

UBS Financial Services’ Wealth Management division has about 8,000 financial advisors in the U.S. and its over-55 clients account for 75% of its assets, so it is another object of courtship by annuity manufacturers. Like MSSB’s Stern, UBS managing director Ed O’Connor sounded receptive.

Internal surveys show that retirement income is one of his clients’ top three concerns, O’Connor said. Clients are telling UBS they would prefer a 5% guaranteed income to an uninsured systematic withdrawal income of 4.5% to 5%, he said.

Not every distributor sounded convinced about annuities, however. Bernie Gacona, director of annuities at Wells Fargo Company, said that annuities aren’t getting much traction among his force of some 16,000 reps nationwide.

“We have not added any of those products,” he said in reference to some of the new variable annuity contracts that have appeared since last summer. Participating in a panel called “Simple Annuity and Other New Products Designs,” Gacona said that the commissions on simplified contracts are too low while the expenses on the more elaborate contracts are still too high. 

“The low compensation product doesn’t sell in a commission environment,” he said. “If your commission is in the 2% range and other products pay 5% or 6%, how will your products get sold?” L-shares of variable annuities, which have no up-front charges but higher trailing fees, are not getting traction either.

The manufacturers’ perspective
While Gacona was talking, his fellow panelist, John Egbert, national sales manager in the wire/bank channel for John Hancock Annuities, was visibly stressed. Last summer, his company introduced a simplified A-share variable annuity with a three-percent commission and total annual expenses of only 1.74%. Distributors don’t seem to want it.

Called AnnuityNote, the product has no death benefit, no credits for delaying withdrawals, and involves passive investments. It pays out 5% of the original investment or the contract value on the fifth anniversary, if greater. Income starts five years after issue.

Though simplicity seemed to be just what the post-crisis world wanted, AnnuityNote has not sold well. Egbert and his team are still trying to figure out why. “We were either early or we were wrong,” he said. “But we’re not stopping.” The product is the right thing for the 80% of producers who don’t currently sell annuities and for mass-market investors, Hancock still believes.

Hancock’s approach was just one of many. Executives from New York Life, The Phoenix Companies, Genworth Financial, Hartford Financial, ING Annuities, Nationwide, Lincoln Financial, and AXA Equitable also took part in panel discussions and described their approaches to the market.

ING, like John Hancock, has gone the simplified, low-cost var iable annuity design route. Michael Katz, head of variable annuity product development at ING Financial Services, described ING’s rational from reducing client expenses on its VAs from 314 basis points before the crisis to 225 basis points after.

“The equity markets are stabilizing, and the chirping over costs will start as markets recover,” he said. Advisors won’t like a product that pays out 5% a year in income but costs 3.50% a year, he said, and clients won’t like accumulating 30% less over 20 years because they owned a high-cost contract. 

Hartford and AXA Equitable, represented at the conference by Peter Stahl and Steven Mabry, respectively, have gone another route entirely.

They’ve decided to “decouple” the investment and income segments or “sleeves” of their products into a bucket dedicated to accumulation and a bucket dedicated to income. The manufacturer only takes on the risk of insuring the assets that the owner allocates to the much-tamer income bucket.

Robert Grubka, vice president, Retirement Solutions Products at Lincoln Financial Group, said that his company tries to exploit parts of the market that other companies neglect. “If everybody goes to the same spot on the ice,” he said, using a hockey metaphor, “it gets very crowded and you get jostled around.”

Lincoln will go its own way, he said, perhaps by putting its weight behind a long-term care annuity hybrid product. Such products, which were blocked by regulatory barriers until January 1, 2010, enable annuity owners to, in effect, use their annuity assets or guaranteed income streams to buy low-cost, high-deductible long-term care insurance. 

Chris Blunt, the head of the Retirement Income Security at New York Life, the largest mutual life insurer, came at the market from still another angle. “We want to take immediate annuities into the world of broker-dealers,” he said.

So far there have been “operational” obstacles to doing that in a big way, he said, but eventually New York Life would like to see “guaranteed income treated as an asset class alongside mutual funds.” Demographics will drive the market his way, Blunt added: “Our target clients are in their mid-60s to 70s, so we’re still five years from seeing a tsunami of interest” from Boomers.

Stand-alone living benefits
Although there was no panel discussion devoted purely to stand-only living benefits (SALBs), several panels touched on them. Genworth Financial, the Phoenix Companies, Nationwide and Prudential have already launched group or individual forms of these income guarantees. Although their progress was slowed by the financial crisis, they have by no means disappeared.

Applicable to after-tax managed accounts or to qualified money, SALBs provide advisors and investors with the income guarantee of a variable annuity without the restricted fund selection, fund expenses, or marketing costs associated with one. Their sales potential is unknown, but could extend far beyond the traditional market for variable annuities.

The only conference panelist specifically representing SALBs was Philip Polkinghorn, president, Life & Annuity, at The Phoenix Companies. Phoenix, whose financial strength rating slipped out of the A range in the financial crisis, created the first SALB with Lockwood Asset Management, a Philadelphia-area managed account provider, in late 2007.

“The vast amount of retirement money is not in variable annuities,” Polkinghorn said, referring to the managed account market, which is $1.5 trillion and growing, as well as 401(k) and 403(b) accounts that will eventually roll over to IRAs. SALBs will appeal to that market than variable annuities, he thinks. 

“[SALBs] focus entirely on longevity risk—the tail risk,” he said. They are contingent on both the owner’s life and the exhaustion of the covered portfolio. Deferred income annuities, aka longevity insurance, also cover that risk, but have no cash value. “We’re putting a liquidity feature in longevity insurance.”

Best of all, perhaps, SALBs are not perceived as annuities.

© 2010 RIJ Publishing. All rights reserved.

Fixed Annuity Sales Fall Overall in 2009

Performing inversely to the equity markets, overall fixed annuity sales weakened over the course of 2009 and in the fourth quarter sales were down more than 40% from the same quarter a year earlier.

After a record-setting first quarter 2009, when overall fixed annuity sales reached $34.8 billion, sales fell to $27.8 billion, $22.1 billion, and $20.4 billion in the last three quarters of the year. Sales for the fourth quarter were $20.4 billion, down slightly from $22.1 billion in the previous quarter, representing an 8% decline.

Most of the decline in sales across the year could be attributed to weakening sales of book value and market value adjusted fixed annuities. They sold a combined $25.7 billion in the first quarter of 2009 but were only $10.8 billion in the last quarter, a decline of almost 60%.

Quarterly U.S. Fixed Annuity Sales, By Product Type
Quarter Ended 12/09 9/09 6/09 3/09 12/08
Total Sales ($millions) 20,360 22,140 27,810 34,760 34,110
Book Value 8,994 9,940 13,862 19,194 17,120
Market Vale Adjusted 1,855 2,907 3,563 6,549 7,445
Indexed 7,588 7,349 8,215 7,076 7,179
Income 1,915 1,942 2,167 1,941 2,362
Source: Beacon Research

By contrast, sales of fixed indexed annuities, which are structured notes whose returns fluctuate with equity markets, and sales of immediate annuities, were relatively stable throughout the year.


In a way, the sales decline was a return to normalcy, after the panicky flight from equities in last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009. Year-to-year sales were down marginally, from a record $106.7 billion in 2008 to $105.1 billion in 2009, posting a 1.5% decline.

“Fixed annuity sales in 2009 were second only to the record-setting prior year,” said Jeremy Alexander, CEO of Beacon Research, which compiled the data and released it in partnership with the Insured Retirement Institute. “Due to strong demand for secure retirement savings and income alternatives, 2009 results were achieved despite financial pressures on consumers and other challenges.”

Quarterly Market Share
By Product Type
(As a percent of total sales) 12/31/09
Book Value 44.2%
Market Value Adjusted 9.1
Indexed 37.3
Immediate 9.4
Source: Beacon Research

Fixed indexed annuity sales climb at the end of the year, with fourth quarter sales totaling $7.6 billion, up 3.2% from the previous quarter. Total fixed index annuity sales for 2009 were $30.2 billion, posting a year-to-year increase of $3.5 billion.

Total fixed annuity sales were $105.1 billion in 2009, just 2% less than the record high in 2008. During the last quarter of 2009, fixed indexed annuity sales represented 37.3% of all fixed annuity sales, compared to only 21% in the last quarter of 2008.

Beacon Research, based in Evanston, Ill., is an independent research firm and application service provider that tracks fixed and variable annuity features, rates and sales. Beacon also licenses information to Insurance Technologies’ VisibleChoice annuity sales platform, Ebix, Lipper, and Ibbotson Associates.

© 2010 RIJ Publishing. All rights reserved.

Record Sales for Indexed Annuities in 2009

Forty-four indexed annuity carriers representing 99% of indexed annuity (IA) production reported combined fourth quarter 2009 sales of $7.0 billion, down 2.7% from the same period last year, according to the 50th edition of AnnuitySpecs.com’s Indexed Sales & Market Report (formerly the Advantage Index Sales & Market Report).

But “The big story this quarter is that sales of IAs exceeded $30 billion in 2009, setting an all-time record. That tops our previous 2007 annual sales record by more than 10%,” said Sheryl J. Moore, President and CEO of AnnuitySpecs.com.

Sales were down 6.7% from the prior quarter. “The past two quarters’ sales have been the strongest the IA industry has ever seen. It is natural to rebound to a normal sales level after such record highs,” Moore added.

Allianz Life remained the top-selling carrier in the quarter and for 2009. Aviva regained its position as the second-ranked company, while American Equity, Jackson National and ING rounded out the top five, in that order.

Allianz Life’s MasterDex X was the top-selling IA for the third consecutive quarter. Jackson National Life dominated sales of IAs in the bank and wirehouse distributions for the quarter.

For indexed life sales, 33 carriers in the market participated in the AnnuitySpecs.com’s Indexed Sales & Market Report, representing 100% of production.

Fourth quarter sales were $151.3 million, an increase of nearly 16% from the previous quarter and a reduction of 4.0% from the same period in 2008.

“A third of the companies in the indexed life market experienced greater than 50% growth since this period last year,” said Moore. “The IUL market is going to become increasingly competitive now that so many of these new entrants’ distributions are comfortable with the product.”

Aviva held its top position in indexed life, with a 22% market share. Pacific Life, National Life Group, Minnesota Life, and American General Companies completed the top five.

Pacific Life’s Indexed Accumulator III remained the best-selling indexed life product for the fifth consecutive quarter. Nearly 77% of sales utilized an annual point-to-point crediting method, and the average target premium paid was $7,596.

© 2010 RIJ Publishing. All rights reserved.

 

‘Saving More’ Trumps ‘Working Longer’

“I’ll postpone retirement” is the first thought that many people have when their retirement accounts drop in value. But emergency financial counseling can persuade them to decide to increase their saving rate instead.

That is one of the conclusions of a survey conducted by a team at the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College last summer. The finding was important, say the designer of the survey, because it shows that well-timed advice can produce more positive financial outcomes for many people.

Why is saving more preferable to retiring later? Because few people can or do work as long as they’d like, according to the paper that describes the survey, “Workers’ Response to the Crash: Save More, Work More?”

“The intent to work longer is potentially a powerful response to the loss of retirement wealth. But many workers retire earlier than planned. Increased saving is a more certain and immediate response to a large negative wealth shock,” researchers Steven A. Sass, Courtney Monk and Kelly Haverstick wrote.

This team asked people ages 45 to 59 about the impact of the financial crisis on their finances. Two-thirds had retirement accounts that lost value. Each expressed their way of coping with the loss. Later the researchers (in the guise of a “finance professor”) told some of the people: You could offset your loss by saving 11% more each year, retiring one year later, or living on 8% less in retirement.

Advertisement After this minor intervention, there was a definite shift away from inertia, as well as a shift from working longer to saving more.

The percentage who said they would do nothing to recover their investment losses fell (to 24% from 41%) while the percentage who said they would work longer fell (to 28% from 36%).

The segment who said they would save more and work longer rose (to 30% from 13%) and the percentage of those who said they would save more rose (to 18% from 10%). In sum, 48% said they would save more, either with or without working longer.  

The study supports the argument that retirement plan participants should receive counseling after a market crash so that they do not a) fail to respond at all to the crisis and b) that they do not simply delay pain or sacrifice into the future by making hard-to-keep resolutions to work longer.  

Counseling worked best on those who had succumbed to inertia. “A striking 60% reconsider[ed] their decision, with 24% saying they would increase their retirement age, 20% saying they would increase their savings, and 16% saying they would do both. This outcome suggests that credible information can substantially change both retirement and savings behavior.”

Not surprisingly, individual responses to the survey reflected personal circumstances to at least some extent. People who were more dependant on their investments for retirement security (as opposed to those with good pensions), those closer to retirement, and those with higher degrees of anxiety about their losses tended to respond more actively to the impact of the crisis on their finances.

The survey also showed:

A widespread rise in the expected age of retirement. About 40% expect to retire later than they had before the downturn with most of those who intend to work longer delaying retirement by four or more years.

Relatively little change in retirement saving. Two-thirds of respondents reported no change in how much they save for retirement in 401(k)s, IRAs, or other accounts.

A decline in spending. However, nearly 60% reported that they are spending less (which is equivalent to saving more if income is unchanged).  

Some reallocation of retirement savings. About 30% reported changing the allocation of assets in their accounts or contributions to these accounts, with 81% reallocating away from stocks.

A substantial minority did nothing. Forty-three percent did not intend to change their planned retirement age or savings rate. These households may have suffered little or no loss of retirement savings; may plan to only decrease consumption; may be too overwhelmed to take an active role in rectifying their financial situation; or may just be unaware of their options.

© 2010 RIJ Publishing. All rights reserved.

401(k) Balances Bounced Back in 2009: Fidelity

A new study by Fidelity Investments finds that the average balances of 401(k) retirement plans rebounded in 2009, recovering much of the value they lost in 2008, National Underwriter reported.

Average 401(k) account balances ended 2009 at $64,200, up 5.7% from the end of the third quarter and up 28% for the year, according to Boston-based Fidelity. Standard & Poor’s 500 index showed a total return of 26%. The average balances include employer and employee contributions as well as market appreciation.

The average deferral rate remained relatively flat for the year at about 8.2%, but the fourth quarter saw the continuation of a trend of more participants electing to increase their deferral rates than to decrease them, Fidelity said.

The company’s analysis of employed participants who had a Fidelity 401(k) account from 1999 to 2009 showed their account balance increased nearly 150% in the period, to $163,900 at the end of 2009 from $65,800 at the end of 1999.

The increase in balance was due to continued participant and employer contributions, dollar cost averaging and market returns, Fidelity says. These continuous participants had a median age of 51 years with a deferral rate of 10.4%, the analysis found.

In 2000, Fidelity found participants on average directed over 80% of their new contribution dollars into equities. By contrast, participants were contributing less than 70% to equities by the end of 2009. At the same time, the proportion of participants contributing 100% to equities dropped to 19% in 2009 from 47% percent in 2000.

© 2010 RIJ Publishing. All rights reserved.

 

Brokers Are More Than “Blackjack Dealers,” PA Regulators Say

The commissioners of the Pennsylvania Securities Commission (PSC) today warned that failure to require a higher “fiduciary standard” for stockbrokers would be a blow to investor confidence and slow down economic recovery.

“If Wall Street wants the freedom to engage in the development of new financial products it should shoulder the responsibility to protect investors from inappropriate risks and the best way to do that is to impose on brokers the same fiduciary standards we require of investment advisers,” the commissioners said. “Otherwise, we may as well treat brokers as croupiers and Blackjack dealers.”

PSC Chairman Bob Lam and Commissioners Steve Irwin and Tom Michlovic made the prediction in a letter to Pennsylvania’s two U.S. Senators in response to media reports that the Senate Banking Committee was backing off on efforts to hold stockbrokers to the same ethical standards set for investment advisers.

“What’s at stake here is consumer and investor confidence,” the commissioners said in their letter to Sen. Arlen Specter and Sen. Bob Casey Jr. “Congress acted quickly and effectively through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) to prevent the total collapse of t he nation’s economic systems. Rebuilding our economy—especially the retirement and investment portfolios of ordinary Americans—will require much more and it begins with appropriate and effective measures to protect individuals.”

The commissioners noted that other members of the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA), representing regional securities administrators in the United States, Canada and Mexico, shared their views.

© 2010 RIJ Publishing. All rights reserved.

In UK, BMW Is “Ultimate Pension Machine”

The largest longevity insurance deal seen yet by a pension fund has been completed by the UK pension fund of BMW, the German automaker, with Deutsche Bank unit Abbey Life and Paternoster, IPE.com reported.

BMW confirmed it has agreed to a customized longevity swap that will provide the BMW (UK) Operations Pension Scheme with a hedge for life expectancy risks. The sum protects nearly £3bn (€3.4bn, $4.6bn) of pension scheme liabilities related to approximately 60,000 pensioners and contingent benefits such as spouse’s pensions.

The announcement came a week after Hymans Robertson estimated the longevity swap market could reach £10bn (€11.3bn) in 2010. (See earlier IPE article: Longevity swap market to hit £10bn in 2010)

Abbey Life will insure the longevity risk of the scheme for the whole of life (until the last pensioner or their spouse dies) but has already reinsured part of the risk with a consortium of reinsurers including Hannover Re, Pacific Life Re and Partner Re. Abbey Life has also used the structuring expertise and longevity modeling techniques of Paternoster, which is also partly-owned by Deutsche Bank.

BMW was revealed to be considering its options for a longevity deal earlier this month, as part of a risk reduction strategy, and “chose to insure this risk in order to protect the sponsor against a financial risk in its UK pension scheme”. Latest figures from the 2007 actuarial valuation of the scheme showed the pension fund at that time had a deficit of £584m and a funding ratio of 87%.  

Martin Bird, principal and head of longevity & risk solutions at Hewitt Associates, the consultancy which advised scheme trustees on the transaction, said:

“Entering into a bespoke longevity hedge to mitigate against continued improvements in member life expectancy is a natural extension to the scheme’s current liability-matching investment strategy and is designed to enhance further the security of members’ benefit.”

The policy is a named life policy, which means rather than being referenced against an index, the transaction actually covers the longevity exposure of the members in the BMW scheme, so it is bespoke and customized in a manner similar to the Babcock longevity deals. The transaction is also fully collaterized, despite being written as an insurance-regulated policy.

Bird said the hedge has also been constructed to provide flexibility, which “has not been done before”, so the hedge can be realigned over time to adjust the specific benefit structure and better match the longevity risk of the scheme.

Nardeep Sangha, CEO of Abbey Life said: “In bringing this leading solution to BMW and its UK pension scheme, we have demonstrated our ability to combine our balance sheet strength and internal expertise with the specialist pensions and longevity know-how at Paternoster to bring about a landmark transaction. As this market develops, we are committed to providing innovative solutions to UK pension schemes.”

© 2010 RIJ Publishing. All rights reserved.

Prudential Financial Reports Turnaround in 2009

Prudential Financial, Inc. reported net income of its Financial Services Businesses of $3.411 billion ($7.63 per common share) for the year ended December 31, 2009, compared to a net loss of $1.140 billion ($2.53 per common share) for 2008.

After-tax adjusted operating income for the Financial Services Businesses was $2.481 billion ($5.58 per common share) for 2009, compared to $1.087 billion ($2.62 per Common share) for 2008.   

Pre-tax adjusted operating income for Financial Services Businesses reached $3.3 billion for year 2009, more than double the level of 2008. GAAP book value for Financial Services Businesses reaches $24.2 billion or $51.52 per common share, compared to $14.3 billion or $33.69 per common share a year earlier.

For the fourth quarter of 2009, net income for the Financial Services Businesses attributable to Prudential Financial, Inc. amounted to $1.788 billion ($3.79 per common share) compared to a net loss of $1.656 billion ($3.89 per common share) for the fourth quarter of 2008.

After-tax adjusted operating income for the fourth quarter of 2009 for the Financial Services Businesses amounted to $495 million ($1.07 per common share), compared to a loss, based on after-tax adjusted operating income, of $879 million ($2.04 per common share) for the fourth quarter of 2008.

“We completed over $4 billion of long-term debt and equity issues during the year, significantly adding to our financial strength and flexibility,” said Prudential chairman and CEO John Strangfeld.

“In December, we sold our stake in the Wachovia Securities joint venture for $4.5 billion of cash proceeds. With this transaction we realized a substantial return on our investment, which had an initial book value of $1.0 billion in 2003,” he added.

The Individual Annuities segment reported adjusted operating income of $88 million in the current quarter, compared to a loss of $1.04 billion in the year-ago quarter. Individual annuity gross sales for the fourth quarter were $4.8 billion, up from $2.2 billion a year ago; net sales were $3.2 billion, up from $434 million a year ago.

For the year, individual annuity gross sales were $16 billion, Full Service Retirement gross deposits and sales were $23 billion, International Insurance annualized new business premiums $1.4 billion, each at record-high levels.

The fourth quarter showed net pre-tax benefit of $30 million in Individual Annuities from reserve releases for guaranteed death and income benefits, reduced amortization of deferred policy acquisition and other costs, and mark-to-market of hedging positions and embedded derivatives.

The U.S. Retirement Solutions and Investment Management division reported adjusted operating income of $215 million for the fourth quarter of 2009, compared to a loss of $975 million in the year-ago quarter.

Full Service Retirement gross deposits and sales of $4.0 billion and net additions of $903 million, compared to gross deposits and sales of $6.5 billion and net additions of $2.7 billion a year ago. Individual Life annualized new business premiums of $91 million, compared to $86 million a year ago.

Current quarter results benefited $47 million from net reductions in reserves for guaranteed minimum death and income benefits and $32 million from a net reduction in amortization of deferred policy acquisition and other costs, reflecting an updated estimate of profitability for this business. These benefits to results were largely driven by increases in customer account values during the current quarter.

© 2010 RIJ Publishing. All rights reserved.

White House Tweaks Senate Health Care Bill

The Obama Administration added its own recommendations for health care legislation this week. The new proposal “reflects policies from the House-passed bill and the President’s priorities” and includes “a targeted set of changes” to the Senate-passed Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, according to a White House release.

Key changes to the Senate health care bill include:

  • Eliminating the Nebraska FMAP (Federal Medical Assistance Percentage) provision and providing significant additional Federal financing to all States for the expansion of Medicaid. The Nebraska provision gave special financial assistance to Nebraska, and was widely seen as a quid pro quo for Nebraska Sen. Ben Nelson’s vote in favor of the Senate bill.
  • Closing the Medicare prescription drug “donut hole” coverage gap. The so-called donut hole was a provision in the Bush drug plan that reduced the overall cost of the plan but dramatically increased the cost of prescriptions for people with drug expenses within a certain dollar range.
  • Strengthening the Senate bill’s provisions that make insurance affordable for individuals and families. These provisions would provide public subsidies for the purchase of private health insurance coverage and are intended to reduce the numbers of uninsured Americans, estimated at 31 million people.
  • Strengthening the provisions to fight fraud, waste, and abuse in Medicare and Medicaid. An estimated $60 billion of the $470 billion spent on Medicare last year was lost to waste, fraud or abuse.
  • Increasing the threshold for the excise tax on the premiums of the most expensive health plans from $23,000 for a family plan to $27,500 and starting it in 2018 for all plans. This is the “Cadillac plan” tax, a 40% assessment on high cost insurance plans.
  • Improving insurance protections for consumers and creating a new Health Insurance Rate Authority to provide Federal assistance and oversight to States in conducting reviews of unreasonable rate increases and other unfair practices of insurance plans.

Like the existing House bill, the White House said its proposal would:

  • Set up a new competitive health insurance market giving tens of millions of Americans the same insurance choices that members of Congress will have.
  • End discrimination against Americans with pre-existing conditions.
  • Reduce the federal budget deficit by $100 billion over the next ten years—and about $1 trillion over the second decade—by cutting government overspending and reining in waste, fraud and abuse.

© 2010 RIJ Publishing. All rights reserved.

A Regulatory Nudge Is Needed

Paul Volcker’s proposal that proprietary trading should be spun off from deposit-taking banks is a worthwhile step in the direction of stabilizing the financial services business.

However, when you consider that business in detail, it becomes clear that further breakups are necessary in order to remove the excessive risks from the U.S. economic system.

There are three problems with the current setup on Wall Street: systemic risk, rent seeking and conflicts of interest. The Volcker proposal addresses the systemic risk problem to a great extent, but does not do much about the other two. For a complete solution, we thus need to go further.

Systemic risk

When Treasury Secretary Larry Summers and former Senator Phil Gramm (R-Texas), among others, pushed through repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, they didn’t give proper thought to the dangers of institutions funding a traders’ casino with guaranteed deposits.

The introduction of Glass-Steagall in 1934 had been highly damaging to the economy, because it decapitalized the investment banks, killing off the capital markets for the remainder of the 1930s and playing a major role in prolonging the Great Depression.

Advertisement However, by 1999, the investment banks were more than adequately capitalized (provided they followed sound principles of risk management and leverage, which of course they increasingly didn’t). Thus, the rationale for allowing commercial banking and investment banking to be combined was shaky at best.

It should have caused further doubt that the trigger for Glass-Steagall repeal was the acquisition of the investment bank Salomon Brothers by Citigroup, itself a quagmire of conflicts of interest that had been bailed out from bankruptcy only eight years before.

However, restoring Glass-Steagall as it was would achieve nothing. After all, the two most serious failures of risk management in the 2008 crash were collateralized debt obligations, involving a mortgage bond market in which commercial banks’ securitization operations have always been active, and credit default swaps, a product in which commercial banks were intimately involved from the first.

Conventional underwriting of corporate debt and equity securities, the activity prohibited to commercial banks by Glass-Steagall, was not the problem, as it might have been had the crash occurred with the bursting of the 1999 dot-com bubble. The principal risks involved in finance today are those incurred by traders, but those proliferate in both types of banking.

It’s not clear how Volcker’s ban on proprietary trading in banks benefiting from deposit insurance would work. Every bank foreign exchange desk and money desk trades on the bank’s own account in almost every transaction it makes (relatively few transactions are pure brokerage between two counterparties.)

Thus, however simple the bank’s operations, it cannot avoid “proprietary trading.” Of course you can ban separate “prop trading” desks, but in a naughty world that would drive the proprietary traders to integrate themselves into the operations of the various products concerned, thus negating the effect of the legislation.

The other problem with the Volcker proposal is that even without separate proprietary trading operations, the banks are undertaking risks which they don’t manage properly. Wall Street risk management systems are based on assumptions of Gaussian randomness in markets that are demonstrably far from realistic.

In particular, Wall Street risk management systems understate the risk of several highly risky products such as collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps. This understatement is in the interest of bank management, which benefits from state bailouts when it all goes wrong. It is even more in the interest of traders, who by and large make the most money from trading the riskiest instruments, and hence welcome artificially large position limits for those instruments.

Since current Wall Street risk management methods are in the interest of those who work on Wall Street, they will not be changed except by regulatory means. Before their alteration they will, even without proprietary trading, leave the Wall Street behemoths in continual danger of explosion.

Rent-seeking

Rent-seeking is another current problem of Wall Street, not addressed by Volcker. This takes many forms, and has resulted from computerization and from the endless proliferation of derivative instruments.

Basically, Wall Street houses, by their substantial market share in trading businesses, acquire insider information about money flows, and then profit by trading on this information. Traders have always done this, of course, and there is no sensible way of making it illegal.

In addition, genuine “crony capitalism” insider information about future finances and future government actions is as available as it always has been, but with larger trading volumes and fewer inhibitions is more usable without technically contravening insider treading legislation.

Thus insider trading, almost all of it technically legal, has acquired an enormously magnified profit potential. This is the principal reason for Wall Street’s greater share of the economy; the genuine value added to third parties from “hedging” or “liquidity” is only a tiny fraction of the rents Wall Street can extract from these markets.

There is no complete solution to this problem, but the best palliative is a “Tobin tax,” a modest ad valorem transaction tax on each trade. By this means, the profitability of “high speed trading” would be eliminated and many of the other insider trading strategies would be reduced in scope and profitability, particularly if the tax were levied on the nominal principal amount of a derivative and not on its theoretical value.

This would in turn swing the power base within Wall Street away from traders and back towards bankers and corporate financiers, whose approach to life is more conducive to maximizing those houses’ genuine economic value added.

Conflicts of interest

The final problem in the Wall Street behemoths, that of conflicts of interest, requires no legislative solution, at least as far as the corporate customers are concerned, but only that the financing business remain adequately competitive.

With behemoths doing corporate financing transactions, any of their customers is faced with huge conflicts in dealing with them. Wall Street pretends to operate internal “Chinese walls” through which sensitive information does not penetrate, but to rely on those is to put yourself entirely under the protection of Wall Street’s ethical integrity, a security currently trading at a very substantial discount.

The solution to these conflicts of interest is “single capacity,” the system under which the City of London acted until the passage of the Financial Services Act of 1986, surely among the most misguided legislation in human history.

Under this system brokers, who sold securities, were kept separate from jobbers, who made markets in them. Both were separate from merchant bankers who arranged financings and carried out mergers and acquisition transactions. When an underwriting took place, the merchant bank arranged the transaction and the brokers sold the underwriting to insurance companies and other large investment institutions, who earned additional income by backstopping deals in this way.

“Proprietary trading” was undertaken by investment trusts, pools of money whose business was to maximize income for their investors, in a similar way to a U.S. hedge fund. As for banking, that was done by the merchant banks if complicated, but the high volume simple transactions were carried out by the clearing banks, home of the nation’s retail deposits but not known for their intellectual heavy lifting.

It worked beautifully, just as well as the modern system, indeed better. It cost far less, in terms of the wealth it extracted from the economy. It was much less risky. And there were few conflicts of interest; each participant in the business, having only one function and capability, was devoted to its own interest rather than torn between the interests of several participants in every transaction.

This system is to some extent returning anyway, with the increasing market share of “boutique” investment banks such as Greenhill & Co. and Evercore Partners, which at least have fewer conflicts of interest than the behemoths. However, a regulatory “nudge” or two would be no bad thing.

As I said, Volcker had a good idea, but he did not go nearly far enough.

© The Prudent Bear. A longer version of this article appeared at atimes.com.

 

The Exploitation of Sherry Pratt

Sherry Lynn Pratt, a quadriplegic 38-year-old African-American woman, was a bed-ridden patient in a Chicago nursing home when, in December 2007, her forsaken life became the only thing standing between a group of “investors” and some $9.1 million in annuity death benefits.

Pratt died destitute in February 2008 of complications from neglected decubitus ulcers, or bedsores. But not before she served as the unwitting pawn in what her family’s lawyers describe as a multi-state conspiracy that also targeted at least six of the nation’s largest insurers.

Like the widely-reported lawsuits filed against attorney Joseph Caramadre and others in Providence, RI, by Western Reserve Life and Transamerica Life, the lawsuits that are filed or about to be filed in Illinois on behalf of Sherry Pratt’s family also involve “stranger-originated annuity transactions,” or STATs.

Advertisement Interviews with or documents provided by the Pratt family’s attorneys, Robert Auler of Urbana, Ill., and Peter C. King of Columbus, Ind., claim that, through offers of what amounted to small finder’s fees, representatives of a Daniel Zeidman of Long Island, NY, and the Esther Zeidman estate, procured Sherry Pratt’s signature on several annuity contracts during the winter of 2007-2008.

Pratt was the named the contracts’ annuitant, on whose life expectancy future annuity payments would be calculated and on whose death, if prior to annuitization, a death benefit would be paid to a designated beneficiary.

Others acting for Zeidman were said to be Menachem (Mark) Berger of Patient Financial Services, Abraham Gottesman and Akiva Greenfield. They allegedly approached a Chicago woman named Debra Flowers in October 2007 and enlisted her help, for compensation, in finding terminally ill nursing home patients.

Through a relative of Ms. Pratt, Ms. Flowers obtained Ms. Pratt’s signature, Social Security number, and other personal information, and sent it to people and companies identified as Richard Horowitz and Mark Firestone of Management Brokers Insurance Company, Beverly Hills, Calif., as well as to Global Risk Management LLC, CZ Planning Group, U.S. Planning Group, AM Consulting Inc., Marc Cohen, Abraham Gottesman, Asher Greenfield and Akiva Greenfield.

In due course, Daniel Zeidman and the Esther Zeidman estate of Boca Raton, Fl., purchased a number of variable annuity contracts using what was purported to be Sherry Pratt’s signature.

According to attorneys Auler and King, Zeidman invested $975,000 in a MetLife annuity, $950,000 in a New York Life annuity, $2.95 million in an ING USA annuity, $1.9 million in a Sun Life annuity, $1.875 million in a Genworth Life annuity, and $494,000 in an annuity issued by The Hartford.

[Given deadline pressures, RIJ was unable to seek or obtain confirmation from those six companies or from the other parties named here but instead relied on documentation from attorneys Auler and King. As a rule, companies do not comment on pending litigation. Attempts by telephone and e-mail to contact Daniel Zeidman and his attorney were unsuccessful.]

In late 2009, relatives of Sherry Pratt became aware of the contracts and contacted the insurance companies involved. In January 2009, MetLife filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York, indicating that it rescinded Zeidman’s contract and asking the court to decide whether it should return the $975,000 premium to Sherry Pratt’s family or to Daniel Zeidman.

On behalf of the Pratt survivors, Auler has sued the Southshore Nursing and Rehabilitation Center of Chicago for neglect in the death of Ms. Pratt. He told RIJ that he believes that she “was allowed to die” prematurely of horrific and untreated bedsores for reasons not unconnected with the annuity contracts purchased in her name.

According to Auler, Pratt told a relative, “These people are trying to kill me,” in reference to the failure by nursing home staff to treat her skin ulcers.

Under a little-used Illinois statute protecting individuals from the improper exploitation of their identify, Auler and King say they intend to ask the courts to turn the $9.1 million in annuity premiums over to Sherry Pratt’s survivors, as recompense for the  misuse of her identity, and not to return it to Daniel Zeidman.

“Because Sherry Lynn Pratt or her estate is the only innocent or blameless party who has had no benefit whatsoever, and in equity, instead of refunding the money to any of the other parties, equity should direct it to the estate of Sherry Lynn Pratt,” wrote attorney Auler, “not only because she deserved it for the use of her last remaining thing of value, her name and persona, but to discourage this type of transaction in the future, in that perpetrators would stand to lose the funds they cynically ‘invested’ in harvesting the rapidly vanishing lives of dying and innocent patients.”

In late February 2009, the Zeidman Trust’s attorney, Gary Guzzi of the Florida law firm of Akkerman Senterfitt, filed a response to MetLife’s suit, asking that the $975,000 be returned to the Zeidmans.

© 2010 RIJ Publishing. All rights reserved.

Plan Sponsor Barriers to In-Plan Annuities

Plan Sponsor Barriers to
In-Plan Annuities
48% >>No barriers; not interested now
45% >>Wait to see how industry develops
28% >>Concern over fiduciary exposure
24% >>Employee usage too small to justify
23% >>Communication hurdles
17% >>Difficulty in selecting provider
14% >>Cost to set up and maintain
10% >>Potential operational difficulties
 7 % >>Accumulation focus, not income

Source: “Hot Topics in Retirement 2010,” Hewitt Associates. Based on survey of 160 employers.

Stellar 2008 Makes for Dismal 2009 in Bank Annuity Sales

In November, total annuity sales at banks dropped below the $3 billion mark for the first time since February 2007 and remained there through December, according to the Kehrer-LIMRA Monthly Bank Annuity Sales Survey.

“There have been only two times in the last five years where we have seen bank channel total annuity sales this low,” said Janet Cappelletti, associate research director at Kehrer-LIMRA.

Financial institutions sold $2.7 billion of fixed and variable annuities in November, a reduction of 23% month-to-month, and 37% year-over-year.  In December, banks sold just slightly more—$2.8 billion—or about half of the $5.4 billion in sales recorded in December of 2008. 

Total annuity sales were pulled lower by faltering fixed annuity sales, which trended downward nearly every month of 2009.

The Kehrer-LIMRA survey is based on a national sample of banks that have a minimum of $4 billion in assets. The participating institutions account for about one-third of all bank annuity sales.

Fixed Annuity Sales

Sales of fixed annuities through financial institutions fell below $2 billion in November 2009 for the first time since January of 2008. Banks sold $1.7 billion of fixed annuities in November, a 32% erosion from October and a 47% collapse from the previous November.

Fixed annuity sales through banks in November 2009 were 51% below where they started the year at $3.5 billion. In December, fixed annuity sales slipped an additional 6%, ending the year at $1.6 billion, 63% below the record high of $4.3 billion set in December of the previous year.

“Since the all-time high in December 2008, fixed annuity sales have declined consistently through 2009, and variable annuity sales have not stepped up to take their place as they normally would” said Scott Stathis, managing director of Kehrer-LIMRA. “Instead mutual funds sales, which are less profitable to banks, have ramped up.”

“Fixed annuities have been rate-challenged, and variable annuities have increased in cost while the value of their benefits has decreased. This makes for a very challenging annuity sales environment,” he added.

Fixed annuities continue to lose their appeal as providers pull back on interest rates. The average effective rate on five-year fixed annuities eroded by 45% since December of 2008, but five-year CD rates slipped comparatively less-34% in the same period.

According to the Kehrer-LIMRA Bank Fixed Annuity RateWatch, the spread between the yield on five-year CDs and the average effective yield offered by fixed annuities guaranteed for five years dropped from 111 basis points in December 2008 to 24 basis points in December 2009.

“Fixed annuity sales accounted for only about a quarter of packaged product sales at financial institutions in November 2009 compared to more than half the sales mix a year ago,” Cappelletti said. “The vanishing spread on the five year products between the effective yield on fixed annuities and CD rates represents diminished opportunities for bank investment programs.”

Variable Annuity Sales

Bank-sold variable annuities continued to tread water at $1.0 billion in November, just short of the $1.1 billion level they were flat for most of the year. After bottoming out in the beginning of the year at $0.7 billion, variable annuity sales had been running at $1.1 billion a month from March through September. 

In December, however, variable annuity production shot up 20% to $1.2 billion, back to the levels last seen in October of 2008.  Compared to January 2009’s record low sales, December was up 71% for the year, but improved only 9% from December of the previous year.

Banks sold $1.70 in fixed annuities for every dollar of variable annuities in November, and the ratio sunk to $1.33 to one in December.  These ratios are considerably lower than the January 2009 high of $5.00 to one, and much closer to figures from March of 2008 when the ratio was at $1.55 to one, after which fixed annuity sales began to pick up steam.

Mutual Fund Sales

Since August of 2009 mutual funds have consistently accounted for more than half of the bank sales mix. This had not been the case since June of 2008. Sales of mutual funds have more than doubled since January of 2009.

Bank mutual fund sales in November cooled after several increases in 2009, backing down 14% from a robust October.  In November, banks sold $4.4 billion in mutual funds, making a significant recovery from the prior November when mutual fund sales hit their low point at $2 billion.

In December, bank mutual fund sales rallied 15% to $5.1 billion to match October’s banner productivity.  Mutual fund sales at financial institutions closed the year 143% higher than the $2.1 billion they began at in January.

Mutual fund recovery outpaced variable annuities and accounted for 62% and 64% of packaged product sales at banks in November and December, respectively.  Mutual fund sales mix had not been that high since June of 2007.

© 2010 RIJ Publishing. All rights reserved.

Correction

In the February 10, 2010 issue of Retirement Income Journal, we erred in reporting that “When a husband in a retired couple (both at least age 62) dies, his widow’s Social Security benefit, if lower, rises to match his own.”

According to Steven Sass, director of Boston College’s Center for Financial Literacy and co-author of The Social Security Claiming Guide, the surviving spouse’s benefit doesn’t always match the benefit of the deceased spouse.

Under current regulations, he said, “The survivor benefit is reduced if the survivor claims the benefit before her Full Retirement Age, though she’s guaranteed 71.5% of her husband’s Full Retirement Age benefit.  If the survivor claims the benefit after her Full Retirement Age, she’s guaranteed at least 82.5% of her husband’s Full Retirement Age benefit.”

© 2010 RIJ Publishing. All rights reserved.

Penn Mutual Enriches Income Benefit Without Raising Fees

Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company announced that it is increasing the accumulation and withdrawal benefits in one of its variable annuity lifetime income guarantee benefit riders. 

The Horsham, Pa., company said its Growth and Income Advantage Benefit rider now has a 6% guaranteed accumulation rate for the withdrawal benefit base, up from 4%. The company also increased the rider’s maximum annual withdrawal percentage to 5%, up from 4%.

In addition, the company’s Purchasing Power Protector rider, which adjusts with changes in the U.S. Consumer Price Index, will now vary the withdrawal percentage based on the insured’s age at first withdrawal.

Annual withdrawals that begin before age 64½ are limited to 4% of the withdrawal base. Withdrawals that begin on or after that age can be 5% of the withdrawal base.  Current rider charges or other benefits currently offered under each rider will not change, the insurer said.

The changes “provide clients with improved accumulation potential and secure withdrawal rates to assure our products keep pace with our clients’ needs through every life stage,” said Ray Caucci, vice president, product management.

© 2010 RIJ Publishing. All rights reserved.

Few Advisors Confident of Own Business Strategy: Curian Capital

While two out of three financial advisors define their 2010 business mindset as one of “acceleration and growth,” only one in 100 feels his or her business strategy is sound, according to a Curian Capital LLC survey of more than 1,800 independent financial advisors associated with 150 broker-dealers.

The survey, conducted last November, is titled “2010 Outlook for Advisor Priorities.” Curian, a unit of Jackson National Life Insurance Company, provides a fee-based managed account platform for financial professionals, and also offers practice management, business development and educational support for advisors.

Among the findings:

  • 88% of advisors feel investor emotions impacted their ability to manage clients’ portfolios and led them to increase the frequency and duration of their client meetings.
  • Only 10% of respondents feel their business strategy is currently sound, while a third know their business model needs to change but are uncertain how.
  • Most respondents feel that marketing, cross-selling and business plan development are valuable forms of support that can help them achieve growth.
  • 78% of respondents have changed the way they interact with clients during the past year.
  • More than half of advisors report that their clients have modified their expectations of retirement lifestyle or plan to delay retirement.
  • More than half of respondents have adopted a more tactical approach to portfolio construction in response to client demand for more conservative investments and guaranteed income.
  • 56% have a strategic plan in place to grow their business.

“Most advisors responding to our survey indicate that their clients’ goals and priorities have changed dramatically since the downturn, said Chris Rosato, senior vice president of strategic development for Curian Capital.

“As a result, advisors have had to make a fundamental shift in their approach to portfolio construction, client interaction and practice management,” he added. “The advisors who recognize the need for change and seek out new solutions for meeting their clients’ needs will be the most successful in the coming year.”

Curian distributed its 2010 Advisor Outlook Survey to independent advisors via e-mail in November 2009. Results were collected via Zoomerang, and 150 broker-dealers are represented among the 1,804 respondents. 

© 2010 RIJ Publishing. All rights reserved.

AllianceBernstein Adds “Volatility Management” To Target-Date Funds

In early April 2010, AllianceBernstein will add a “Volatility Management” component to its Retirement Strategies target-date mutual funds. The new component is designed to reduce the market risk of the funds during periods of extreme volatility.

“This enhancement is the result of a multi-year firm-wide research effort, which created new tools we believe can be applied to ‘smooth the ride’ and improve retirement outcomes for defined contribution plan participants,” said Seth J. Masters, chief investment officer of blend strategies and defined contribution at AllianceBernstein.

AllianceBernstein said it would allocate up to 20% of its existing Retirement Strategies target-date funds into the new Volatility Management component, with the allocation varying by “vintage.”

The component will invest in a mix of equities and REITs in normal markets but will have the ability “to dynamically de-risk into bonds and cash when it’s appropriate” to reduce overall portfolio risk.

The Volatility Management component will replace a portion of the equities and REITs so the long-term strategic allocation does not change following the introduction of this component into the Retirement Strategies funds.

An institutional implementation of Volatility Management will be available in the second quarter of 2010 for use in customized target-date portfolios, including AllianceBernstein’s Customized Retirement Strategies service for large-market defined contribution plans.

The new approach “differs from traditional tactical asset allocation which focuses primarily on predicting asset-class returns and attempting to time the market to take advantage of short-term opportunities to enhance returns,” the company said in a release.

“Target-date funds naturally reduce the volatility in a portfolio by reducing the exposure to equities over time as an investor approaches and moves through retirement. With Volatility Management, we can now more explicitly manage risk in target-date portfolios,” says Thomas J. Fontaine, head of Defined Contribution at AllianceBernstein.

“We believe our new risk management tools will allow us to adjust portfolios during extreme market cycles such as the recent credit crunch, moderating short-term negative performance-but importantly, without sacrificing long-term return potential.”

© 2010 RIJ Publishing. All rights reserved.

Robin Hood or Just Robbin’?

While Western Reserve Life describes his client’s “stranger-originated annuity transactions” as fraud, attorney Robert Flanders, a Harvard Law graduate and former Rhode Island Supreme Court Justice, says that Joseph Caramadre merely took fair advantage of a tempting loophole in certain variable annuity contracts.

“There’s nothing new here,” Flanders told RIJ. “He’s been doing these kinds of investments for 15 years. In some cases he invested on his own account. Or he invested for others.” (See this week’s cover story, “In League with the Angel of Death.”)

In fact, he described his client’s actions as a form of rough justice, noting that companies like Western Reserve, a unit of Aegon NV, knowingly offer non-underwritten, generously-enhanced death benefits to maximize annuity sales to the rich and elderly.

And STATs don’t hurt the terminally ill people who serve as annuitants, he said. They or their families receive cash they could not otherwise have obtained. Caramadre placed local ads in Providence offering money to the terminally ill. More than 110 people answered the ads and received $2,000 each, Flanders said. Of those, 44 eventually signed annuity contracts.

Although the annuity purchases that Caramadre arranged overlapped in time with the financial crisis, and despite the fact that STATs can provide a form of investment insurance by guaranteeing premiums, the crisis had nothing to do with Caramadre’s activities, Flanders told RIJ. “It just so happens that there was a financial crisis. That created a situation where the insurance companies had to pony up. Once they had to make good on the guarantees, they were incentivized into claiming there was fraud.”

Advertisement “The thing to understand is that some insurance companies make a conscious decision not to include the kinds of restrictions that would prevent [STATs] to capture market share. Some insurers do require minimum holding periods, or insurable interests or relationships between the annuitant and beneficiary. But there are certain types of products issued by certain insurers where there are no such restrictions,” Flanders added.

Caramadre’s “service was to read through the fine print, to find the right products and steer his clients to the ones that permitted this,” he maintained.

“This is a business decision made by insurers to capture market share. If you put in restrictions such as requiring health tests, you shrink the market. It’s a conscious decision to capture premium. These products are marketed mostly to elderly retired people with short life expectancies. So there’s obviously some risk-taking going on by the issuers. So how can they cry crocodile tears?”

A few members of the public—at least in Providence, R.I., a 375-year-old city as famous for its history of organized crime activity as for prestigious Brown University and the Rhode Island School of Design—appear to agree with Flanders’ portrayal of Caramadre as a modern Robin Hood.

“This man aided the terminally ill people and their families, and took nothing from them,” someone wrote on WJAR-TV’s website after the Providence NBC affiliate broke the Caramadre story last fall. “Far from taking advantage of them, he helped them get money they otherwise had no access to.

“As for the insurance companies, he outsmarted them and took advantage of a loophole (assuming there was no forgery). As a financial planner, I am all too keenly aware of the sales process and features of annuity products which allow insurance companies to legally prey on less informed consumers. Kudos to someone who figured out how to beat them at their own game legally.”

Neither of these sources directed their comments to the issue of whether the licensed representatives who earned commissions on the sale of contracts were aware that the annuitants who were recruited by Caramadre and his associates at Estate Planning Services were terminally ill and that the contracts would exist for only a matter of days, weeks or months at the most.

As for annuity executives who are just now hearing about some of the details of the schemes, they seemed shocked both personally and professionally. “This is so wrong on so many levels, it’s hard to know where to begin,” one insurance executive told RIJ. “It’s harmful to the reputation of financial services. It’s preying on people at the worst possible time.”

He was stunned by the apparent failures of due diligence by the agents or representatives, the supervising broker-dealers, and the insurance companies. But he was most concerned about potential damage to the variable annuity business.

“This is almost like in blackjack, where the card counters can ruin the game for everyone if the casinos don’t throw them out. If professional arbitrageurs can play and prey on the elderly, it could mean the end of these products,” he said.

In a worst case scenario, he said, swindlers might conspire to finance the purchase of variable annuity living benefits by people in their mid-50s, for instance, and then arrange for the commencement of guaranteed lifetime withdrawals immediately after purchase. This type of pre-mediated adverse selection could wreck the financial engineering behind these products and make them impractical for insurers to offer without applying bulky restrictions or raising prices. 

© 2010 RIJ Publishing. All rights reserved.

The Future of Fixed Annuities: A 2020 Vision

The well-known indexed annuity expert, Jack Marrion, president of St. Louis-based Advantage Compendium Ltd., predicts that by 2020 the securities industry will exercise control over the annuity market in the U.S.

In a new report, “Fixed Annuity Distribution In 2020,” he forecasts that Boomer demand for lifetime income guarantees will strengthen, and that the securities industry will attach these benefits to investment vehicles with minimal insurer involvement.

“The securities world will be doing a lot more annuity business,” Marrion told RIJ. “The changes are going to be as big as we saw in the ‘80s.” Such predictions aren’t likely to make him popular, he said, but he believes they’re accurate.

Advertisement The report says Rule 151A (the contested SEC rule written in 2008 that reclassifies indexed annuities as securities), if enacted, will ruin the profitability of any insurance marketing organizations (MOs) that doesn’t own or is affiliated with a securities broker-dealer or advisory firm and therefore won’t be able to collect commissions from the sale of securities.

Three out of four insurance wholesalers don’t have such affiliations, Marrion said. Of the 51 MOs in his study, only six had or were forming their own securities operations. A handful of others, also listed in the study, already have links to securities firms.

The report says in part:

“The next decade for annuity distribution will be unlike any other,” the report says. “Commissions will be lower, regulatory supervision will be ramped up to levels that today’s typical annuity producer cannot imagine, marketing organizations will need to change or die, and the financial markets will continue to be volatile and difficult to forecast.

“And yet more fixed annuities will be purchased in the next ten years than ever before because the fixed annuity value proposition will find a receptive ear in the 57.7 million people that are currently between ages 55 and 75. Fixed annuities, through creative uses of living benefits, will finally be embraced by the financial community and be used to offer protection against the major uncertainties of retirement.

“Wall Street could become the main annuity store for consumers because they have the marketing power, the capital, and they can meet a financial behavioral need best expressed by realizing that we buy both insurance and lottery tickets. Today the ‘insurance need’ in a Wall Street portfolio is met by bonds, but could also be provided with a synthetic annuity attached to an investment.

“A few of the conclusions reached are that 1035 exchanges will significantly decline, securities regulators will essentially supervise the fixed annuity world, and that the largest distributors of fixed annuities in 2020 will be broker-dealers and advisory firms.”

Ten years from now, Marrion predicts:

  • Banks and wirehouses are likely to sell multi-year guaranteed rate annuities (MYGAs) during parts of interest cycles and at all times sell fixed annuities to protect against longevity risk or create an income foundation. Wall Street may create synthetic annuities to perform these functions rather than using off-the-shelf insurance company products.
  • 1035 Exchanges will have declined resulting in lower annuity sales in all distribution channels.
  • Today’s annuity marketing organizations will be rare in 2020 because securities regulators will supervise the fixed annuity world. MOs that offer B/D or RIA capabilities will benefit because they can offer agents someone that “gets them.”
  • MOs without securities connections will find a decreasing pool of annuity agents with which to work and greatly reduced overrides.
  • Private annuities will not be required in pension plans, despite the current buzz in DC. The use of annuities in retirement planning will grow because of government interest, however.
  • There will be a wide variety of fixed annuity guaranteed benefits that go beyond the current lifetime withdrawal riders and LTC/annuity combos.
  • Wirehouses, banks and advisory firms will be the biggest distributors of annuity products, but these annuities will be largely synthetic driven by the investment engine within.
  • Fixed annuity sales, whether traditional or synthetic, will have strongly increased and be many times greater than they were in 2010.
  • A growing number of jobs will be available in the annuity industry for suitability officers, broker/ dealer liaisons, marketing people with behavioral economics backgrounds, and product development specialists.

Advantage Compendium Ltd. provides research and consulting services to insurance companies and financial firms in a variety of annuity areas ranging from the behavioral economic reasons why consumers buy or don’t buy financial products, to carrier and marketing company future industry impact models, as well as providing executive management strategic planning for annuity carriers and distributors.

© 2010 RIJ Publishing. All rights reserved.

Where’s The Alpha?

More than twenty-five years have passed since I completed my CFP curriculum and what strikes me today is the “disconnect” between reality and what I learned in the classroom. What concerns me (and amuses me at times) is that an academic/reality gap persists.

In my youth I noticed a generation gap between my parents and me. It narrowed as time went on. But on the financial frontier, academics continue to create analytical solutions that rarely apply in the human world.

With my CFP I was armed with the tools to create financial plans that spanned my clients’ entire adult lives. I learned about managing debt, funding college educations and ultimately creating enough wealth for a comfortable retirement. And all with tax strategies and insurance safety nets built in.

As a new CFP, I decided to specialize in retirement income planning and have remained in that specialty ever since. With my newly acquired academic credential I was equipped to create elaborate spread sheets that illustrated a variety of monthly expenses and carefully adjusted them for inflation and taxes.

Advertisement I could create tailor-made portfolios consistent with the risk tolerances of my clients. I could analyze any money manager’s results and seek out funds that delivered positive “alpha”—without realizing that investment alpha was virtually impossible if I were compensated along the way. (If 80% of money managers don’t beat their index, then adding another point or so for me pretty much eliminates any “investment” alpha.)

When markets are dropping and portfolios are losing money, very few people are comforted by “alpha.” When the cashflow spreadsheet, so painstakingly detailed, is interrupted by a son who needs $25,000 because he lost his job, my Excel talents are of little use.

Of course we set aside an “emergency fund.” But we never thought we would need one for unexpected unemployment. We planned for our children’s weddings, but not for their divorces. We planned for our children to move out some day, but not to move back in.

Who would have imagined that Bruce’s ex-employer would stop paying for retiree health insurance? Under what circumstances could we have anticipated a pension plan going broke and benefits being reduced to the PBGC limits? Why didn’t I anticipate Sally’s premature death and Hal’s re-marriage to someone 20 years younger? How about Dan and Sarah’s weekend getaway that resulted in the purchase of an illiquid timeshare, or Jim’s aunt who died and left him her royalty income of $50,000 a year.

I find myself saying, or thinking:

This can’t be… It’s not what my spreadsheet projected… We weren’t supposed to need that mutual fund for another 10 years… Whoever thought interest rates would be so low… Your expenses don’t seem to be tracking the national inflation rate… You can’t pull your money out of the market; your risk tolerance answers said you could tolerate this kind of drop… I thought you understood that “guarantees” limit your upside potential… This product would have worked well if the market hadn’t gone up (or down)… Gee, the Monte Carlo analysis said this ROR had a 90% probability of success…

And on and on and on.

Yet every day I read another academic or analytical article on how “best” to provide enduring retirement income, on how to achieve that “exact” allocation of asset classes and “optimal” combination of income riders and model portfolios.

I just laugh to myself and ask, “What really is alpha?” Investopedia defines alpha as “the value that a portfolio manager adds to or subtracts from a fund’s return.” Unfortunately, Investopedia doesn’t add a footnote stating that this “alpha” was achieved in a parallel universe where human conditions do not exist.

Bottom line: There are no one-size-fits-all solutions. No product mix is best for everyone. There is no spreadsheet that can anticipate or project with perfect foresight. The most precise analysis becomes invalid the minute it leaves your office.

I don’t recommend that you stop reading and learning-the academics offer great comic relief. But the question, “Where is the alpha?” can be answered in two words: Review and Adapt. Every strategy you implement must be flexible and changeable. Most single-product strategies are neither.

Wake up, fellow advisors! The elusive “alpha” is you and your relationship with your client. It is your ability to problem-solve, to explain potential consequences and to advise on “life” decisions. R-squares, standard deviations, betas, and Monte Carlos make for fascinating debate, but they are relatively insignificant in the overall success of a retiree’s income strategy.

© 2010 Strategic Distribution Institute,LLC. Used by permission.